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PART I. EUROPEAN UNION LAW  
THE NEED FOR EU MINIMUM STANDARDS ON DETENTION 
 
Vincent Eechaudt, Jasmien Claeys, Tom Vander Beken 
1. INTRODUCTION 
More than 569 000 accused and convicted prisoners are held in prisons throughout the 
European Union. More than 90 000 of them are in pre-trial detention.1 Detention conditions are 
regulated at different levels, ranging from the constitutional law, to prison law and international 
conventions. On the European level, the protection of fundamental rights in Europe in general 
and in European prisons in particular should be guaranteed by both the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU). Relevant 
human rights provisions foreseen in both instruments include those prohibiting torture and 
other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment. Prison life must – as an 
absolute minimum – conform with the standards spelled out in both instruments.  
In practice, violations of the ECHR and CFREU provisions are not uncommon in detention 
settings. The ECtHR has held numerous times that poor detention conditions within EU 
Member States constitute a violation of the Convention rights.2 Monitoring bodies such as the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture equally emphasize that detention conditions 
continue to be problematic in many countries.3 The same goes for NGOs like Fair Trials 
International.4  In addition, academic research in several EU Member States reveals that 
detention conditions are such that they hinder a safe, humane and rehabilitation oriented 
detention.5  
Poor detention conditions are not only problematic in themselves since they constitute 
violations of fundamental rights, but they also compromise judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters within the European Union, hence the importance of EU-action on the matter. The EU 
has developed several instruments to enhance judicial cooperation in the last two decades, 
based on the principle of mutual recognition.  
Mutual recognition instruments rely on the intrinsic mutual trust between the various EU 
countries. The concept of mutual trust refers to the idea that all Member States intrinsically 
                                                             
1 Based on the latest Eurostat data, which shows the number of prisoners for 2016. Eurostat does not show the 
number of prisoners in Belgium and Scotland for 2016 (yet). See Eurostat, Prison capacity and number of 
persons held (crim_pris_cap), last updated on 10 January 2019, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.  
2 The ECtHR provides a summary of its most relevant case-law on detention conditions on its website. See 
European Court of Human Rights, Press Unit, Factsheet – Detention conditions and treatment of prisoners, 
January 2019, www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Detention_conditions_ENG.pdf.  
3 Annual reports and reports of visits to states parties are available online, at http://www.cpt.coe.int.  
4 Fair Trials International, A Measure of Last Resort? The practice of pre-trial detention decision making in the EU, 
2016, available at https://www.fairtrials.org/publication/measure-last-resort.  
5 Vermeulen, G., Van Kalmthout, A., Paterson, N., Knapen, M., Verbeke, P. & De Bondt, W., Cross-border 
execution of judgements involving deprivation of liberty in the EU. Overcoming legal and practical problems 
through flanking measures, Antwerp, Maklu, 2011; Vermeulen, G., Van Kalmthout, A., Paterson, N., Knapen, M., 
Verbeke, P. & De Bondt, W., Material detention conditions, execution of custodial sentences and prison transfer in 
the EU Member States, Antwerp, Maklu, 2011; Eeechaudt, V., Penitentiair tuchtrecht en internationale 
detentiestandaarden, naleving in België en Frankrijk, Antwerp, Maklu, 2017. 
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trust each other’s judicial system, thus including how pre-trial detention and custodial 
sentences are executed. The idea of mutual trust was deemed justified, since all Member 
States were to be equivalent to each other due to their shared commitment to the principles of 
freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.6 
In short, EU Member States have a shared basis of fundamental rights in their society, which 
justifies the principle of mutual recognition based on mutual trust. 
As of today, two mutual recognition instruments allow for prisoners to be confronted with prison 
conditions in another EU Member State: the European Arrest Warrant and the Framework 
Decision on the transfer of prisoners.7 Being increasingly used in the judicial cooperation 
between the Member States, it is clear that the execution of mutual recognition instruments 
may lead to violations of fundamental rights of pre-trial and convicted prisoners. This concern 
has not only been expressed by different scholars 8 , but is also supported by recent 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the joined cases Aranyosi-
Căldăraru, in which execution of the EAW was refused due to poor detention conditions in the 
issuing Member State.9 Violations of fundamental rights within the various countries of the 
European Union are thus an impediment to judicial cooperation between the Member 
States. 
The fact that the execution of a European Arrest Warrant can be synonymous to cooperation 
between Member States at the expense of the fundamental rights of the surrendered person 
has previously given rise to action on the side of the European Union. The past decade the EU 
has played a major role in strengthening the procedural rights of suspects and accused 
persons as Member States agreed that common minimum standards were necessary to 
facilitate the execution of mutual recognition instruments. Indeed, the lack of a common 
understanding of human rights standards across EU Member States hampers EU cooperation 
and reflects the need for an EU-wide understanding of prisoners’ fundamental rights. So, 
although individual EU Member States are responsible for their detention conditions, the 
European Union has convincing reasons to take a lead in this matter. This argument was 
equally brought forward at a recent Eurojust-meeting:  
“Despite different national approaches, the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment makes clear 
that the required threshold [for prison conditions] should be the European minimum 
standard. Therefore, a common understanding on this minimum standard is important. 
Despite an extensive number of judgements from the ECtHR, national authorities sometimes 
still struggle with a correct and uniform interpretation/application.”10 
Hereunder we will further clarify why the European Union is correct to be concerned about 
prison conditions. Firstly, we will explain why the current Council of Europe instruments are 
                                                             
6 Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters,  
PB C 12, 15 January 2001. 
7 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, OJ L 190, 18 July 2002 and Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 
27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters 
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in 
the European Union, OJ L 327, 5 December 2008. 
8 Sanger, A., “Force of circumstance: the European Arrest Warrant and human rights”, Democracy and Security 
2010, afl. 1, 17-51; Mitsilegas, V., “The symbiotic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in 
Europe's area of criminal justice”, New Journal of European Criminal Law 2015, afl. 4, 457-480. 
9 CJEU 5 April 2016, Joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru. 
10 Council of the European Union, The EAW and prison conditions. Outcome report of the College thematic 
discussion, Brussels, 16 May 2017, 2. 
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not adequate to ensure smooth EU cooperation. They were designed with another goal in 
mind, and cannot provide the necessary preconditions for EU mutual recognition instruments. 
An individual can indeed have recourse to the European Court of Human Rights to assert rights 
arising from the European Convention on Human Rights. However, this has not proved to be 
an effective means of ensuring that signatories comply with the Convention’s standards. We 
will shortly consider why (1). Subsequently, the evolution of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters within the European Union will be set out : from the establishment of one common 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice without internal borders (2), to declaring the principle 
of mutual recognition based on mutual trust as the cornerstone for judicial cooperation (3), and 
adopting several mutual recognition (MR) instruments (4). We will highlight the problems 
encountered in the execution of these MR-instruments. EU mutual recognition instruments 
related to imprisonment might not function properly if prison conditions in a Member State 
conflict with fundamental rights. Next, we will discuss the importance of the protection of 
fundamental rights for the proper functioning of European Union instruments (5) and the results 
of the Stockholm Programme, adopted hereto (6). The Post-Stockholm Programme (7) also 
refers to the need to establish of minimum procedural safeguards for suspected and accused 
persons in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union.  
All of this will underline the need to pay attention to prisoners’ rights on the EU-level. Moreover, 
it will explain why this is nothing more but the next logical step in the EU policy on judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
 
2. WHY THE PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE ECHR IS INSUFFICIENT 
In the following section we will explain why the protection foreseen by the Strasbourg system 
cannot guarantee the proper functioning of the EU mutual recognition instruments. 
The ECHR sets out fundamental rights for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings 
within Europe. Article 6 on the right to a fair trial and article 3 on the prohibition of torture are 
two of the most important provisions for the protection of human rights in criminal cases. 
Violations of the ECHR-rights are dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights. In 
practice, the Strasbourg Court is not always able to adequately enforce ECHR rights in the 
domestic criminal justice systems of the Member States.11 For instance, Member States are 
obliged to effectively protect the rights of their citizens, yet violations of article 6 occur in all EU 
Member States as has been demonstrated by ECtHR case law against all of them.  
The Court allows that Member States have a margin of appreciation when transposing ECHR 
standards to national legislation. This means that there is no standard implementation of the 
Convention, resulting in a different implementation of the ECHR-rights in each Member State. 
The European Commission acknowledges this: ‘despite the fact that the law and criminal 
procedures of all Member States are subject to the standards of the European Court of Human 
Rights, there are often some doubts about standards being similar across the EU’.12 Moreover, 
a 2009 study shows the worrying discrepancy between the ECHR-obligations and the domestic 
                                                             
11 Spronken, T., “Effective defence. The letter of rights and the Salduz-directive” in Vermeulen, G. (ed.), Defence 
rights. International and European developments, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 82. 
12 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 2007 of 
the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States, SEC(2011) 430, 11 April 2011. 
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legislation of some Member States as well as its implementation in practice. Certain 
fundamental rights, including basic aspects of a fair trial in the ECHR such as the right to 
remain silent, to have access to the file and to call and/or examine witnesses or experts, were 
not provided for in EU Member States’ legislation. Nor was the implementation of ECHR-
standards in practice in line with what the ECtHR required.13  
The Strasbourg Court equally deals with a considerable caseload and repetitive cases. As a 
result of the backlog, it can take years before the Court reaches a final decision. Repetitive 
cases refer to cases on matters which have been dealt with by the Court in previous cases but 
which remain problematic because the concerned Member State fails to take the necessary 
action to improve or adjust the situation.14 This shows that judgments sometimes fail to bring 
systematic change in a country’s practice.15 Since more than a decade the ECtHR has adopted 
‘pilot judgments’ to force Member States to make structural improvements when the Court 
identifies systemic problems in a Member State.16 The Member State receives clear indications 
of the type of remedial measures needed to resolve the problem and are closely supervised 
by the Court during the process.17 Despite the pilot judgments and while the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR shows general lines of thought, decisions of the Court are inextricably linked with 
the specific circumstances of the case. This makes it sometimes challenging to deduce general 
rules from its case-law. As a result, whether a Strasbourg judgment will have actual 
consequences for the national legal system depends to a large extent on how national 
authorities interpret the judgement as they have a substantial margin of appreciation in this 
respect.18  
The Strasbourg system is also characterised by some hurdles for individuals taking recourse 
to the European Court of Human Rights. First of all, applying to the ECtHR can only be done 
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, which means that the potential applicant 
has to take his case as far as the appeal system of his country allows. The process thus take 
time and requires financial resources as procedures usually take years and the applicant might 
face substantial lawyers’ fees and additional costs.19 
In conclusion, although the ECtHR has been successful in setting general minimum standards 
on fundamental rights, the effectiveness of the ECtHR is still faces certain challenges. As such, 
fundamental rights in detention are not protected sufficiently in practically all European 
countries.20 The European Commission similarly observed, in its report on the functioning of 
the EAW, that: “While an individual can have recourse to the European Court of Human Rights 
to assert rights arising from the European Convention on Human Rights (…) this has not 
                                                             
13 Spronken, T., Vermeulen, G., de Vocht, D., van Puyenbroeck, L., EU Procedural Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings, Antwerp, Maklu, 2009. 
14 Spronken, T., “Effective defence. The letter of rights and the Salduz-directive” in Vermeulen, G. (ed.), Defence 
rights. International and European developments, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 82-83. 
15 European Court of Human Rights, Solemn hearing of the European Court of Human Rights on the occasion of 
the opening of the judicial year Friday 27 January 2012, Address by Sir Nicolas Bratza President of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 4. 
16 Rule 61 Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights. 
17 See European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet – Pilot judgments, January 2019. 
18 Spronken, T., “Effective defence. The letter of rights and the Salduz-directive” in Vermeulen, G. (ed.), Defence 
rights. International and European developments, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 83. 
19 Morgan, 2012, p.76 
20 Spronken, T., “Effective defence. The letter of rights and the Salduz-directive” in Vermeulen, G. (ed.), Defence 
rights. International and European developments, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 82. 
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proved to be an effective means of ensuring that signatories comply with the Convention’s 
standards.”21 
 
3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU-
CONTEXT 
Given its initial economic objectives, the European Union originally had no ambitions in the 
field of fundamental rights protection and was not, or rarely, active in the area of criminal 
procedural law.22 However, certain historical developments made the European Union gear its 
attention to fundamental rights protection as a necessary next step to ensure further judicial 
cooperation between the EU Member States. This evolution has been the most pronounced 
when it comes to fundamental rights in criminal proceedings, but, as will be argued further, 
should equally be clear in the area of imprisonment. 
On 14 June 1985, France, Germany and the three Benelux-countries signed the Schengen 
Agreement, agreeing to gradually abolish the internal border controls for persons. This 
agreement meant the creation of an area allowing free movement across borders between the 
five countries, the so-called Schengen Area. The Schengen Implementation Convention to 
implement the Schengen Agreement was subsequently signed on 19 June 1990. Even though 
the initial five Schengen Parties were also Member States of the then European Economic 
Community (EEC), the Schengen acquis was originally developed independently from the 
EEC.23 However, the Schengen acquis was completely integrated into the institutional and 
legal framework of the European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 
1997 and adopted in 1999. The abolition of border controls aimed at facilitating the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and captial but at the same time facilitated cross-border 
crime. Thus, judicial cooperation between the Member States had become more crucial than 
ever before. Hence, the Amsterdam Treaty further developed the European Union’s 
competences in the field of judicial cooperation and introduced the concept of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). This notion referred to the European Union not only 
as an area in which the free movement of persons was simplified, but also as an area where 
different police and judicial authorities could cooperate effectively. Cooperation in controls at 
the external borders, asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil as well as in criminal 
matters and police operation had to shape this Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.24  
In the meantime however, the Council of Europe (CoE) had already taken several important 
measures to improve criminal cross-border cooperation. Cooperation in criminal matters 
traditionally covered six domains, all of which were tackled by the CoE: extradition, mutual 
legal assistance, transfer of prisoners, enforcement of sentences, transfer of proceedings and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime. The CoE adopted conventions, of which four were 
universally ratified by EU Member States: the ones on extradition, mutual assistance, transfer 
                                                             
21 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation since 2007 of 
the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States, COM(2011) 175 final, 11 April 2011, 6. 
22 Spronken, T., “Effective defence. The letter of rights and the Salduz-directive” in Vermeulen, G. (ed.), Defence 
rights. International and European developments, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 85. 
23 Vermeulen, G. & De Bondt, W., EU Justice and Home Affairs: institutional and policy development, Antwerp, 
Maklu, 2014, 15. 
24 Ibid., 36. 
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of prisoners and the confiscation of proceeds of crime.25 Two of them, however, proved less 
popular. The treaties on the enforcement of sentences and transfer of proceedings attracted 
only a few ratifications from EU Member States.26 The European Union wanted to become 
involved in criminal cooperation despite the extensive activity of the Council of Europe for two 
reason. The EU wanted either to supplement widely ratified Council of Europe Conventions, 
for instance by reducing the number of exceptions to the rules, or to find alternative routes to 
achieve the same ends where the Council of Europe measures had not attracted many 
ratifications.27  
To this end, the EU Member States agreed upon several Conventions, amongst others relating 
to the transfer of sentenced persons, the transfer of criminal proceedings and the validity of 
criminal judgments. Few of these conventions, however, generated any effect since the 
Member States were reluctant to ratify them, exactly as was the case with the Council of 
Europe conventions. 28  The procedures in place were still deemed too restrictive and 
excessively complicated. Moreover, the limited ratification of these conventions demonstrated 
a lack of the indispensable mutual trust between the EU Member States, necessary for a 
smoother cooperation with fewer formalities. 
Bearing in mind the complicated and restrictive procedures, the European Council decided to 
facilitate cooperation between the judicial authorities of the different Member States.29 To this 
end, the European Council introduced the concept of mutual recognition as the new 
cornerstone to judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This decision was taken at the 
European Council of Tampere of 1999, the first summit entirely devoted to Justice and Home 
Affairs.30  
The principle of mutual recognition differs significantly from traditional cooperation between 
Member States. Originally, assistance in criminal matters had to be requested, whereas mutual 
recognition requires States to execute the decision taken by the issuing State. This results in 
the executing State losing some of its sovereign power in the enforcement of criminal decisions 
on its territory. However, depending on the instrument involved, the executing State still retains 
some power to refuse to implement the issuing State’s decision into an act within its own legal 
system.31 
The principle of mutual recognition was not an entirely new concept when it came to 
cooperation between EU Member States. The principle was already applied in the economic 
sphere with the establishment of the EU internal market. Mutual recognition meant for instance 
that if one Member State deemed a product safe for its citizens, other Member States would 
accept this decision and thus consider the product safe for their own citizens too. Mutual 
                                                             
25 European Convention of 13 December 1957 on Extradition, ETS 24; European Convention of 20 April 1959 on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS 30 ; Convention of 21 March 1983 on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons, ETS 112; Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, 
ETS 141. 
26 European Convention of 28 May 1970 on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, ETS 70; European 
Convention of 15 May 1972 on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, ETS 73. 
27 Peers, S., "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?", Common 
Market Law Review 2004, afl. 41, 6-7. 
28 Ibid., 7. 
29 Vermeulen, G. & De Bondt, W., EU Justice and Home Affairs: institutional and policy development, Antwerp, 
Maklu, 2014, 96. 
30 Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency conclusions. 
31 Peers, S., "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?", Common 
Market Law Review 2004, afl. 41, 10 
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recognition allowed Member States to avoid the difficulties with having different legal systems 
within one economic area and avoiding the hurdles linked with harmonising the national 
contingencies when marketing goods throughout the entire European Union. Wanting to 
overcome the difficulties related to the differences between national criminal law systems too, 
the European Union decided at the Summit of Tampere to extend the principle of mutual 
recognition to criminal matters.  
The Tampere Conclusions were translated to practical actions in 2000, prioritising 24 specific 
mutual recognition measures.32 These measures aimed at enhancing the free movement of 
criminal investigations, prosecutions and sentences within the European Union.33 A twofold 
objective was expressed: “Mutual recognition is designed to strengthen cooperation between 
Member States but also to enhance the protection of individual rights.”34 Nonetheless, attention 
was directly mainly at strengthening cooperation while the protection of individual rights was 
rather neglected.  
Although the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition is an extension from its 
application in the internal market, there is an important difference. The European Council 
assumed that for the application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters, the 
underlying law need not be comparable. The application of the principle in the internal market, 
however, usually requires either at least some basic comparability of underlying national laws, 
or the adoption of EC legislation to ensure that those national laws are sufficiently 
comparable.35 Mutual recognition in criminal matters was a simplified version to ensure that 
judicial decisions taken in one Member State would indeed be recognized by every other 
Member State as if it was their own decision. Member States were expected to execute each 
other’s judgements without feeling any need for further requirements or adaptation checks 
against their own procedural standards. So, mutual recognition was to be considered 
recognition without any imposed formalities.36 For instruments based on mutual recognition 
to work, mutual trust between the ratifying Member States is thus a crucial prerequisite.37 This 
trust is grounded, in particular, on Member States’ shared commitment to the principles of 
freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.38  
 
4. DIFFICULTIES FACED BY MR INSTRUMENTS: THE CASE OF THE EAW 
The execution of the Programme of Measures to implement the principle of mutual 
recognition of decisions in criminal matters dominated the Justice and Home Affairs’ 
agenda of the European Union for the following years. It led to the extension of the EU acquis 
                                                             
32 Programme of measures of 30 November 2000 to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15 January 2001. 
33 Peers, S., "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?", Common 
Market Law Review 2004, afl. 41, 5-36. 
34 Programme of measures of 30 November 2000 to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15 January 2001. 
35 Peers, S., "Mutual recognition and criminal law in the European Union: has the Council got it wrong?", Common 
Market Law Review 2004, afl. 41, 3. 
36 Vermeulen, G. & De Bondt, W., EU Justice and Home Affairs: institutional and policy development, Antwerp, 
Maklu, 2014, 101. 
37 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Mutual Recognition of Final 
Decisions in Criminal Matters. COM(2000) 495, 26 July 2000. 
38 Programme of measures of 30 November 2000 to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12, 15 January 2001, 10-22. 
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by adopting several mutual recognition instruments, of which the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW) is arguably the most well-known.39 The instrument provided a simplified and more 
flexible surrender of suspected and sentenced persons in criminal matters. It replaced all 
previous extradition procedures between EU Member States.40  
Judging by the numbers, the instrument is an operational success. Data are not available for 
all EU Member States, but recent figures show that at least 6518 people surrendered on the 
basis of an EAW in 2015.41 Data also show that the total number of executed European Arrest 
Warrants show a positive trend.42  
The Framework Decision on the EAW exhaustively lists the refusal grounds for mandatory and 
optional non-execution of the European arrest warrant. No reference is made to violations of 
fundamental rights as an explicit refusal ground for the execution of an EAW. This can be 
explained by referring to the assumed mutual trust Member States had in each other, which, 
after all, justified the adoption of mutual recognition instruments. In other words, EU Member 
States were assumed to respect fundamental rights and violations of these rights were thus 
not taken into account.43 The preamble of the EAW Framework Decision stresses the basis for 
mutual recognition by explicitly recalling that the EAW “is based on a high level of confidence 
between Member States”. 44  Therefore, the execution of an EAW can be postponed or 
cancelled “only in the event of a serious and persistent breach” of the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, by one 
of the Member States.45 
In practice, the fine line between mutual recognition and the obligation to respect fundamental 
rights, raised multiple issues when executing EAW’s. The lack of judicial control, the 
abolishment of several safeguards and an excessive reliance on mutual trust entailed the risk 
of human rights violations. Later on, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
addressed the balance between mutual recognition and respect for fundamental rights on 
several occasions, revealing a gap between the expected and the actual mutual trust between 
the EU Member States. 46 In the Radu case, the Mellloni case and the Lanigan case, the CJEU 
ruled on the right to be heard, respectively the right to a fair trial in the context of in absentia 
judgments and the right to liberty.47 The main question always being: when does the protection 
of fundamental rights require a judicial authority to refuse mutual recognition, and to execute 
an EAW in particular?48 
                                                             
39 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, OJ L190, 18 July 2002. 
40 Böse, M., “Human Rights Violations and Mutual Trust: Recent Case Law on the European Arrest Warrant” in: 
Ruggeri, S., (ed.), Human Rights in European Criminal Law, Cham, Springer, 2015. 
41 Commission Staff Working Document. Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical 
operation of the European arrest warrant - Year 2015, SWD(2017) 320, 28 September 2017, 5. 
42 Ibid., annex III. 
43 Article 1(3) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L190, 18 July 2002. 
44 Ibid., preamble, 10. 
45 Ibid., preamble, 10. 
46 For a short overview, see Eurojust, Case Law by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the European 
Arrest Warrant, October 2018, 69 p. 
47 CJEU 29 January 2013, case C-396/11, Radu; CJEU 26 February 2013, case C-399/11, Melloni; CJEU 16 July 
2015, Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan. 
48 Tinsley, A., “The Reference in Case C-396/11 Radu: When does the Protection of Fundamental Rights Require 
Non-Execution of a European Arrest Warrant?”, European Criminal Law Review, afl. 3, 2012, 338-352. 
11 
 
The case of Radu was the first major case in this context. Ciprian Vasile Radu was suspected 
of aggravated robbery in Germany. Therefore, Germany issued four European Arrest Warrants 
in 2007 and 2008, on the basis of which he was subsequently arrested in Romania. However, 
Mr. Radu did not consent to his surrender and he raised several objections in the surrender 
proceedings against the execution of the EAWs. He claimed in particular that the executing 
state, Romania, had to ascertain that the issuing state, Germany, observes the fundamental 
rights laid down by the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
The executing authorities would be entitled to refuse execution of the EAW if this was not the 
case. It was the first time that the CJEU was asked in such a direct manner by a national court 
whether mutual recognition could be refused on fundamental rights grounds.49 Mr. Radu 
referred quite generally to the rights to a fair trial, to the presumption of innocence and to 
liberty. He did however not further specify the alleged violations of these three rights. In fact, 
he only raised one point, stating that “he had not been given the opportunity to hire a lawyer 
and to present his defense before the German authorities had issued the European Arrest 
Warrants”. 50 
In its judgment, the Court pointed out the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition are 
essential for the AFSJ: “An obligation for the issuing judicial authorities to hear the requested 
person before a European arrest warrant is issued would inevitably lead to the failure of the 
very system of surrender provided for by Framework Decision 2002/584 and, consequently, 
prevent the achievement of the area of freedom, security and justice, in so far as such an arrest 
warrant must have a certain element of surprise, in particular in order to stop the person 
concerned from taking flight.”51 The Court thus ruled that fundamental rights obligations do not 
require the judicial authority of a Member State to refuse execution of an EAW on the ground 
that the requested person was not heard by the issuing judicial authorities before that warrant 
was issued. It further added that “in any event, the European legislature has ensured that the 
right to be heard will be observed in the executing Member State in such a way as not to 
compromise the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system”.52 The Court placed 
effectiveness considerations at the forefront of its reasoning in this case. Consequently, it 
answered the question whether mutual recognition could be refused on fundamental rights 
grounds in the negative. 53 Indeed, fundamental rights had to be interpreted “in such a way as 
not to compromise the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system”.54  
On 5 April 2016, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled differently in the 
joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru 55 . In the Case of Aranyosi, Hungarian judicial 
authorities issued two European arrest warrants with respect to a Hungarian national, Mr. 
Aranyosi. He was suspected of having committed two offences of forced entry and theft in 
Hungary. In this case, the EAWs were issued for the purpose of criminal prosecution. In the 
case of Căldăraru, Romanian judicial authorities issued an EAW with respect to Mr. Căldăraru 
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who was sentenced to one year and eight months imprisonment for driving without a driving 
license. In this case, surrender was requested for the purpose of executing the sentence in 
Romania.  
Since the two men had been located in Germany, the German authorities were to execute the 
warrants. The German judiciary, however, found that the detention conditions in Hungarian 
and Romanian prisons might be of such a nature that they violated fundamental rights, in 
particular the provisions in the ECHR (art. 3) and the CFREU (art. 4) prohibiting inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The ECtHR ruled in 2014 and 2015 that Romania as well 
as Hungary had violated the ECHR as their prisons were overcrowded.56 Moreover, reports 
issued by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture were very critical of the prison 
conditions in both countries. The extradition would thus potentially lead to the imprisonment of 
Mr. Aranyosi and Mr. Căldăraru in conditions violating fundamental rights. Therefore, the 
German court referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling to 
ascertain whether execution of EAWs can or must be refused when there are strong indications 
that the detention conditions in the issuing state infringe fundamental rights of the persons 
concerned.  
The CJEU ruled that that execution of an EAW must be postponed, and ultimately refused, if 
the person concerned would be at risk of inhumane or degrading treatment due to the detention 
conditions he or she would be subject to if surrendered to the issuing Member State. The Court 
thus recognized for the first time that the risk of fundamental rights violations were a refusal 
ground for the execution of an EAW. By doing so, the CJEU clarified that mutual trust is not 
unconditional and that Member States must assess respect for human rights prior to 
surrender following an EAW.57 The CJEU gave some guidance as to the kind of assessment 
that national authorities are required to make if serious concerns regarding prison conditions 
are being raised: “Framework Decision 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, must be interpreted as meaning that, where 
there is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence with respect to detention 
conditions in the issuing Member State that demonstrates that there are deficiencies, which 
may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may 
affect certain places of detention, the executing judicial authority must determine, 
specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual 
concerned by a European arrest warrant, issued for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence, will be exposed, because of the conditions 
for his detention in the issuing Member State, to a real risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in the event of his surrender to that Member State.”58 In case of objective, 
reliable, specific and properly updated evidence of detention conditions that violate 
fundamental rights, the executing state is thus obliged to ascertain the risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment in the event of surrender of the person. In case of a real risk “the executing 
judicial authority must request that supplementary information be provided by the issuing 
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judicial authority”. The former may seek the assistance of the central authorities of the issuing 
State, which “must send that information within the time limit specified in the request”.59 
Subsequently, “the executing judicial authority must postpone its decision on the surrender of 
the individual concerned until it obtains the supplementary information that allows it to discount 
the existence of such a risk”. 60 
The Court judgment in the joined case Aranyosi-Căldăraru acknowledged that detention 
conditions are a decisive element in the application of the principle of mutual recognition of 
judgments in the European Union Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This judgment has 
to be considered ground-breaking since it is the first in which the CJEU acknowledges that 
protection of fundamental rights limits the principles of mutual trust and recognition in judicial 
cooperation. The fact that surrender following a European Arrest Warrant has been actually 
refused by the CJEU due to a violation of fundamental rights has made it painfully clear that 
the Court acknowledges that the lack of mutual trust in the judicial cooperation between 
Member States is well-founded. Thus, human rights violations cannot be ignored when 
deciding upon the execution of a European Arrest Warrant. The principle of mutual 
recognition does not relieve the executing state from its obligation to respect 
fundamental rights.61 Accordingly, inadequate detention conditions in Member States can 
seriously hamper judicial cooperation using mutual recognition instruments based on mutual 
trust.  
 
5. ATTENTION FOR PROCEDURAL RIGHTS  
The refusal to execute European Arrest Warrants and other mutual recognition instruments, 
coupled with CJEU case law, showed that the European Union could not blindly assume 
mutual trust. After all, mutual recognition relies on mutual trust and confidence, and can 
therefore be seriously hindered by divergent interpretations of and respect for fundamental 
rights. The awareness grew that the current discrepancies in levels of procedural safeguards 
between Member States could seriously affect the realisation of ‘an area of freedom, security 
and justice’.62 However, the focus was primarily laid on introducing minimum standards related 
to the procedural rights of suspect and accused persons and not on detention conditions. 
Nevertheless, rather than expanding the EU acquis with mutual recognition instruments, the 
EU decided to adopt minimum standards throughout the entire EU, thus providing a real basis 
for the until then presumed mutual trust between the Member States. 
5.1 A FALSE START 
The Commission highlighted the importance of developing procedural safeguards for suspects 
and defendants in criminal proceedings on the EU level in a Green Paper of 2003.63 Mutual 
trust between the EU Member States had to be enhanced by harmonising the application of 
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existing ECHR standards at the EU level.64  The minimum threshold regarding suspects’ 
procedural rights in the EU are after all set by the European Convention on Human Rights, a 
treaty to which all EU Member States are party. Despite this, divergent application of the ECHR 
in the various Member States has hindered the reliance on mutual trust.65 The main role for 
the European Union according to the Green Paper lies thus not in setting standards but in 
developing practical instruments for enhancing the visibility and the efficiency of the operation 
of those standards at the EU level.66  
The European Commission attempted to guarantee certain procedural rights on the EU level 
by presenting a proposal for a Framework Decision on procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings throughout the EU in 2004.67 The explanatory memorandum to the proposal 
reads: “If common minimum standards are applied to basic procedural safeguards 
throughout the EU, this will lead to increased confidence in the criminal justice systems of all 
the member states which in turn will lead to more efficient judicial cooperation in a climate of 
mutual trust”. The 2004 proposal thus did not envisage the creation of new rights nor the 
monitoring of compliance with the rights resulting from the ECHR, but aimed at ensuring a 
reasonable level of protection for suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings in 
order to comply with the principle of mutual recognition68. This goal underlines the fact 
that the EU recognized that mutual trust still had to be built, although several mutual recognition 
instruments had already been adopted relying on the presumed mutual trust between the 
Member States.  
The point of view expressed in the 2004 proposal was adopted in the Hague Programme, 
stating that “the further realisation of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation implies the development of equivalent standards for procedural rights in criminal 
proceeding, based on the studies of the existing level of safeguards in Member States and 
with due respect for their legal traditions”. Nevertheless, no political agreement could be 
reached on the matter and concrete measures failed to be adopted. One of the main arguments 
of the opposing Member States was that they doubted the added value of the 2004 proposal 
in relation to the ECHR since they were convinced that the latter provided adequate protection 
for the rights of suspects and accused persons in the EU. Additionally, the lack of legal basis 
in the EU Treaties for such an initiative was put forward. Some Member States claimed that 
the EU did not have the competence to deal with the issue of procedural rights.69 The work on 
establishing common minimum standards in order to guarantee procedural rights was 
eventually abandoned in 2007.70 
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5.2 CHANGING EU COMPETENCES UNDER THE LISBON TREATY 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides a stronger basis for the protection of rights of suspected and 
accused persons in criminal proceedings.71 Amongst others, the Lisbon Treaty introduced new 
working structures, not only significantly simplifying the decision making process in the field of 
criminal law, but also strengthening the supervision of the Court of Justice in the area of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Framework decisions were replaced with directives as main 
legislative instrument and majority voting replaced unanimity voting when adopting legislative 
proposals. The latter gave a new impetus to negotiations for new EU minimum standards. A 
directive is also a more stringent legal tool than a framework decision, since they generate 
direct effect, that is to say that they must be strictly complied with when the provisions are 
described unconditionally and are sufficiently precise and clear.72 It is thus clear that the Lisbon 
Treaty strengthened the legislative powers of the EU. As a result it has become easier, both in 
the preliminary negotiation process and in the enforcement of compliance, for the EU to 
guarantee the protection of procedural rights via minimum rules.  
The provisions in the Lisbon Treaty with regards to the area of judicial cooperation have 
changed the context in which the European Arrest Warrant and other mutual recognition 
instruments operate. The Lisbon Treaty finally provides – almost a decade after the declaration 
at the Summit of Tampere – a treaty-basis for mutual recognition as the cornerstone for judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 73  Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty clarifies the until then 
ambiguous relationship between approximation of national criminal law and mutual 
recognition. Thus, mutual recognition as well as approximation are both fundamental for 
judicial cooperation. Approximation is to be seen as a means to guarantee the proper 
functioning of mutual recognition, from which it follows that measures to approximate the laws 
of the Member States are only appropriate when mutual recognition requires so.74  
In relation to substantive criminal law, the Lisbon Treaty goes explicitly beyond the point of 
view that approximation is solely required for cross-border judicial cooperation. Approximation 
should not only be limited to particular serious crimes with a cross-border dimension but should 
also be used to ensure the effective implementation of Union policy in an area that has been 
subject to harmonisation measures.75 Thus, the Lisbon Treaty provides a general competence 
provision for the approximation of substantive criminal law by means of directives.76  
This point of view seems to be slightly different in relation to procedural criminal law. The Treaty 
provides EU competence to adopt minimum rules on the rights of individuals in criminal 
procedures, but this competence is not general, but functional, following from the necessity 
requirement of article 82(2)(b) TFEU stating that the EU only has competence on the matter 
of procedural rights to the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. What is striking in 
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this wording is that the EU competence in the protection of procedural rights is considered to 
be a flanking measure for mutual recognition instead of autonomously necessary to address 
the effects of the operation of mutual recognition instruments on the individual, already well-
known by then.77 This is made clear by the preambles of the Directives based on Article 82(2) 
TFEU, justifying the measures by linking them to mutual trust. In any case, regardless of the 
intention, the Lisbon Treaty allocates a central role to procedural rights in the EU area of 
criminal justice. 
5.3 ATTENTION FOR PROCEDURAL RIGHTS: THE EU PROCEDURAL 
RIGHTS ROADMAP 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was preceded by a renewed attention for procedural 
rights. A few months earlier the procedural rights debate was put back on the agenda by the 
European Commission. Subsequently, an important step was taken at the initiative of the 
Swedish Presidency with the presentation of the Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights 
of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings. 78  In this Roadmap, strategic 
guidelines for developing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice were formulated, in which 
the Member States recognised the need for measures on the protection of procedural rights at 
European level. The preamble pointed out that there was “room for further action on the part 
of the EU to ensure full implementation and respect of Convention standards and, where 
appropriate, to ensure consistent application of the applicable standards and to raise existing 
standards”. The Roadmap was not free of criticism. Some scholars stressed the fact that there 
is more to procedural rights than the traditional fair trial rights mentioned in the Roadmap, e.g. 
in the context of pre-trial evidence gathering. 79  The non-exhaustive nature of the list is 
emphasized in the Roadmap however.  
The Roadmap identified five procedural rights which should be prioritised: translation and 
interpretation (Measure A); information on rights for suspected and accused persons in 
criminal proceedings and information about the charges (Measure B); legal advice and legal 
aid (Measure C); communication with relatives, employers and consular authorities (Measure 
D) and special safeguards for suspected or accused persons who are vulnerable, owing, for 
example, to age, mental, or physical condition (Measure E). The Roadmap also invited the 
European Commission to consider presenting a Green Paper on pre-trial detention (Measure 
F).  
The Preamble of the Roadmap follows a twofold reasoning in acknowledging the importance 
of the establishment of procedural rights protection measures. It is stressed that common 
minimum standards in procedural law are considered essential “in order to facilitate the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition.” Furthermore, the Council recognized that 
“procedural rights of suspected or accused persons are particularly important in order to 
safeguard the right to a fair trial.” This second argument is important since it explicitly links the 
establishment of procedural rights at EU level to ensuring a fair trial, thus no longer appointing 
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procedural rights as mere flanking measure for mutual recognition but as an autonomous 
prerequisite for a fair trial. Recital 10 also explicitly refers to this second argument by stating 
that EU action in the field of procedural rights is needed to improve the balance between 
existing EU policy on law enforcement and prosecution on the one hand and the protection of 
procedural rights of the individual on the other.  
The Roadmap is the first instrument to put forward rights that should be guaranteed on the EU 
level, but it is also the first in its kind to explicitly mention how these results should be achieved. 
Bearing in mind the difficulties that had risen in previous negotiations on procedural rights, the 
Roadmap prescribed a step-by-step approach, ensuring that priorities should be dealt with one 
at a time. Moreover, the sequence of the measures indicated the expected level of difficulty 
with regards to the negotiations. The first measure is thus considered to be the least 
controversial subject.  
The Roadmap was not only formally adopted by the European Council on 30 November 2009, 
the day before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, but it was subsequently implemented 
as an explicit part of the Stockholm Programme.80 The latter, adopted by the European Council 
in December 2009, detailed the priorities for developing the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, including strategic guidelines for a future common policy in the field of justice. These 
guidelines had to result in legislation providing minimum procedural rights’ safeguards within 
the European Union. 
 
6 RESULTS OF THE STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME: DIRECTIVES AND A 
GREEN PAPER 
The implementation of the Roadmap has to date resulted in six directives on procedural rights 
in criminal proceedings, five of which were prioritised in the Roadmap, and a Green Paper on 
pre-trial detention. As previously stated, the mere fact that procedural rights are laid down in 
directives is added value in itself, even if these rights are comparable to those adopted in the 
ECHR. As directives are legally binding, the EU member states are obliged to implement the 
rules on procedural safeguards in their national legislation. This guarantees a uniform 
interpretation of the procedural rights.  
6.1 THE DIRECTIVES  
The directives adopted in accordance with the Roadmap create direct rights for all individuals 
involved in criminal proceedings within the EU Member States. In other words, it creates rights 
not only for those involved in cross-border cases involving mutual recognition, but also for 
individuals involved in purely domestic cases too. 81  Some states strongly opposed this, 
claiming that the EU only has the competence to establish minimum rules for procedural rights 
for individuals involved in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. Due to the 
institutional changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, in which unanimity voting was replaced by 
majority voting, no consensus upon the matter was needed. It has to be pointed out that the 
directives apply to any individual in criminal proceedings and the procedural safeguards 
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foreseen in the directives are thus limited to criminal proceedings only. The directives are 
applicable at all stages of the criminal proceedings, from the moment a person is suspected or 
accused of having committed a criminal offence until the final decision, including the resolution 
of any appeal. 
The first directive following from the Roadmap, being the Directive on the right to interpretation 
and translation in criminal proceedings, was adopted in 2010.82  The directive had to be 
transposed to national legislation before 27 October 2013. The provisions should guarantee 
that the suspected or accused person understands what is happening and is able to make 
himself understood. If the person does not speak or understand the language that is used in 
the proceedings, he or she has to receive interpretation assistance. This assistance is not only 
required during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial authorities and during 
police questioning, but must also be foreseen for communication between suspected or 
accused persons and their lawyer. The right to interpretation also includes appropriate 
assistance for persons with hearing or speech impediments. The right to translation, which is 
not mentioned as such in the ECHR, is also addressed.83 More specifically, suspected or 
accused persons who do not understand the language of the criminal proceedings are provided 
with a written translation of all essential documents. Essential documents refers in this case to 
documents ensuring an effective defence.  
The second measure, Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings, 
was adopted in May 2012 and had to be implemented by the Member States by 2 June 2014.84 
This Directive ensures that all suspects and accused persons in the EU should be orally 
informed of their rights in criminal proceedings and of the accusation against them. In case a 
person is being arrested, he or she has to be given a written letter of rights in a language he 
or she understand. The Directive contains an indicative model Letter of Rights. There is also a 
specific provision foreseen for persons involved in European Arrest Warrant Proceedings 
stating that they have to receive a Letter of Rights promptly upon their arrest. The adoption of 
this Directive was not exactly plain sailing. Originally, Member States wanted to limit the scope 
of this directive only to suspects and defendants involved in cross-border cases. This led to 
heavy criticism since such a limitation would result in different treatment between citizens of 
the EU, and thus in discrimination.85  
Measure C of the Roadmap, on legal advice and legal aid, is addressed in two distinct 
directives. One of them being the third implemented directive, on the right of access to a lawyer 
in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings. 86 This Directive also 
dealt measure D too, on the right to communicate upon arrest. Member States had to comply 
with this Directive by 27 November 2016. 
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The European Commission followed a specific line of reasoning for the merging of measure C 
and D of the Procedural Rights Roadmap, without implementing both aspects of measure C in 
the same directive. The right to legal aid had been left out and was planned to be covered at 
a later date because the Commission wanted to avoid that the negotiations on the right of 
access to a lawyer were being hampered by financial aspects. The right to see a lawyer had 
to be discussed on its own merits void of financial considerations.87 This can however be 
considered a rather naïve point of view since the right to legal assistance is intrinsically linked 
with the right to legal aid. It can thus hardly be expected that the Member States will not have 
the financial consequences in the back of their minds during the negotiations on the right to 
access to a lawyer.88 Another reason for the merging was the impact assessment. Each 
proposal presented by the Commission must be accompanied by an impact assessment. Since 
the Commission lacked information on the legal aid regimes of the various Member States and 
since collecting this information would be a lengthy process, the Commission decided to cover 
that aspect of Roadmap measure C at a later date.89 The Commission did however decide to 
address the right to communication altogether with the right to access to a lawyer because in 
at least 22 Member States out of 27 the right to communication was already included in 
domestic legislation on access to a lawyer. Therefore, it was assumed to be easier for the 
Member States to implement a directive that covers both these rights at the same time.90  
The right of access to a lawyer applies to suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings 
from the time when they are made aware by the competent authorities that they are suspected 
or accused of having committed a criminal offence. The person involved does not necessarily 
have to be deprived of his liberty. It applies until the final determination of the question whether 
the suspect or accused person has committed the offence, including sentencing and the 
resolution of any appeal. What is striking is the mentioning in the preamble of the necessity of 
the ability of the lawyer to raise a question regarding the conditions in which a person is 
deprived of liberty, but the absence of any reference hereto in the directive itself. The second 
part of the third directive, the right to communicate, refers to communication with relatives, 
employers and consular authorities. The Directive includes remedies to guarantee that an 
earlier breach of the right guaranteed by the Directive does not contaminate the fairness of the 
proceedings as a whole. This refers to the ECtHR judgement in the Salduz-Case in which was 
stated that if the right to a lawyer at the pre-trial stage is violated, remedial action must be 
taken to ensure that the thus obtained evidence is not used for a conviction, for instance 
through its exclusion. The remedies provision was clearly designed to secure compliance with 
the Salduz principle.91  
This directive proved to be more difficult to negotiate than the previous ones. Three countries 
chose to make use of the opt out clause, namely Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
The impact of the right to access to a lawyer on jurisdictions with strong inquisitorial features 
is indeed significant. Preceding the implementation of the this Directive, there were still 
Member States where the right for a legal counsellor to be present during interrogations was 
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not yet safeguarded, as was the case in the Netherlands.92 In Austria, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland and Sweden, access to a lawyer was not granted immediately upon arrest. 93 
Furthermore there were countries in which access could be restricted when the interest of the 
investigation required so. In Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Czech 
Republic, Spain and Sweden supervision of the communications between the lawyer and his 
client were possible.94 
The fourth directive was not prioritized in the Procedural Rights Roadmap, emphasizing the 
non-exhaustive nature of that list. The directive strengthens the right to be presumed innocent 
and addresses the right to be present at the trial.95 This directive was adopted in March 2016 
and had to be nationally implemented by 1 April 2018. 
 
The fifth directive introduces procedural safeguards for vulnerable persons, more specifically 
children involved as suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings.96 It was adopted 
in May 2016 and has to be implemented by the Member States by 11 June 2019. The directive 
is linked to measure E of the Procedural Rights Roadmap, which called for specific safeguards 
for individuals involved in criminal proceedings which are explicitly vulnerable due to for 
instance their age or mental or physical condition.  
The sixth and last directive to date addresses the right to legal aid, the second part of measure 
C of the Roadmap.97 It was adopted by the Council in October 2016 and has to be complied 
with by the Member States on 11 June 2019. The purpose of Directive EU 2016/1919 is to 
ensure the effectiveness of the right of access to a lawyer provided for under Directive EU 
2013/48 by ensuring that financial and judicial support is granted in criminal proceedings to all 
accused persons who cannot afford a legal defence with their own resources. The Legal Aid 
Directive is only applicable to suspected and accused persons in criminal proceedings and to 
requested persons in EAW proceedings. It is important to notice that the scope of the Legal 
Aid Directive is thus rather small. Within the specific EAW framework, responsibility of the 
lawyer in the issuing state goes beyond mere legal advice in criminal proceedings, since he 
has to assist the lawyer in the executing state by providing him with information and advice. 
This is the only case in which legal aid can be provided outside the limited borders of criminal 
proceedings. This means that the Directive on Legal Aid will have no impact at all on litigation 
related to detention conditions. 
6.2 THE GREEN PAPER ON PRE-TRIAL DETENTION AND DETENTION 
CONDITIONS 
The Procedural Rights Roadmap also invited the Commission to present a Green Paper on 
pre-trial detention. The Commission presented a Green Paper on the subject of pre-trial 
detention and detention conditions in general in June 2011, titled “Strengthening mutual trust 
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in the European judicial area – A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice 
legislation in the field of detention.”98 The Green Paper covers the interplay between detention 
conditions and mutual recognition instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant, as well 
as pre-trial detention. Although the other measures of the procedural rights package, the 
directives, are indirectly linked with detention too, the Green Paper is the first measure 
specifically focusing on detention conditions and aspects of pre-trial detention.  
The purpose of the Green Paper was to identify appropriate measures to counter the impact 
of detention issues on mutual trust and thus on mutual recognition and judicial cooperation 
generally within the European Union. The duration of pre-trial detention varies considerably 
between the Member States. There are also significant disparities between Member States in 
definition, terminology and practice of pre-trial detention. Although detention issues are 
deemed to be the responsibility of Member States, the EU, too, deemed it had a certain 
responsibility to bear, notwithstanding the principle of subsidiarity. The EU’s interest in the 
matter of pre-trail detention is threefold. Firstly, excessively long periods of pre-trial detention 
are detrimental for the individual. Secondly, lengthy pre-trial periods and poor detention 
conditions in general affect the mutual recognition instruments and consequently prejudice the 
judicial cooperation between the Member States and, lastly, they do not represent the values 
for which the European Union stands.99  
The Commission specifically looked into the issues of pre-trial detention and into the 
possibilities to improve detention conditions within the EU. Several issues were identified in 
relation to pre-trial detention. To start with, the presumption of innocence is often neglected. 
Pre-trial detention has a serious impact upon the persons involved and by extension upon their 
families and friends, even more when this takes place in a prison in a foreign country. Case 
law under article 5 of the ECHR demonstrates that pre-trial detention is to be seen as a 
measure of last resort, it is therefore only deemed acceptable if there are no possible 
alternatives. Pre-trial detention is however too often an automatic, self-evident act, which it is 
not allowed to be under the ECHR provisions. The regular reviews are often a simple formality 
to meet the requirements under the ECHR. Suspected or accused persons who are non-
nationals are often automatically put in remand due to their flight risk. Research shows that 
once pre-trial detention has been imposed, the detainee has a greater chance of being 
sentenced with a prison sentence post-trial. Moreover, many EU countries are faced with 
overcrowded prisons and poor detention conditions.  
Concerning pre-trial detention the Green Paper explored the need for the European Union to 
establish minimum rules in order to strengthen mutual trust. The Commission specifically 
focused on the possibilities to impose provisions on a statutory maximum length of pre-trial 
detention and on the regularity of the review, referring to the recurring obligation for judicial 
authorities to justify extension of the pre-trial detention. Regarding detention conditions, the 
Commission explored the role of the EU in ensuring equivalent detention standards throughout 
the European Union by establishing minimum standards and monitoring of the detention 
conditions. On the level of the Council of Europe, there are the European Prison Rules, which 
address the issue of prisoners’ access to legal advice and legal aid, and the monitoring by the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), which publishes country-specific reports and 
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recommendations. While said instruments have their respective strengths, compliance with the 
European Prison Rules is not mandatory and the recommendations of the CPT are not binding. 
The Green Paper informs that eleven Member States and the large majority of NGOs were in 
favour of EU minimum standards on obligatory and regular reviews of the grounds for 
detention. An example of such standard is the obligation for national judicial authorities to verify 
at certain intervals whether the prerequisites for pre-trial detention continue to exist. The 
majority of the Member States was not in favour of harmonizing maximum time periods of 
detention. Many Member States also did not support the adoption of EU minimum standards, 
arguing that the principle of subsidiarity meant that the EU lacks a legal basis to set minimum 
rules related to pre-trial detention. Moreover, they argued that the ECHR already provides a 
basis for mutual trust. 
7 THE POST-STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME (2015-2020) 
Following from the Green Paper and the adoption of the five directives related to the proposed 
measures of the Roadmap on Procedural Rights, the priorities set out in the Roadmap have 
been addressed. Still, as was mentioned in the Roadmap itself and repeated in EU documents 
following the implementation of the Roadmap, the Roadmap did not contain an exhaustive list 
of issues to be addressed, but identified several priorities. The European Parliament already 
pointed out that “further work remains outstanding in relation to pre-trial detention, 
administrative detention and the detention of minors, in respect of which standards in many 
Member States fall short of human rights and other international standards. It called upon the 
European Commission “to revisit the case for establishing such standards in relation to pre-
trial detention, administrative detention and detention of minors through legislative action” in 
its mid-term review of the Stockholm Programme.100 
Despite this, the post-Stockholm Programme setting out the European Union’s policy lines for 
the period of 2015-2020 does not mention the establishment of minimum and enforceable 
standards on pre-trial detention. In 2014, the European Council recalled that one of the key 
objectives of the Union is to build an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice without internal 
borders, and with full respect for fundamental rights.101 While it brought attention to the work 
that was undertaken (i.e. the directives following from the Roadmap), the Council also agreed 
that mutual trust in Member States’ justice systems should be enhanced, including by 
continued efforts to strengthen the rights of accused and suspect persons in criminal 
proceedings. The Council put forward five overarching priorities for 2015-2020, one of them 
being that the EU as ‘a trusted area of fundamental freedoms’. Amongst others, the aim should 
be to build bridges between the different justice systems and traditions and to ensure mutual 
recognition of judgments.  
So, while strengthening the rights of accused and suspect persons in criminal proceedings 
was mentioned as a key action point for the European Union’s policy in 2015-2020, an explicit 
reference to establishing minimum standards on pre-trial detention is lacking. That said, the 
European Commissioner for Justice, Vera Jourová, mentioned pre-trial detention reforms as 
one of her top priorities in a speech of 25 April 2016: “My priority here is to improve the 
procedural safeguards related to pre-trial detention. The lack of minimum procedural 
safeguards for pre-trial detention can hinder judicial cooperation. Poor detention conditions 
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can indeed lead to refusal of extradition under the European Arrest Warrant, as the 
European Court of Justice has recently made clear. Furthermore, pre-trial detention should 
only be a last resort solution. We see however that it is often used too early. Conditions in pre-
trial detention are often worse than those in regular prisons.”102 The European Parliament 
equally expressed its will to pursue prison conditions in line with fundamental rights, in its 
resolution on prison systems and conditions of October 2017: “The European Parliament calls 
for the Commission and the EU institutions to take the necessary measures in their fields of 
competence to ensure respect for and protection of the fundamental rights of prisoners, 
and particularly of vulnerable individuals, children, mentally ill persons, disabled persons and 
women, including the adoption of common European standards and rules of detention 
in all Member States.”103 
 
8 CONCLUSION 
Since the very establishment of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, mutual recognition instruments have taken a pivotal role in ensuring judicial 
cooperation between EU Member States. The creation of an internal market without internal 
borders equally entailed closer cooperation between judicial authorities, ensuring cross-border 
crime could be dealt with swiftly. Mutual recognition, which implies that Member State 
recognize judicial decisions in criminal matters and execute them without further requirements, 
allowed for cooperation between Member States without the need to interfere too much with 
national criminal law. This made sense as criminal justice is an area in which Member States 
are sensitive when it comes to a loss of sovereignty. With the European Arrest Warrant and 
the Framework Decision on the transfer of prisoners, the EU currently has two mutual 
recognition instruments which allow for a swift transfer of suspects and convicted persons to 
other Member States. 
Mutual recognition, however, requires mutual trust between these Member States. Indeed, 
Member states must feel confident to rely on each other’s decisions without controlling them 
vis-à-vis their own substantive and procedural criminal law standards.104 This means Member 
States need intrinsic trust in each other’s judicial authorities, including in other Member States’ 
commitment to fundamental rights. In practice, however, Member States have proven to have 
very different levels of protection of fundamental rights, showing that mutual trust sometimes 
lacks a factual basis. In other words, respect for fundamental rights in all Member States 
cannot de facto be assumed. As such, fundamental rights violations lead to distrust in each 
other’s judicial system, which in turn hampers swift cooperation based on mutual recognition 
instruments. Guaranteeing fundamental rights thus not only serves the interests of the 
individuals involved, but is equally essential for the swift functioning of mutual recognition 
instruments. In practice, detention conditions in Member States which violate fundamental 
rights have led to the execution of mutual recognition instruments, such as the European Arrest 
Warrant, being refused.  
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The European Commission recognized that there was de facto no equivalent commitment to 
fundamental rights in all EU Member States and realised the implications for judicial 
cooperation between Member States. The Commission therefore proposed to harmonise the 
application of existing ECHR standards at the EU level. Indeed, the difficulty was not that 
fundamental rights did not exist, but rather the broad margin of appreciation the ECtHR gave 
to Member States regarding how ECHR-standards must be interpreted, which posed a threat 
to mutual recognition. Moreover, the non-conformity of some Member States with ECHR 
standards also contributed to mutual distrust. To ensure full implementation of the ECHR 
standards and the consistent application of existing standards across Member States, and, 
thus, to facilitate the use of mutual recognition instruments such as the European Arrest 
Warrant, the European Council decided to develop its own minimum standards. 105 
Consequently, the EU adopted six directives, which strengthened the procedural rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings. To date, minimum standards deal, 
amongst other, with the right of access to a lawyer, the right to communicate with third persons, 
the presumption of innocence and the right to legal aid. 
The introduction of minimum standards for suspects and accused has thus been targeted at a 
uniform interpretation of procedural rights in criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, ensuring a 
consistent application of ECHR standards not only proves difficult when it comes to procedural 
rights. As case-law has made it abundantly clear, the current manner in which people are taken 
and held in pre-trial detention, has proven to be in violation of ECHR standards in many 
Member States on many occasions.106 Just as was the case with the procedural rights of 
suspects and accused, problems currently experienced in pre-trial detention have a major 
impact on mutual trust and the use of mutual recognition instruments between Member 
States.107 Taking this reasoning a step further, the detention conditions for convicted prisoners, 
which are equally problematic in many Member States, can also hamper swift cooperation 
between Member States, as both the EAW and the Framework Decision on the transfer of 
prisoners allow for the transfer of convicted persons.  
We believe that the more open prisons are to judicial oversight, the better the chances are that 
these prisons will provide humane, safe and rehabilitation-oriented detention conditions. A first 
step towards EU minimum standards on pre-trial detention should therefor consist of 
guaranteeing prisoners a proper access to justice and a swift access to a lawyer in case their 
fundamental rights are at stake. Guaranteeing that prisoners can take up their case with an 
independent oversight body could provide the necessary impetus to ensure that prison 
conditions are in line with ECHR standards, and, thus, that mutual trust between Member 
States is strengthened. EU minimum standards focussing on access to justice and to a lawyer 
for pre-trial prisoners are therefore the first step to ensuring a swift mutual recognition-based 
cooperation between Member States, with minimum intervention from the EU when it comes 
to regulating detention conditions. 
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PART II. ECHR LAW 
PRISONERS’ ACCESS TO COURT IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM. ACHIEVEMENTS 
AND PROSPECTS 
 
Sofia Ciuffoletti, Daniela Ranalli, Hugues de Suremain  
1. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS SUPPORTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS 
The principle of effectiveness is at the heart of the European Court of human rights case-law. 
The concern for effectiveness has led the Court to develop a twofold approach: on the one 
hand the Court has enhanced the procedural rights (in particular Articles 6 and 13 of the 
Convention), considered as “creators of safeguard” for substantial rights108 and, on the other 
hand, the Court has strengthened and, sometimes, extended the material requirements, by 
combining them with additional procedural obligations, autonomous from those provided for by 
Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.     
The Court’s case-law on prison matters is fully in line with this approach.  
The development of procedural requirements has led to the extension and intensification of 
prisoners’ ‘rights109. The reinforcement of procedural rights, and in particular Articles 6 and 13 
of the Convention, has played an extremely important role. Article 6 of the Convention, 
particularly in its civil aspect, has made it possible to restore the principle of the rule of law in 
prison and to remove from the absolute discretion of the prison administration decisions 
affecting the personal situation of prisoners (relations with the outside world, disciplinary 
regime, access to outdoor exercise, etc.). At the same time, the configuration of procedural 
guarantees has led to develop protective standards at a European level and to harmonize 
national laws. 
Article 13, in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, has proved to be an essential 
instrument for the development of procedural requirements regarding conditions of detention 
and has been widely used in the fight against prison overcrowding110. The Court has configured 
the general characteristics and minimum requirements that the right to an effective remedy in 
the prison field must fulfil. It provided for the articulation of two fundamental requirements: the 
preventive effect, i.e. the remedy must be capable of preventing or stopping ill-treatment, and 
the compensatory effect, such as to allow compensation for the damage suffered. The case 
law has set precise and strict procedural requirements for effective remedies, bringing them in 
line with the fair trial standards: the independence of the decision-making body from the prison 
administration; the binding force of decisions; the effectiveness of redress; the respect of a 
reasonable time of the proceeding111.  
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Although it had a less significant quantitative impact, development of the procedural aspect of 
substantive rights has enriched the content and the substantial guarantees by recognizing a 
procedural obligation of the State, autonomous from Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention112. 
Concerning the effectiveness, the Court has set out new procedural obligations arising from 
the material provision. Article 3 and the right to material conditions of detention compatible with 
respect for human dignity has been the privileged ground for the development of this 
interpretative technique of the Court. This approach has been widely used, for example, in life 
imprisonment case-law, where the obligation to provide procedural guarantees in the parole 
mechanism arising directly from Article 3113.  
 
As a matter of fact, the Court asserted the applicability of procedural guarantees to prisoners 
at a very early stage, at a time when detainees rights were hardly taken into account by the 
organs of the Convention, when issues related to prison litigation escaped, according to the 
configuration of domestic law, the guarantees of a fair trial.  
 
The evolution of case-law in this issue is characterized, on the one hand, by the effort to adapt 
the substantial right of the Convention to the complexity of the detention and the construction 
of a real legal status of detainees and, on the other hand, by the consolidation of procedural 
rights and guarantees as means for transforming the penitentiary condition. 
 
1.1 THE ECTHR’S CASE LAW AS A TOOL FOR THE CREATION OF A LEGAL 
STATUS OF EUROPEAN PRISONERS 
  
The prisoners’ rights protection issue allows for an analysis of the ability of the Court to position 
itself as a judicial tool for the effective protection of rights by force of interpretative methods 
and strategy. As a matter of facts, prisoners’ rights are not a specific focus of the Convention, 
yet since the beginning of its activity, the Commission received and decided a high number of 
applications by European prisoners. This seems to be connected to the role of international 
courts to provide a forum for minorities’ rights in pluralistic societies. Specifically, for minorities 
and vulnerable individuals subject to state-power authority.  
As shown by Van Zyl Smit and Snacken114, the early cases to reach the Commission and the 
Court never passed the threshold of the Commission, because of the theory of the inherent 
limitations. According to this theory the rights of persons in a particular legal situation 
(prisoners, but also mental patients, military personnel, officials) are more limited than those 
of others. As a consequence, detention entails the loss of a number of rights considered 
inherently limited (incompatible) with the status detentionis. The all issue is then to define what 
is ‘inherently’ incompatible from a normative standpoint. As Mireille Delmas-Marty puts it, “it is 
not the exercise of the relevant rights which is restricted, but the content of the rights 
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themselves”115. Therefore in the process to establish whether a national law or a practice is 
consistent with the Convention (i.e. answering the three questions: is there an interference 
with a right;  is the interference prescribed by national laws; is the interference or restriction 
necessary in a democratic society with a view to attaining one of the aims which are set out in 
the Convention and proportionate) the analysis of the legitimate limitations to the rights was 
simply not conducted. The process stopped in light of the inherent nature of the limitations.  
In 1975 the Court departed for the first time from the theory of the inherent limitations in the 
case Golder v. United Kingdom116, where it was held that “the interference with a prisoner’s 
correspondence with a lawyer by the state’s authorities constituted a breach of the 
Convention”. The Court found that the interference infringed upon the prisoner’s right of access 
to court as guaranteed by Article 6 and the right to correspondence as guaranteed in Article 8. 
The Court grounded its reasoning on the rejection of the theory of the inherent limitations. 
Instead the Court held that, when it came to restricting the rights of correspondence, it could 
be done only on the general grounds that the Convention provided. In sum, the Court is 
rejecting the theory of inherent limitation as an in abstracto theory, basing its reasoning on the 
idea of the casuistic approach to questions of violations of rights and legitimate limitations:  
It is not the function of the Court to elaborate a general theory of the limitations admissible in the case 
of convicted prisoners, nor even to rule in abstracto on the compatibility of Rules 33 para. 2, 34 para. 
8 and 37 para. 2 of the Prison Rules 1964 with the Convention. Seised of a case which has its origin 
in a petition presented by an individual, the Court is called upon to pronounce itself only on the point 
whether or not the application of those Rules in the present case violated the Convention to the 
prejudice of Golder (De Becker judgment of 27 March 1962, Series A no. 4, p. 26)117.  
The Court, further on, reduce the scope of the possible limitations and strengthen the strict 
scrutiny rule concerning the same legitimate limitations:  
The Court accepts, moreover, that the "necessity" for interference with the exercise of the right of a 
convicted prisoner to respect for his correspondence must be appreciated having regard to the 
ordinary and reasonable requirements of imprisonment. The "prevention of disorder or crime", for 
example, may justify wider measures of interference in the case of such a prisoner than in that of a 
person at liberty. To this extent, but to this extent only, lawful deprivation of liberty within the meaning 
of Article 5 (art. 5) does not fail to impinge on the application of Article 8 (art. 8)118. 
Within this perspective and concerning the interpretation and evaluation of the legitimate 
nature of the limitations imposed on the same content of fundamental rights, it seems only 
appropriate that the “power of appreciation” left to states needs to be precisely defined. Mere 
assumptions concerning the prevention of disorder or crime and the interest of public safety 
and the protection of the rights of others need substantiation from the part of the Government. 
In sum, the purposes advanced by the Government in view of a limitation of prisoners’ rights 
cannot be presumed and simply derived from the status detentionis:   
In order to show why the interference complained of by Golder was "necessary", the Government 
advanced the prevention of disorder or crime and, up to a certain point, the interests of public safety 
and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Even having regard to the power of 
appreciation left to the Contracting States, the Court cannot discern how these considerations, as 
they are understood "in a democratic society", could oblige the Home Secretary to prevent Golder 
from corresponding with a solicitor with a view to suing Laird for libel. The Court again lays stress on 
the fact that Golder was seeking to exculpate himself of a charge made against him by that prison 
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officer acting in the course of his duties and relating to an incident in prison. In these circumstances, 
Golder could justifiably wish to write to a solicitor119. 
Snacken and van Zyl Smit propose an interesting reading of this early stage of prisoners’ rights 
protection affirming that the Court and the Commission, during the first three decades of their 
work, engaged in this dynamic and evolutive interpretation only when it came to recognize the 
procedural aspects of prisoners’ rights. Paradigmatic is the decision in Silver and Others v. 
UK120, where the Court “was reluctant to engage with the substantive questions of prison 
administration”121. Interestingly enough, the Court discusses the violation of Article 13 and, 
while it holds not necessary to examine Article 13 taken in conjunction with article 6 § 1122, on 
the contrary, when Article 13 was taken in conjunction with Article 8, the Court acknowledged 
a lack of domestic remedy to the consolidated principles deriving from its own case law: 
“113. (a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set 
forth in the Convention, he should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have 
his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress (see the above-mentioned Klass and others 
judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 29, § 64);  
(b) the authority referred to in Article 13 (art. 13) may not necessarily be a judicial authority but, if it is 
not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy 
before it is effective (ibid., p. 30, § 67); SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
JUGDMENT 38  
(c) although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13 (art. 13), the 
aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-
mentioned X v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 46, p. 26, § 60, and the Van 
Droogenbroeck judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 32, § 56);  
(d) neither Article 13 (art. 13) nor the Convention in general lays down for the Contracting States any 
given manner for ensuring within their internal law the effective implementation of any of the 
provisions of the Convention - for example, by incorporating the Convention into domestic law (see 
the Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union judgment of 6 February 1976, Series A no. 2O, p. 18, § 50)”. 
The Court advanced the protection of procedural rights in Campbell and Feld v. UK123, where 
it affirms the rights of prisoners to legal assistance in disciplinary procedures based on the 
conventional requirement that a “person charged with a criminal offence who does not wish to 
defend himself in person must be able to have recourse to legal assistance of his own 
choosing”. 
Concerning Article 13, the Court reiterates that:  
the restrictions on Father Fell’s access to legal advice and on his personal correspondence were the 
result of the application of norms that were incompatible with the Convention. In such circumstances, 
as the Court held in its above-mentioned Silver and Others judgment (ibid., p. 44, para. 118), there 
could be no "effective remedy" as required by Article 13 (art. 13)124. 
The dynamic dimension of the procedural aspect of prisoners’ rights was not paired by a 
parallel protection of prisoners’ substantive rights. Particularly concerning conditions of 
detention potentially in violation of Article 3, the Court appeared much more cautious. 
                                                             
119 Ibidem. 
120 Silver and Others v. UK, n. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75. 
121 D. Van Zyl Smit and S. Snacken, cited above, p. 12. 
122 As traditionally expressed by the Court’s case law, once a violation decision is made under Article 6, there is no 
need to examine complaints under Article 13; this is because the requirements of the latter Article (art. 13) are less  
to cover astrict than, and are here absorbed by, those of the former. 
123 Campbell and Feld v. UK, n. 819/77 7878/77   
124 Ivi, §127. 
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According to the literature on the issue125: “the Court seems to have accepted, without going 
into the matter too deeply, that what it regarded as the inevitable deprivation of imprisonment 
were not inhuman or degrading form of treatment”126. It seemed like the theory of inherent 
limitations was fading away in relation to procedural rights but was reaffirmed in the field of 
substantive issues concerning conditions of detentions and Article 3 of the Convention.  
As Livingstone notes, on this aspect:  
(…) while the Court has shown itself willing to develop the standards of protection for those in 
detention at what might be called the higher end of the spectrum, it has remained reluctant to extend 
the scope of Article 3 at the lower end to cover more routing conditions produced by neglect. (…) 
Thus it is only in the case of political prisoners (…) that the Commission and Court have been 
prepared to find breaches of Article 3 in relation to things like overcrowding or inadequate medical 
treatment.127. 
The dynamism, effectiveness and scope of the Conventional protection seemed dramatically 
insufficient.  
However, the Court’s stance changed rather drastically at the turn of the millennium. The Court 
became noticeably more prepared to make findings in respect of the full range of conduct 
prohibited in Article 3.  In several major cases, the Court strengthened the protection of 
prisoners’ rights. In 1996, in the case of Aksoy v. Turkey, it found for the first time that the 
treatment of a prisoners had been so harsh that it amounted to torture. In 1997, in the case of 
Aydin v. Turkey, the rape of a prisoners by an official had also been held to constitute torture. 
In 1999, in the important case of Selmouni v. France, the Court reiterated the practice emerging 
from the cases of Aksoy and Aydin and commented that: “certain acts which were classified in 
the past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be classified 
differently in future”. 
In rapid succession, in two judgments in 2001 (Peers v. Greece and Dougoz v. Greece), 
regarding physical conditions, the Court abandoned the « intentional element » as a condition 
required in order for the treatment to be considered as contrary to article 3. In 2001, in the 
Peers v. Greece128  judgment the Court affirmed that “although the question whether the 
purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into 
account, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of 
Article 3.”129. Moreover, the violation resulted from overcrowding and bad detention conditions 
in Greek prisons. In assessing the level and quality of detention conditions the Court relied 
heavily on CPT reports and findings. This trends will be then consolidated by the further 
development of the case law where the Court seemed more and more inclined toward 
accepting its role in the system of protection of prisoners’ rights within the Council of Europe 
and the potentially fruitful collaboration with the CPT in the respect of the different 
competencies.  
The real turning point in the case law concerning prisoners’ rights is represented by the 
introduction of the ‘dignity perspective’. As Tulkens affirmed, the Court has moved from « the 
stage of ignorance of the general conditions of detention to that of recognising the right of any 
                                                             
125 See D. Van Zyl Smit and S. Snacken, cit., p. 13 (and the cited references, particularly footnotes 50, 60, 62). See 
also, Trechsel, S., “Human Rights of Persons Deprived of their Liberty”, report prepared for the 7th International 
Colloquy on the ECHR, 1990, Doc. H/CoU (90) 3,20. 
126 D. Van Zyl Smit and S. Snacken, cit., p. 12. 
127 S. Livingstone, « Prisoners' Rights in the Context of the European Convention on Human Rights », (2000)2, 
Punishment and Society 309-324, at 314, as cited by D. Van Zyl Smit and S. Snacken, cit., p. 12. 
128 Peers v. Greece, 28524/95. 
129 Ivi, § 74.  
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detainee to conditions that respect human dignity »130. Building on this development, the 
decade from 2000-2010 has, in this respect, seen a genuine increase in the number of 
proceedings in Strasbourg related to prison life. The European Commission of Human Rights 
has certainly admitted that physical conditions of detention can be found to be inhuman or 
degrading treatment. In the « Greek cases » it came to this conclusion regarding overcrowding 
and inadequate facilities for heating, sanitation, sleeping arrangements, food, recreation and 
contact with the outside world131. Sudre however recalls that the Commission only penalised 
conditions of detention when two conditions were met: an objectively degrading environment 
and the intention to humiliate the detainee132. Ultimately, « the refusal, by the Commission, to 
take into account in its consideration the minimal European rules in the area left it the duty to 
set this threshold according to the specific data in question », which was placed at a very high 
level133.   
 
The right to humane conditions of detention has truly be established in favour of a judgment 
regarding the right to health in prison. As noted by F. Tulkens134, these two rights, the right to 
protect health and the right to decent conditions, find their "common matrix" in Kudła v. 
Poland135, where the Grand Chamber summarised the obligations of the State in these terms:  
 
Article 3 requires that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are 
compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the 
measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of 
suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and 
well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical 
assistance. 
 
The  Court affirms, for the first time, in Kudla v. Poland that Article 3 guarantees the right to be 
"held in conditions that are compatible with respect for dignity". The reasoning of the Court in 
Kudla operates a qualitative leap, overcoming the indirect protection, adopted so far and 
consecrating a new right, the right to conditions of detention in accordance with human dignity. 
 
To do this, the Court elaborates the argument of the "minimum severity threshold": the 
treatments and conditions of detention must reach a minimum level of gravity to fall under 
Article 3 and the evaluation of this minimum level appears "relative by essence". In the words 
of the Court:  “the assessment of the minimum is, in the nature of things, relative, it depends 
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and the context of the treatment, the 
method and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects, and in some 
instances, the sex, and the state of health of the victim.” 
 
                                                             
130 F. Tulkens, "droits de l’homme en prison", in J.-P. Céré (dir), Panorama européen de la prison, L’Haramattan, 
coll. "sciences criminelles", 2002, p.39 
131 Claims nos 3321/67 and others, Commission's report of 5 November 1969, Year book 12 
132 F. Sudre "L’article 3bis de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme : le droit à des conditions de 
détention conformes au respect de la dignité humaine", Prev. art., p. 1508. To support this assertion the author 
refers to the European Commission on Human Right's decision, 15 May 1980, MCFEELEY and others v. United 
Kingdom, app. no. 8317/78, p. 54 
133B. Ecochard, L'émergence d'un droit à des conditions de détention décentes garanti par l'article 3 de la 
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, RFDA 2003. 99 
134 F. Tulkens, Les prisons en Europe. Les développements récents de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne 
des droits de l’homme, Déviance et Société 2014/4 (Vol. 38) 
135  
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This initial appeal to the relativization of the assessment in relation to the minimum severity 
level and, therefore, in order to integrate a violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, appears as one of the essential argumentative key to safeguarding the absolute 
nature of art. 3 of the Convention. 
The development thus described is part of the origin of a broader and more general changing 
approach that tends to appreciate breaches of fundamental rights in a stricter manner. Belda136 
has demonstrated that the lowering of the threshold of seriousness also leads to a redefinition 
of the concepts contained in article 3 through the notion of human dignity. The principle of 
respecting human dignity is a fundamental objective pursued by the Court when it applies, and 
therefore interprets, the Convention for persons deprived of their liberty. She explains that 
European judges adopt a specific approach to interpretation when they apply rights under the 
Convention to detainees, aiming to grant a privileged protection of their rights, due to the 
complexity of their status. In a ruling under the scope of article 3, which makes no exception 
to prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatments, the Court grants a basic right to decent 
conditions of detention. As a consequence, the Court affirms that the respondent Government 
must « organise its penitentiary system in such a way as to ensure respect for the dignity of 
detainees, regardless of financial or logistical difficulties »137. 
 
This approach to interpretation—by which the Court has updated the possibilities of the text to 
construct a category based protection for detainees—was accompanied by an incorporation 
of the doctrine by other bodies of the European Council, and particularly soft case law, from 
the activity of the CPT. This approach is part of a more general tendency to take into account 
external sources in European case law. As revealed by Belda, a common European detention 
law is being progressively built, under the leadership of European judges and for which the 
"basic tools" used 138 , then assimilated into law under the Convention, are a range of 
instruments with normative constraints.   
 
Another interesting line of reasoning concerning international prison soft law instruments is the 
so called process of « hardening of the soft law » in prison field. As argued by P. Pinto de 
Albuquerque, Partly dissenting opinion, in Muršić v. Croatia, [GC], no. 7334/13 :  
 
In the continuum between hard law and soft law, several factors may harden the text. Like a degradé 
normatif, the gradual normativity of the text increases with the number of these factors that are 
present and decreases with their absence. In this gradualist logic, it is ultimately up to the Court to 
decide “how much weight” to attribute to these hardening factors of soft law. 28. Soft European human 
rights law may be hardened by certain factors that relate either to the rule-making procedure or to 
the rule-application procedure. These are “building bricks in a wall of normativity. 
 
According to this view, the hardening of prison soft law is particularly visible in Europe and 
concerns specifically the norms deriving from the activity of the CPT.  
 
This is the case for requirements regarding the surface area that detainees must have available 
in collective cells. In its decision on Kalachnikov v. Russia in 2002139, in order to judge if the 
size of the applicant’s cell, which measured 17 m² and was occupied by between 18 and 24 
detainees, raised problems covered by the scope of article 3 of the Convention, the Court 
                                                             
136 Thesis cited above 
137 See for example, Varga and others. v. Hungary, 10 March 2015 no. 14097/12 
138 As opposed to the "methodological tools" represented by methods of interpretation. 
139 European Court of Human Rights, 15 July 2002, Kalachnikov v. Russia. 
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« recalled that the CPT has set the approximate minimum desirable surface area per person 
for a detention cell at 7 m² (see the CPT's 2nd general report – [CPT/Inf] (92) 3, §43), i.e. 56 
m² for eight detainees » (§97). The Court, after specifying that « serious overcrowding was 
constantly the rule in the cell », concluded that this was "a state of affairs which in itself raised 
an issue under Article 3" (§97). 
 
One perspective that opened up for an ongoing discussion is the auspicability of the definition 
of an absolute presumption of violation of Article 3. While the majority, in Sulejmanovic v. Italy, 
(no. 22635/03, 16 July, 2009), found that according to a consistent case law140 an available 
space inferior to 3 m² constitutes a sufficient element in order to attain the “minimum level of 
severity” requested by the scope of Article 3, the separate dissenting opinion of judge 
Zagrebelsky, joined by judge Jočienė marks a strict difference between what is intolerable and 
what is desirable in terms of prison condition141, confining the analysis of the Court to the former 
term, in order not to dilute the strength and absolute nature of Article 3: 
La tendance que cet arrêt semble mettre en lumière, à savoir que la Cour place son examen dans le 
cadre de ce qui est « souhaitable », devrait avoir pour effet d’accroître la protection contre les 
traitements prohibés par l’article 3. Or, même si cette tendance se nourrit de générosité, elle favorise 
en réalité une dérive dangereuse vers la relativisation de l’interdiction, puisque plus l’on abaisse le 
seuil « minimum de gravité », plus on est contraint de tenir compte des raisons et circonstances (ou 
bien de réduire à néant la satisfaction équitable).142 
When called to ensure the proper consistency of the different approaches in respect to the 
minimum space to be allocated to detainees and of the application of the “strong presumption” 
criterion143 , the Grand Chamber in Muršić operated a relativization of the absolute nature of 
Article 3 of the Convention, by introducing the concept of cumulative effect of compensating 
factors144 able to rebut a strong presumption of violation of Article 3 whenever the 3 sq. m of 
personal space in the cell is not guaranteed. 
The next step in the case law is represented by the evolving use of quasi-pilot and pilot 
judgment in order to solve endemic and persistent violations of rights at a domestic level. 
According to the Court, assessing the effectiveness of a system of legal channels involves 
taking into account, in a realistic manner, not only the remedy available in theory in a domestic 
legal system, but also the general legal and political context in which it operates . The Court 
was required to specify the required features for domestic bodies called to recognise issues 
related to overcrowding in prisons and other physical conditions of detention. In particular, it 
did so in a highly instructive manner in the developments that it established, based on article 
                                                             
140 See: Aleksandr Makarov v. Russia, n. 15217/07, § 93, 12 marzo 2009; see also Lind v. Russia, n. 25664/05, § 
59, 6 dicembre 2007; Kantyrev v. Russia, n. 37213/02, §§ 50-51, 21 giugno 2007; Andreï Frolov v. Russia, n. 
205/02, §§ 47-49, 29 marzo 2007; Labzov v. Russia, n. 62208/00, § 44, 16 giugno 2005, e Mayzit v. Russia, n. 
63378/00, § 40, 20 gennaio 2005. 
141 See Sulejmanovic, cited above, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Zagrebelski, pp. 18,19: “L’article 3 prévoit une 
interdiction absolue de la torture et des traitements inhumains ou dégradants. Même le droit à la vie (article 2) n’est 
pas aussi absolu. Je crois que la raison de la nature absolue de l’interdiction des traitements prohibés par l’article 
3 réside dans le fait que, dans la conscience et la sensibilité des Européens, de tels traitements apparaissent 
comme intolérables en soi, en toute occasion et dans toute situation. Or, entre ce que l’on considère dans le cadre 
de l’article 3 comme étant intolérable et ce que l’on peut considérer comme étant souhaitable, il y a, à mes yeux, la 
même différence que celle qui a cours entre le rôle de la Cour et les rôles du CPT, du Conseil de l’Europe, des 
organisations non gouvernementales et des Parlements nationaux.” 
142 Ibidem. 
143 For an overview of the different approaches, see the Dissenting opinion of Judge Sicilianos in the Chamber 
judgment in Muršić v. Croatia, Application no. 7334/13. 
144 Muršić, [GC], cited §§ 137 and 138. 
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46, for the measures expected from States following a pilot or quasi pilot judgment145. Since 
2009, prison overcrowding has been on the agenda of the Court with two quasi-pilot judgment 
Polish cases146, immediately followed by Russian, Italian, Belgian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, 
Lithuanian, Croatian, Romanian cases147. This situation marked the transnational dimension 
of the phenomenon in the European region148 and the Court has dealt with the issue by building 
a rich case law under the scope of Article 3 of the Convention149.  
Prison overcrowding can be considered according to a twofold perspective since it can amount 
to inhuman treatment as a violation of human dignity and it is one of the primary impediments 
to resocialisation150. Both perspectives are highly meaningful in light of the Court’s case law, 
but if traditionally the issue of overcrowding and prison conditions involved a strong use of the 
human dignity category, recently the issue gained relevance under the resocialization 
viewpoint.  
Starting with Dickson151, the Court made express reference to the English term ‘rehabilitation’ 
(or  the French ‘réinsertion’152) in order to frame the possible objectives of a prison sentence. 
                                                             
145 A quasi-pilot judgement, as Tulkens described it: “puts the respondent State on notice that the Court’s concerns 
are not limited to the individual case and that it is bound to remedy the violation in a holistic way. In so doing, it 
draws the attention of the Committee of Ministers (along with other Council of Europe authorities) to the fact that a 
systemic problem underlies the particular case” F. Tulkens, Perspectives from the Court. A typology of the pilot-
judgment procedure, Seminar RESPONDING TO SYSTEMIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS PILOT 
JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THEIR IMPACT AT NATIONAL LEVEL, 
Strasbourg, 14 June 2010. See also, L Garlicki, “Broniowski and After: on the Dual Nature of Pilot Judgments”, in 
L. Caflisch et al. (eds.), Liber amicorum 
Luzius Wildhaber: human rights, Strasbourg views, Kehl-Strasbourg-Arlington, N.P. Engel, 2007, .p. 191; Ph. 
LEACH et al., “Can the European Court’s pilot judgment procedure help resolve systemic human rights violations? 
Burdov and the failure to implement domestic court decisions in Russia”, Human Rights Law Review, 2010, p. 358 
146 Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885/04, § 154, 22 October 2009 and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland, no. 17599/05, § 
161, 22 October 2009. 
147 Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08 , Torreggiani, cited, Vasilescu v. Belgium, no. 
64682/12,  Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13,  
Varga and Others v. Hungary, nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 and 64586/13,  Varga and 
Others v. Hungary, nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13 and 64586/13,  Muršić v. Croatia, 
cited 
148 And worldwide, see H.-J. Albrecht, Prison Overcrowding – Finding Effective Solutions Strategies and Best 
Practices Against Overcrowding in Correctional Facilities, UNAFEI, reprint April 2012. Interestingly enough, prison 
litigation and Courts’ rulings around the world are assessed as an effective leverage for a decrease of prison 
population, p. 45: “Prison litigation has resulted in California being pressured into changing prison politics. In June 
2007 the Delhi High Court ordered for example the Tihar authorities to release 600 prisoners charged with disturbing 
public peace, considered a relatively minor offence, to reduce overcrowding in the prison”. 
149  As assessed in the  Mironovas and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 40828/12, 29292/12, 69598/12, 40163/13, 
66281/13, 70048/13 and 70065/13, Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, §2. 
150  As the UNODC Handbook on strategies to reduce prison overcrowding (2010) has indicated, prison 
overcrowding is “the root cause of a range of challenges and human rights violations in prison systems worldwide, 
threatening, at best, the social reintegration prospects, and at worst, the life of prisoners”. 
151 Dickson v. UK, [GC], no. 44362/04. 
152 The terminology is not neutral. The concept of 'rehabilitation’ has been a source of controversy in the literature, 
during the 80’s (See, F. Allen, The decline of the rehabilitative ideal, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, and, 
in general, D. Garland, The Culture of Control, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) and has been superseded 
by terms (and concepts) like social reintegration or resocialization, especially in the continental European penology. 
Some authors have understood this different terminology as embedded in a different normative ideology: the Anglo-
american concept of rehabilitation as opposed to the continental (mainly German, but also Italian made) concept of 
resocialization or social reintegration (See the excellent, L. Lazarus, Contrasting Prisoners' Rights: A Comparative 
Examination of England and Germany, Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice, 2004, explaining this 
different approach and assessing why when the ‘rehabilitative model’ was facing a crisis og political legitimacy, 
German penologists, as well as legislators, policy makers and reformers shared a commitment to ‘resocialization’ 
as a substantive aim of imprisonment). More recently terms such as ‘reintegration’ have been used in order to 
potentiate the idea of a full legal position of the prisoner (See, Van Zyl Smit., S., Snacken S., Principles of European 
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If traditionally, criminologists have considered legitimate functions such as retribution, 
prevention (deterrence), protection of the public (incapacitation) and rehabilitation, more 
recently, “there has been a trend towards placing more emphasis on rehabilitation, as 
demonstrated notably by the Council of Europe’s legal instruments”153. This shift is based on 
a differential understanding of the same concept of rehabilitation.  
The Court is expressly fabricating its own autonomous concept which is no longer grounded 
on the Anglo-American (negative) version of mere rehabilitation “as a mean of preventing 
recidivism154”, but rather as a positive “idea of re-socialisation through the fostering of personal 
responsibility”155. The Court has recognized on several occasions “the legitimate aim of a policy 
of progressive social reintegration of persons sentenced to imprisonment”156. In Mastromatteo 
v. Italy the Court acknowledges that “[o]ne of the essential functions of a prison sentence is to 
protect society, for example by preventing a criminal from re-offending and thus causing further 
harm,” but at the same time,“the Court recognises the legitimate aim of a policy of progressive 
social reintegration of persons sentenced to imprisonment”157. 
It is through the most recent case law concerning life-long sentences that the Court expanded 
the concept of social rehabilitation or resocialisation, indissolubly connecting it with human 
dignity. The rehabilitative paradigm needs to be tested in light of the Strasbourg case law on 
overcrowding and prison conditions.  
It seems clear that an international obligation exists for the State to consider resocialization as 
the primary purpose for imprisonment in respect of human dignity. Resocialization is seriously 
hindered by both an impoverished prison regime and detrimental material conditions of 
detention. This seems to be the more advanced perspective of the Court’s case law and could 
potentially support strategic litigation in different areas of prisoners’ life and rights.  
 
1.2 PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS AS A TOOL FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
PRISON CONDITIONS 
1.2.1 ARTICLE 13, A PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 
 
Traditionally seen as a tool for the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, Article 13 
plays a vital role in the sustainability of the Convention system. Article 13 fulfils a twofold 
                                                             
prison law and policy, cited). Finally the concept of (re)integration is used by Article 6 of the 2006 version of the 
European Prison Rules: “6 All detention shall be managed so as to facilitate the reintegration into free society of 
persons who have been deprived of their liberty”.   
The Italian Constitution specifies that punishment shall aim to ‘re-educate’ the person upon whom sentence is 
passed (see Article 27: ‘Punishment cannot consist in treatment contrary to human dignity and must aim at re-
educating the condemned.’ See for references to case law of the Italian Constitutional Court , ECHR, Vinter and 
others v. the United Kingdom (§ 72). For an historical and theoretical account of the ‘re-educative’ principle in the 
Italian constitutional history, see, A. Pugiotto, Il volto costituzionale della pena (e i suoi sfregi), Diritto Penale 
Contemporaneo, 2014.  
153 Dickson, cited, §28.  
154 Ibidem. 
155 Ibidem. 
156 Boulois v. Luxembourg [GC], no. 37575/04, § 83, with further references to Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 
37703/97, § 72, 2002-VIII; Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634/06, § 108, 15 December 2009; and 
Schemkamper v. France, no. 75833/01, § 31, 18 October 2005. 
157 Mastromatteo v. Italy, cited above, § 72.  
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dynamic role: on one hand it supports the other fundamental rights (trend toward the affirmation 
of the autonomous character of Article 13), on the other hand it is essential in order to stimulate 
the effectiveness of the national protection of the Convention  (principle of subsidiarity).  
Concerning the second role, Article 13 is linked with the rule contained in Article 35 (exhaustion 
of domestic remedies before bringing an Article 34 application). As the Court said in Kudla: 
 
The purpose of Article 35 § 1, which sets out the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, is to afford 
the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against 
them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, as a recent authority, Selmouni v. 
France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-V). The rule in Article 35 § 1 is based on the 
assumption, reflected in Article 13 (with which it has a close affinity), that there is an effective 
domestic remedy available in respect of the alleged breach of an individual’s Convention rights (ibid.). 
 
Here lies the positive obligation for member states to guarantee the availability at national level 
of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms. The effect of 
Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of 
an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. The inexistence 
of such a remedy immediately entails a violation of Article 13. 
 
The right to human material conditions of detention has been a privileged standpoint for the 
development of procedural requirements, to the point of serving as a matrix for a ius commune 
of the right to an effective remedy in the prison field, then transposed to other areas of prison 
life, in particular those also falling under Article 3, such as the protection of health. Thus in 
particular the articulation of two fundamental requirements, relating to the obligation placed on 
States to provide a preventive remedy, capable of preventing or stopping ill-treatment, and a 
compensatory remedy to enable the compensation for the damage that has resulted. 
 
As to the characteristics of the remedies, the Court’s case law has evolved and densified the 
procedural requirements, making a comparison with the canons of fair trial. As a matter of 
facts, the Court has investigated on various matters concerning the procedural requirements 
related to Article 13: 
 
• Nature of the complaint body 
Concerning the nature of the complaints body, the Court considers that the "national body" to 
which this provision refers does not necessarily need to be a legal institution. If it is not, its 
powers and the guarantees that it offers shall be taken into account in assessing the 
effectiveness of the remedy available before it 158 . Taking into account the traditionally 
acknowledged place, in national law, of remedies within the penitentiary authorities, the main 
question from this point of view is to know if such a system meets the requirements of article 
13. In this regard, the acceptance, for the purposes of article 13, of non-legal mechanisms, 
sometimes leads to ambiguous formulations regarding physical conditions of detention, which 
implies that recourse to a higher level of the penitentiary authority may be regarded as 
sufficient.  
Although the States are free to choose the nature of the configuration of the recourse to be 
implemented this has not prevented the Court from promoting very specific models. Thus, in 
the case of Ananyev v. Russia, the Court promotes before the constitution ex nihilo of a 
mechanism potentially involving external people, who may not necessarily be legal 
professionals, citing the examples of the Dutch complaint commissions and British Boards of 
                                                             
158 See Kudła v. Poland, op. cit., paragraph 157. 
36 
 
Visitors159. This position is repeated in the Bulgarian pilot judgment160 (§282). The more 
prudent Hungarian pilot judgment161 does not refer the State to any particular system.  
Furthermore, the Court may also itself impose the intervention of another legal body. Thus, in 
the case of the detainees placed in disciplinary accommodation, which was unfit for 
habitation162, the Court expressly provided, with regard to the importance of the repercussions 
of detention in a disciplinary cell, the necessity for a "legal body", which must examine both 
the form and the content of such a measure. Such a solution may however be regarded as 
extending the requirement for the intervention of a judge, dedicated to the neighbouring field 
of isolation as a security measure (that may last for several years).  
The Italian case can be an interesting point of view of the general and specific requirements 
attached to Article 13. Concerning the nature of the national authority, the then existing remedy 
in Italy was  constituted by a procedure in front of the judicial authority specialized in 
penitentiary issues (Magistratura di Sorveglianza).  In the Torreggiani pilot judgment163 the 
Court affirms not only that the remedy deriving from Articles 35 and 69 of the Penitentiary law 
is ineffective164, and that no compensatory remedy exists165, but meaningfully the Court also 
declares that no common normative ideology exists, within the Italian interpretative 
community166, on their role as protector of prisoners’ rights167. This constituted a real failure in 
the domestic legal order, which results in a defeat of the system of human rights’ protection at 
a national level. This case shows how a contextualist, anti-formalist and effectiveness-driven 
approach to the interpretation of the scope of Article 13 and the right to an effective remedy 
can implement and substantiate the notion of access to justice in prison. The mere nominalist 
approach (a ‘judicial’ body) is rejected and an assessment of all the features and the 
                                                             
159 The latter reference is the result of an error to the extent that this mechanism, which was already no longer in 
force, did not meet the requirements pronounced by the Court itself.  
160  
161 Varga and others v. Hungary, cited above 
162 In the Payet case, the cells in the disciplinary wing had no windows but an opaque dome in the ceiling. The air 
vents were infested with birds and the walking areas were frequently flooded with rainwater. The applicant remained 
there for 45 days. In a second judgment, the applicant was placed in a cell that had been burnt out where there was 
a suffocating odour.  
163 Torreggiani and Others v. Italy,  [GC], (Applications n. 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09 et al.) 
164 Torreggiani, cit, § 97: “le seul recours indiqué par le gouvernement défendeur dans les présentes affaires qui 
était susceptible d’améliorer les conditions de détention dénoncées, à savoir la réclamation devant le juge 
d’application des peines en vertu des articles 35 et 69 de la loi sur l’administration pénitentiaire, est un recours qui, 
bien qu’accessible, n’est pas effectif en pratique, dans la mesure où il ne permet pas de mettre rapidement fin à 
l’incarcération dans des conditions contraires à l’article 3 de la Convention (paragraphe 55 ci-dessus).” 
165 Ibidem: “D’autre part, le Gouvernement n’a pas démontré l’existence d’un recours qui permettrait aux personnes 
ayant été incarcérées dans des conditions ayant porté atteinte à leur dignité d’obtenir une quelconque forme de 
réparation pour la violation subie”. 
166 For a comprehensive theoretical approach to the concept of interpretative community from a legal realistic 
perspective,  see E.Santoro, Diritto e diritti: lo stato di diritto nell'era della globalizzazione. Studi genealogici: Albert 
Venn Dicey e il Rule of law, Giappichelli, Torino, 2008. 
167 Torreggiani, cit, § 97: “À cet égard, elle observe que la jurisprudence récente attribuant au juge de l’application 
des peines le pouvoir de condamner l’administration à payer une indemnisation pécuniaire est loin de constituer 
une pratique établie et constante des autorités nationales”. See also §§ 20-22. It is worthy to note that the only 
judicial intervention granting a judicial redress was the decision of the Surveillance judge of Lecce, 9 June 2011, 
according to which: “it does not appear as a convincing reconstruction the fact that the Surveillance judge should 
limit himself/herself to ascertain the infringement of the detainee’s right, assuring its protection directly, without 
prejudice to the possibility for the prisoner to obtain a compensation for damages suffered as a result of the 
established injury” and condemned the administration to pay “as a compensation for damages the total amount of  
220.00 €” (See, contra, Surveillance Judge of Udine, 24 December 2011, Surveillance judge of Vercelli, 18 April 
2012 and Corte di Cassazione, n. 4772/2013).  
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characteristics of the procedure, the power of the judicial body and enforceability of its 
decisions is required.  
• Procedure and accessibility 
Concerning the procedure and accessibility for the prisoner, although the Court has abstained 
from providing a model for the system of recourse that is best able to meet the requirements 
of article 13, there is a clear preference for independent authorities or a specialist judge, taking 
into account the specific concern of the responsiveness of the mechanism and its knowledge 
of the penitentiary environment, but also its accessibility for detainees. Various aspects are 
taken into account, to varying degrees, in this regard: the cost of the proceedings, the 
complexity of the rules and the procedures, protection against reprisals, etc. 
In the Ananyev judgment, the Court is satisfied that the procedure for preventive remedy 
provided for by domestic law is implemented at no cost to the applicant (§109). For the 
compensatory remedy to be established in performance of the judgment, it asserts that it must 
not include a regime with legal costs that place an excessive burden on an applicant who's 
action is with good cause (§228). On the grounds of article 6, in a general manner case law 
considers that the capacity for an applicant to pay legal costs, and the stage of the proceedings 
where these fees are required are also elements to be taken into account to know if access to 
the judge may be hindered. Restrictions of a purely financial nature, with no relation to the 
outlook for the success of the claim, may be subject to a particularly thorough examination. 
The Court has proven to be rather severe with regard to mechanisms including fees for seizing 
the judge regarding conditions of detention168.   
• Access to legal aid 
As for access to legal aid, case law appears to be rather sparse. From the perspective of a fair 
trial, it takes into account the absence of legal aid but declares in its conclusions, not on the 
grounds of right to access to a judge, which is usually the grounds on which it considers the 
issue of free legal aid, but regarding a failure to be personally heard before a judicial body169. 
It should however be noted that, in its judgment in Aden Ahmed v. Malta of 23 July 2013170, 
regarding issues associated with the physical conditions for the retention of illegal immigrants, 
and for which the findings may be transposed to disputes regarding the prison system, the 
Court expressly asserted that the absence of a structured system of legal aid posed in itself a 
problem in terms of access to recourse, regardless of the merits thereof (§66). However, it 
does not seem that such a position has been taken at this time in a penitentiary dispute, 
whereas a country such as Russia, which has been subject to a pilot judgment, does not offer 
free access to a lawyer in this area. In reality, the Court insists rather on the seizing of 
competent organs by the detainees themselves, emphasizing the simplicity of the 
procedures171 or requiring the adaptation of rules governing establishing the facts. 
• Fear of reprisal 
The major obstacle to exercising means to rights in prison that is constituted by fear of reprisals 
now seems to be taken into account by the Court. In the judgment Neshkov and others v. 
Bulgaria, the Court therefore went to the trouble of specifying that the detainees must be able 
to pursue channels of recourse with no fear of punishment or prejudicial consequences due 
thereto (§191), thanks to the support of the European Prison Rules. The Court bases itself 
mutatis mutandis on the solution given in a case where the applicant was placed in isolation 
                                                             
168 article 70.4 of the European Prison Rules of 2006 
169 Vasilyev v. Russia, 10 January 2012, no 28370/05; Beresnev v. Russia, 24 December 2013 no 37975/02. See 
the report on article 6 in this regard.  
170 no. 55352/12 
171 Neshkov, cited above, §191; mutatis mutandis, Marin Kostov v. Bulgaria, no. 13801/07, § § 47-48, 24 July 2012) 
38 
 
due to their complaints to the prosecutor172. This innovation has not at this stage resulted in an 
"operational" instruction, which may require a specific protection mechanism for a person 
making a complaint.   
• A regulated process, ensuring the participation of the applicant 
To satisfy the requirements of article 13, the consideration of claims by detainees must follow 
a procedure which is defined by legislation and that ensures the participation of the interested 
parties. This means both allowing the facts to be established independently and avoiding the 
claims of detainees being ignored. On the one hand, the interested parties must be able to 
comment on the observations made by the authority in its defence, in order that their 
allegations may not be swept away by contradictory statements made by the penitentiary 
services. On the other hand, the body must be obliged by procedural rules to rule effectively 
on the claims for which it was seized.     
In this respect, authorities such as the Prosecutor, responsible in some central and eastern 
European States for checking the legitimacy of the acts of the authority, were considered to be 
inadequate for the purposes of article 13, as they did not allow the detainee to follow the 
progress of the proceedings and to dispute the statements of the authority. Thus, the Court 
has analysed the system in force in Russia, in which the public prosecutors departments may 
make surprise inspections of detention, investigate and trigger proceedings for an offence in 
the case of failings, to which the penitentiary authorities are legally bound to respond within 
one month, in the form of a report stating the measures taken to remedy them. In spite of the 
coercive nature of the proceedings, the Court considered that this system may not be 
considered as effective recourse, as the prosecutor is not obliged to hear from the applicant 
and that the latter has no right to information on how the monitoring body has treated the claim, 
as the proceedings occur between the prosecutor and the inspected body173. The same 
assessment was given of the Bulgarian system 174 . It should be noted that the same 
considerations, further to those regarding the absence of an enforceable powers, led the Court 
to refuse to see Ombudsman institutions and the like as effective recourse under the terms of 
article 13175. 
It should be noted that the in the inspection undertaken under article 6§1 by the Court in 
compensation disputes regarding conditions of detention are mostly embodied by the issue of 
the participation of the applicants in hearings, regarding situations in which their witness 
statement is deemed to be crucial to settle the dispute176. 
• Prima facie case and Burden of Proof.  A way of re-balancing the legal vulnerability 
of prisoners 
According to the European judges, “for a domestic remedy in respect of conditions of detention 
to be effective, the authority or court in charge of the case must deal with it in accordance with 
the relevant principles laid down in the Court’s case-law”177 . This requirement concerns 
primarily understanding the facts and, as a result, the administration of proof that must be 
equivalent to that in force before the Court. In this matter, with no directive in the Convention 
or the Rules of the Court, case law has established a general criteria which is, very strictly, that 
                                                             
172 Reference made to article 70.4 of the European Prison Rules of 2006, and, mutatis mutandis, Marin Kostov v. 
Bulgaria, no. 13801/07, § § 47-48, 24 July 2012. 
173 Pavlenko, no 42371/02 , §§  88-89, 1 April 2010; Aleksandr Makarov, no 15217/07 §86, and Ananyev, cited 
above, §99. 
174 Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, cited above, §212. 
175 See for example Ananyev and others, cited above, §§105-106 
176 See the chapter on article 6.  
177 Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, 27 January 2015, no 36925/10, §187. 
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of proof "beyond any reasonable doubt"178. As noted by Pastre Belda, "this means, therefore, 
a principal standard that is at least rigorous and that, first and foremost, places the burden of 
proof exclusively on the person claiming violation of the Convention.”179.  
However, to ensure that the regime of proof does not weaken the protection afforded by the 
Convention, the Court has greatly softened the strictness of this principle, stressing that the 
procedures followed before it do not always presuppose the principle by which the person 
claiming something must prove the truth of its allegations180. This easing is particularly clear 
with regard to imprisonment181. Indeed, as found by Pastre Belda, "as establishing the truth of 
the alleged facts is a condition for the applicability of the immaterial provisions of the 
Convention, it is therefore fundamental for the applicant who is deprived of their liberty of 
movement, that the burden of proof is not exclusively placed on them, all the more so for 
serious allegations"182. The Court takes into account the context for the interpretation of the 
requirements of the Convention, i.e. the fact that the applicant depends entirely on the 
authority, making it impossible to demonstrate the alleged facts under normal conditions. 
Almost all of the evidence that may prove the truth of the allegations is held by the respondent 
authority, which controls access to the rooms in question and concretely holds the defendant 
in a situation of subjection. Therefore the Court asserts that "it falls upon the national authorities 
to gather the data that may demonstrate that a situation that is subject to a claim by an 
applicant to Strasbourg complies with the Convention"183.  
The same applies regarding disputes concerning conditions of detention. The Court always 
asserts that the procedure provided for by the Convention does not lend itself to a strict 
application of the affirmanti incumbit probatio principle as, "inevitably, the respondent 
government is sometimes the only one to have access to all the information that may confirm 
or refute the assertions of the applicant"; "the mere fact that the Government's version 
contradicts that of the applicant shall not, if no relevant document or explanation is provided 
by the Government, lead the Court to reject the allegations of the interested part as 
unproven"184. 
By virtue of the equivalence expected between the protection offered by a domestic judge and 
a common law judge from the Convention, the Court requires that they implement similar, or 
identical, rules of evidence. Thus the pilot judgment in Ananyev and others v. Russia recalls in 
a very explicit manner (§228) that the requirement for the applicants in the mechanism for 
remedy imposed by the Russian authorities should be satisfied by a simple initial proof of poor 
treatment (prima facie case). It should merely be required that the interested party produces 
elements that are easily accessible to them, such as detailed descriptions of their conditions 
of detention, declarations by witnesses or answers from inspection bodies (ombudsman, 
monitoring commission, etc.); it would then be down to the authorities to refute these 
allegations by producing documents demonstrating that the conditions of detention are not in 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 
                                                             
178 Ireland v. United Kingdom, that also specifies that the system is that of the free assessment of the evidence: 
"the Court, being master of its own procedure and of its own rules (...) has complete freedom in assessing not only 
the admissibility and the relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it" (§617). 
179 Thesis, cited above, p.  
180 Principle of affirmanti incubit probatio 
181 Also see the section regarding violence between detainees and by penitentiary staff, as well as that on protection 
of privacy. 
182 Thesis, p.  
183  Wegera v. Poland, 19 January 2010, no 141/07, §69, regarding denying detainee's visitation rights. 
184 Brânduşe v. Romania, no 6586/03, § 48, 7 April 2009; Ananyev and others v. Russia, cited above, § 123; 
Torreggiani v. Italy, cited above, §72 
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This system of protection meets the intention to make mechanisms for remedies work in spite 
of the obstacles to exercising these rights in detention, which arises due to the radical structural 
imbalance that characterizes the situation of the two parties to the process. It works in two 
phases. A first phase is marked by an adaptation of the purpose and means of evidence, which 
is in such a way that the applicant is not held to a procedure with a "burden of proof", or the 
obligation to demonstrate its complaints to give them sufficient grounds, which allows the 
opening of the second phase of consideration. This is embodied by the implementation of a 
mechanism of negative proof, which places the burden on the authority to refute the assertions 
of its opponent by producing elements to disprove them.  
 1.2.2 ARTICLE 6 : A TWOFOLD PERSPECTIVE  
Since the beginning, the Court has recognized the existence of an essential link between the 
principle of the rule of law, access to justice and the effectiveness of the fundamental rights 
set out in the Convention. In Golder (1975)185, a landmark case for the right to a fair trial and 
for the right of access to justice for detainees, the Court granted the right of access to the court 
for a detainee who wished to bring a defamation action against a prison officer who had 
accused him of having participated in a disturbance. The Court expressly stated that access 
to the judge, although not expressly proclaimed by the Convention, is an "inherent 
element"186  of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention and that “one can scarcely 
conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the courts” 187. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court followed a teleological interpretation of the Convention, 
in light of the “universally recognized fundamental principles of law” and, in particular, in light 
of the principle of the rule of law.  
Following the same approach and according to fundamental principles of any democratic 
society, the Court stated a few years later, in its judgment Campbell et Fell v. United Kingdom, 
that “justice cannot stop at the prison gate and there is, in appropriate cases, no warrant for 
depriving inmates of the safeguards of Article 6” 188.  
Prisoners access to justice thus becomes the corollary both of the principle of the rule of law 
and of the democratic principle. Beyond the statement according to which “prisoners 
in GENERAL CONTINUE to ENJOY ALL the FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS and freedoms 
guaranteed under the Convention, SAVE for the right to liberty”, the Court has recognized, in 
certain circumstances, reinforced protection and specific positive obligations of the State 
justified by the special vulnerability of detainees.  The guarantees provided and the extent of 
positive obligations depend on the context in which prisoners' access to justice is at stake. 
The Court's case law shows two different approaches, depending on whether it concerns 
access to justice for prisoners in criminal proceedings or in any other situation concerning 
prison litigation. 
In the first perspective, the Court's case law recognizes the paramount importance of the right 
of defense in criminal proceedings and gives greater protection to the right to legal assistance. 
In this way, legal assistance and legal aid are closely connected. In the judgment Salduz v. 
Turkey189, the Court affirmed that: “the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be 
effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental 
                                                             
185 Golder c. Royaume-Uni, arrêt du 21 février 1975, n. 4451/70 
186 Golder, précité, § 34 
187 Ibidem.  
188 Campbell et Fell c. Royaume-Uni, arrêt du 28 juin 1984, n. 7819/77 et 7878/77, § 69. 
189 Salduz c. Turquie, (GC), arrêt du 27 novembre 2008, n. 36391/02. 
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features of a fair trial190”. This is particularly relevant and is provided with a reinforced protection 
whenever the person is in police custody or in pre-trial detention. The reinforced protection is 
justified by the special vulnerability of the defendants, exposed to the risk of being subjected 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment during police interrogation, and is intended to 
ensure that the right to remain silent and not to contribute to one’s own criminalisation remains 
concrete and effective.  
Within the second perspective, the case-law on legal aid in any other penitentiary field shows 
a lack of consistency, mainly due to two reasons: the first being the limited applicability of 
Article 6 to proceedings concerning the prison system; the second being the fact that despite 
the large case-law on prison overcrowding and conditions of detention, on one hand the Court 
recognizes the right to an effective remedy (art. 13) to complain about the conditions of 
detention, calling on State to enforce a system of remedies, on the other hand this has not 
implied the express recognition of the right to legal assistance in this kind of proceedings191.  
• Civil limb 
The evolution in the field of civil litigation within the realm of public law has inevitably raised 
the question of Article 6 § 1 coming into play with regards to the exercise of its official powers 
by the public authority vis-à-vis prisoners. From this point of view, referring to the principle of 
the judgement Golder v. The United Kingdom, the Court has stated that the analytical 
framework that has been developed in this matter by its case-law is applicable under general 
law conditions. Three parameters are taken into consideration by the Court in order to tackle 
the issue of the applicability of Article 6 § 1 in its civil limb192: the parameter of the existence of 
a “dispute over a right”, the parameter of the existence, of which it can be said in a defensible 
way that it is recognized in the domestic order, and finally the parameter of the “civil character” 
of this right. These different aspects are laid down as distinct and cumulative conditions, but 
the case-law portraits them rather as links of a chain that is closely interlinked with the 
qualification pursuant to Article 6 § 1, as certain characteristics can be taken into account under 
any line of argument, depending on the case. Moreover, the three parameters exposed below 
are a response to a pedagogical concern, as they do not represent a systematic description of 
the different stages of the Court’s approach.     
As for the first aspect, Article 6 § 1 shall only apply if the “dispute”, which can concern both the 
very existence of a right as well as its scope or the procedures of its exercise, is “real and 
serious”, in the sense that the outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the 
right in question, “mere tenuous connections or remote consequences not being sufficient to 
bring Article 6 § 1 into play”. In other words, a peripheral matter of the litigation cannot be taken 
artificially into account when characterizing such right. It is necessary to take into consideration 
the restrictions of the individual’s rights of a civil character, “on account of the nature of the 
restrictions (for instance, a prohibition on receiving more than a certain number of visits from 
family members each month or the ongoing monitoring of correspondence and telephone calls) 
and of their possible repercussions (for instance, difficulty in maintaining family ties or 
relationships with non-family members, exclusion from outdoor exercise)” 193  (§ 106). 
Moreover, if a claim brought before a court is to be presumed real and serious194, this would 
                                                             
190 Ibidem § 51. Ce principe, réaffirmé dans l’affaire Salduz, avait déjà été reconnu par la Cour Européenne des 
droits de l’homme dans l’affaire Poitrimol c. France, 23 Novembre 1993, § 34.  
191 Voir infra 
192 The Court is not always consistent in the way it deconstructs the conditions for the applicability of Article 6 § 1, 
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of the applicant, deemed “erratic”, as he had filed multiple claims regarding his conditions of detention to different 
42 
 
change if there are clear indications proving that the claim is frivolous or devoid of any 
foundation. In a civil claim against the prison administration concerning the mere presence in 
the prison of HIV-infected prisoners, the Court ruled that the injury required by the domestic 
order to grant a financial compensation was impossible to characterize based on the charge 
invoked by the applicant195. The same solution has been established with regards to the claim 
of injury arising from the absence of film screenings in the prison196.  
The second aspect implies that the right in question in the case be recognized in the national 
legal order. As a matter of fact, “the Court should not create, by way of interpretation of Article 
6 § 1, substantive law that has no legal basis in the concerned State”. In order to assess the 
legal status of the applicant’s claims in national law, the Court takes as its point of departure 
the provisions of the relevant national law and the interpretation given to them by national 
courts197. From this point of view, the Court states that it needs very serious reasons to go 
against the highest national courts by ruling, unlike them, that the person concerned could 
claim in a defensible way that he/she held a right recognized by domestic law198. However, the 
autonomy of the analytical framework pursuant to Article 6 § 1 equally applies here, and the 
Court has to examine the legal density of the interests claimed by the applicant. In making this 
appraisal, ”one must look beyond the appearances and the language used and concentrate 
on the realities of the situation”199.  
For an understanding, pursuant to Article 6-1, of the “right”, the discretionary character of the 
powers of the authorities in the exercise of their prerogatives can be taken into consideration, 
and can even play a decisive role. However, the mere presence of a discretionary element in 
the wording of a legal provision does not per se exclude the existence of a right200. In the Grand 
Chamber case Enea v. Italy [GC], the respondent Government pointed out that the choice of 
institution in which a prisoner served his/her sentence fell exclusively within the scope of the 
administrative authorities’ discretionary powers and was based on “considerations falling 
wholly within the sphere of public law”. These included order and security and the need to 
prevent possible acts of violence or escape attempts by prisoners. The Italian Government 
explained that “in the presence of such extensive powers the subjective situation of the 
prisoner and his or her aspirations and claims were the subject of purely residual protection 
which could not have the same ranking in the legal system as the protection afforded to 
“rights”.” (§ 90). 
The Grand Chamber objects that “any restriction affecting these individual civil rights must be 
open to challenge in judicial proceedings, on account of the nature of the restrictions (…).By 
this means it is possible to achieve the fair balance which must be struck between the 
constraints facing the State in the prison context on the one hand and the protection of 
prisoners’ rights on the other” (§ 106). In other words, the balance between the requirements 
of order and security and the protection of prisoners’ interests is a matter for the courts, as the 
former cannot constitute in principle an obstacle to judicial review.  
The sequence following the analysis of the legal status of the “right” in question leads the Court 
to research, according to the criterion outlined in the Grand Chamber judgement Vilho 
                                                             
instances and on different bases, the Court deems that the actions carried out by the person concerned cannot be 
considered as vexatious or abusive (§ 113).     
195 Skorobogatykh v. Russia (dec.). 
196 Artyomov v. Russia. 
197 Masson and Van Zon v. The Netherlands, § 49. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, § 38, § 121. 
200 Camps v. France (dec.), and Ellès and others v. Switzerland, § 16. 
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Eskelinen and others v. Finland [GC]201, whether the national courts, in similar circumstances, 
accept to examine an applicant’s claim202. It is the so-called criterion of the “benevolent 
judicialization”203.   
As for the different parameters, and taking into account, if need be, the requirements flowing 
from international law, the Court assesses whether the right has a legal basis in national law. 
Hence, it is the consideration of the absence of such a “right” to a prison leave in the domestic 
order of Luxembourg that has led the Court to rule that the provisions of Article 6 § 1 shall not 
apply to the requests for temporary permission to leave the correctional institution204. In the 
case Enea v. Italy [GC],  the Grand Chamber initially takes into account the position of Italy’s 
Constitutional Court, which has censured certain provisions of the law on the prison system, 
because they did not envisage any judicial remedy against a decision that may influence the 
rights of a prisoner (§ 100 and § 39). Subsequently, the Court bases its line of argument on 
the fact that “most of the restrictions to which the applicant was allegedly subjected relate to a 
set of prisoners’ rights which the Council of Europe has recognised by means of the European 
Prison Rules, adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 1987 and elaborated on in a 
Recommendation of 11 January 2006 (Rec(2006)2). Although this Recommendation is not 
legally binding on the member States, the great majority of them recognise that prisoners enjoy 
most of the rights to which it refers and provide for avenues of appeal against measures 
restricting those rights.” (§ 101).  
Independently of the legal qualification used in national law, the Court takes into account, as 
has been already said, the substantive content of the “right” and the effects attached to it by 
the concerned State’s domestic law, with a view to determine whether it is of a “civil character”. 
In this perspective, the proceedings that in national law flow from “public law”, because they 
bring into play the powers of public authorities, flow in principle from the civil limb of Article 6 § 
1, as their outcome is decisive for rights and obligations of a private character. 
Disputes that have accrual ramifications clearly fall within the scope of this category. The same 
is true of compensation claims filed by prisoners concerning acts of violence perpetrated by 
state officials 205 , forcible feeding during a hunger strike 206 , poor material conditions of 
detention207 or inadequate health care208. It also applies to restrictions imposed on a prisoner’s 
right to receive money from outside209. 
Similarly, the Court has no difficulty in ruling that the restrictions on family rights fall within the 
scope of the rights of a private character, whether the question is a limitation of access to the 
visiting room210 or security measures surrounding visits by relatives, such as the use of a 
separation system211.  
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Besides this hard core of the rights of a private character, the Court’s conception of what falls 
within the scope of the “sphere of personal rights”, and is as such of a “civil nature”, is 
comprehensive and comprises potentially a wide variety of situations occurring in prison. The 
Court has for instance taken into consideration, besides the restrictions on the exercise of the 
right of access, the limitations of access to the prison yard, resulting from the implementation 
of a high security regime212. In the case Musumeci v. Italy, the Court makes a reference, 
without further explanation, to the limitations imposed on the prisoner’s “personal freedom” that 
are associated with a reinforced surveillance system (E.I.V.), echoing the foundation of the 
relevant case-law of Italy’s Constitutional Court. In the case Enea v. Italy [GC], which concerns 
the same measure, the Grand Chamber focuses its assessment on the most typical impacts 
on family links and heritage issues (§ 103). Without elaborating on the aspects of the 
restrictions imposed on the rights of the person concerned, in the case Razvyazkin v. Russia, 
the Court refers to the solutions of the judgements Ganci, Musumeci, Enea v. Italy and Gülmez 
v. Turkey, in order to state that the confinement of a prisoner to the disciplinary block falls 
within the scope of the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 (§ 133).   
It is quite remarkable that prison litigation is not among the domains excluded in principle from 
Article 6 § 1213. Because they represent particularly sensitive measures from the point of view 
of fundamental rights, the European case-law has allowed accessing the Court whenever the 
States were attempting to justify, in the name of security constraints and of the preservation of 
internal order, keeping a space that is completely subject to the discretion of the administration. 
Article 6 § 1 has compounded Article 13214, strengthening the obligations imposed on the 
States. However, the case-law is characterized by a certain incoherence, since the issue of 
needing to understand which rights are held by the prisoner seriously affects the coherence of 
the protection granted by the civil limb of Article 6 § 1. 
• Criminal limb. Temporal and material scope of Article 6 of the Convention. 
The Court’s use of autonomous concepts has resulted in including in the scope of Article 6 
issues excluded from the criminal trial stricto sensu and from fair trial guarantees. The dynamic 
interpretation of Strasbourg judges has allowed the scope of the criminal trial to be extended 
to the pre-trial and, under certain conditions, to disciplinary proceedings215.  
With regard to the first point, the Court has at a very early stage recognized that right to legal 
assistance may be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of the 
trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with its provisions 
(Imbiroscia c. Suisse ; Salduz v. Turkey216). 
Right to legal assistance becomes extremely important in the pre-trial stage in order to 
compensate for the defendant’ particularly vulnerable position: exposed to the risk of pressure 
                                                             
212 Ibid.  
213 Litigation concerning the entry and the residence of foreigners, taxation and voting, see Vilho Eskelinin v. 
Finland, § 61. 
214 See Ganci v. Italy. In this respect it should be noted on the one hand that the Court is in charge of the legal 
qualification of the facts of the case (Gatt v. Malta, § 19; Jusic v. Switzerland, § 99) and that on the other hand, in 
the framework outlined by the decision about the admissibility of the request, the Court can address any question 
of fact or of law that may arise during the proceedings before the Court itself (Guerra and others v. Italy, § 44, 
Chahal v. The United Kingdom, § 86 and Ahmed v. Austria, § 43). 
215 M. DELMAS-MARTY, La matière pénale au sens de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme comme 
flou du droit pénal, RSC 1987, p. 819; B. RANDAZZO, I principi del diritto e del processo penale nella giurisprudenza 
della Corte Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo, Quaderno predisposto in occasione dell’incontro trilaterale delle Corti 
costituzionali italiana, spagnola e portoghese, Madrid 13-15 Ottobre 2011. 
216 Imbiroscia c. Suisse, arrêt du 24 novembre 1993, n. 13972/88 ; Salduz, § 50.  
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from the police force in order to obtain information and threatened both for his physical integrity 
and for their right not to incriminate himself.  
 
With regard to the second point, the Court considers that proceedings concerning the 
execution of sentences do not fall within the limb of the criminal head of Article 6 217, however 
the question arose at an early stage as to whether “charges” being possibly brought during the 
enforcement of the sentence are subject to the fair trial safeguards, even as they are 
considered by disciplinary instances, and not by criminal courts. However, a criminal charge 
which arises during the execution of the sentence may be subjected to the guarantees of a fair 
trial, even if it is taken in charge by disciplinary bodies and not by criminal courts.  
The European Commission of Human Rights, in the case Kiss v. The United Kingdom, came 
quickly out in favor of an application of the criteria of the judgement Engel and others v. 
Netherlands to disciplinary disputes in the prison system, which was supported by the Court a 
few years later.   
 
The provision of procedural safeguards in disciplinary proceedings has allowed to restore the 
rule of law in prison and to set up of European standards of protection. However, the 
“autonomous concepts” potentialities do not seem to have been fully exploited by the Court, 
which has locked its reasoning into a binary logic relying on the category of ‘measures’: 
custodial measures as well as those involving deprivation of liberty and any other measure. In 
the absence of an extension of the penalty actually imposed, the disciplinary procedure is still 
out of the reach of the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1, even though it is subject to ‘legality’ 
requirements with regards to the charges and the scale of penalties, to judgement rituals, etc., 
which have been copied from those of criminal law enforcement218.  
 
The Court has built its jurisprudence based on two leading cases: Campbell and Fell v. United 
Kingdom and Ezeh et Connors v. United Kingdom219 and applied, in the prison context, the 
‘Engel Criteria’, developed in the context of disciplinary sanctions imposed on military 
personnel. In Engel v. Netherland220, the Court stated that “in a society subscribing to the rule 
of law, there belong to the "criminal" sphere deprivations of liberty liable to be imposed as a 
punishment, except those which by their nature, duration or manner of execution cannot be 
appreciably detrimental. The seriousness of what is at stake, the traditions of the Contracting 
States and the importance attached by the Convention to respect for the physical liberty of the 
person all require that this should be so” (Ezeh et Connors c. Royaume-Uni, GC, § 126; Engel 
§ 82). In Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom and Ezeh and Connors v. United Kingdom, the 
Court followed a substantial interpretation in order to assess the criminal nature of disciplinary 
measures and considered that the loss of remission and awards of additional days by the 
governor constitute fresh deprivations of liberty imposed for punitive reasons after a finding of 
culpability (§§ 123-124). In its later judgments, Young221 et Black222 v. United Kingdom, the 
                                                             
217 Aux termes de la jurisprudence de la Cour, l’article 6 de la Convention ne s’applique pas à l’examen d’une 
demande tendant à l’octroi de l’amnistie ni à des mesures visant à la réinsertion sociale, comme une libération 
conditionnelle ou des permissions de sortir, ni aux procédures concernant l’assignation à un régime de haute 
sécurité. Voire H. De Suremain, L’article 6 de la CEDH et le droit de la Prison, European Prison Litigation Network. 
218 H. De Suremain, précité.  
219 Ezeh et Connors c. Royaume-Uni (GC), arrêt du 9 octobre 2003, n. 39665/98 et 40086/98.  
220 Engel et autres c. Pays-Bas, arrêt du 8 juin 1976, n. 5100/71 5101/71 5102/71 5354/72 5370/72 
221 Young c. Royaume-Uni, arrêt du 16 janvier 2007, n. 60682/00. 
222 Black c. Royaume-Uni, arrêt du 16 janvier 2007, n. 56745/00. 
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European judge confirmed this approach and found that Art. 6 of the Convention was 
applicable in the light of the third ‘Engel criterion’223. 
 
The presumption arising from the third Engel criterion is privileged to have set an automatic 
application of Article 6 guarantees as soon as the extension of time in detention to be actually 
served is at stake. On the other hand, this approach has encouraged the adoption of a 
restrictive interpretation and a sort of opposite presumption of non-application of Article 6 when 
the disciplinary sanction did not result in an extension of time in detention. 
While the criminal nature of disciplinary sanctions resulting in an extension of the duration of 
detention is very clear in the Court's case law, the same cannot be said for disciplinary 
measures or, more generally, for disciplinary sanctions involving a serious deterioration in 
prison conditions. 
In some cases against France (Payet c. France 224 , Cocaign c. France 225  et Plathey c. 
France226), disciplinary block was considered as a simple deterioration of detention conditions 
excluded from the criminal limb of Article 6.227.  
In the Payet case, the applicant was placed in solitary confinement for forty-five days and the 
Court stated that “it has not been shown that it (the sanction) in any way extended the length 
of the applicant's detention”228. As a consequence, the Court held that “the sanction inflicted 
on the applicant was not of such a nature and gravity as to fall within the criminal scope”229. 
The Court strikingly considered that severity threshold reached for Article 3 but not for Article 
6. Such restrictive interpretation is not justified in the light of the principle of coherence, 
according to which “the Convention must also be read as a whole and interpreted in such a 
way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions” (Stec et 
autres c. Royaume-Uni (déc.) [GC], n. 65731/01 et 65900/01). 
A similar approach was adopted in Cocaign v. France and Plathey v. France. 
In Stitic v. Croatie 230 , the Court found that the disciplinary penalties imposed on the 
applicant (solitary confinement) did not extend the applicant's prison term nor did it seriously 
aggravate the terms of the applicant's prison conditions. The Court seems to have taken into 
consideration not only the extension of time in detention, but also a new criterion, namely the 
serious aggravation of the conditions of detention. Nevertheless, in the Court's view, this 
sanction was not of such a nature and severity that the matter could be considered within the 
“criminal” sphere.  
Thus, the punitive character of a penalty in a disciplinary block is not relevant in this respect.  
On the one hand, the Court does not seem to consider the serious consequences that such a 
measure entails for prisoners. On the other hand, such reasoning, which puts the threshold of 
severity of the sanction so high, does not seem consistent with the evolution of the criminal 
                                                             
223 B. BELDA, Les droits de l’homme des personnes privées de liberté, Contribution à l’étude du pouvoir normatif 
de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruylant, 2010, p. 382 
224 Payet c. France, arrêt du 20 janvier 2011, n. 19606/08. 
225 Cocaign c. France, arrêt du 3 novembre 2011, n. 32010/07. 
226 Plathey c. France, arrêt du 10 novembre 2011, n. 48337/09. 
227 La Cour avait déjà configuré cette approche dans l’affaire X. c. Suisse, déc., 9 mai 1977, n. 7754/77, dans 
laquelle le requérant avait été puni avec 5 jours de cellule disciplinaire pour être rentré en retard d’une permission 
de sortir. 
228 « il n'a pas été démontré qu'elle (la sanction) ait en aucune manière allongé la durée de la détention du 
requérant ». 
229 « la sanction imposée au requérant n'était pas d'une nature et d'une gravité qui la fassent ressortir à la sphère 
pénale » 
230 Stitic c. Croatie, arrêt du 8 novembre 2007, n. 29660/03. 
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law, which increasingly includes non-custodial sentences, alternatives to detention, having a 
significantly lower punitive element than the solitary confinement.  
Such a restrictive interpretation is also not justified in the light of the principle consistently 
affirmed in the Court's case-law that “in a democratic society within the meaning of the 
Convention, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 6 para. 1 would not correspond to the aim and the purpose 
of that provision” (Delcourt v. Belgium, 17 January 1970, § 25, Series A no. 11).  
 
1.3. A SPECIFIC GUARANTEE: ACCESS TO LAWYER IN POLICE CUSTODY AS 
A PROTECTION TOOL AGAINST ILL-TREATMENTS  
“Pre-trial prisoners find themselves in one of the most vulnerable situations an individual can 
face during criminal proceedings, especially when they are denied access to legal assistance 
and information on their rights” (judge Sajo, in his separate opinion in the judgment, Simeonovi 
v. Bulgaria231).  
The Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the 
criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in 
which the offence charged will be considered at the trial232. Rights of defense are objectively 
compromised when defendants are deprived of liberty, not only because of difficulties to 
communicate with the outside world, but also because they are within police forces control and 
exposed to a risk of ill-treatment.  
As emphasized by the doctrine “the preliminary investigation coercive nature, having regard to 
the defendant deprivation of liberty and the police interrogation, should (...) command and 
justify that the person deprived of liberty may benefit from the most elementary procedural 
guarantees in order to compensate for the authorities' coercive power, and thus, to effectively 
protect his material rights during the preliminary investigation (such as the right to physical and 
moral integrity), or his procedural rights (such as the right to prepare his defence effectively) 
in the perspective of the subsequent phases (investigation and criminal trial)233”. 
Prompt access to a lawyer constitutes an important counterweight to the vulnerability of 
suspects in police custody, provides a fundamental safeguard against coercion and ill-
treatment of suspects by the police, and contributes to the prevention of miscarriages of justice 
and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or 
prosecuting authorities and the accused (Salduz § 55 ; Ibrahim § 255) 234.  
The right of an accused to legal assistance “is undoubtedly justified, especially in the initial 
stages of the proceedings when the accused has to confront the prosecuting authorities on 
rather unequal terms, and the fact that he is allowed the assistance of a legal specialist at the 
subsequent interrogations cannot effectively cure this defect” (judgment Imbroscia v. 
Switzerland, dissenting opinion of judge Lopes Rocha) 
Due to the coercive environment of police custody and the psychological constraints to which 
defendants are subjected during the first interrogations235 , no compensatory measures could 
effectively compensate for the absence of the lawyer in this phase of the proceedings. 
                                                             
231 Simeonovi c. Bulgarie (GC), arrêt du 12 mai 2017, n. 21980/04. 
232 Can c. Autriche, 12 juillet 1984, avis de la Commission, § 50 ; Salduz, précité, § 54. 
233 BELDA B., op. cit., p. 392.  
234 Ibrahim et autres c. Royaume-Uni (GC), arrêt du 13 septembre 2016, n. 50541/08 50571/08 50573/08 40351/09 
235 BELDA B.,  p. 394. 
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Immediate access to a lawyer able to provide the right of an accused not to incriminate 
him/herself and to remain silent, which is of the fundamental features of a fair trial 236. This right 
indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against 
the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in 
defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no 54810/00 §100. Salduz § 
54). The presence of the lawyer compensates for the asymmetry in the relationship between 
public prosecution and defendants and aims to ensure legality in the collection of the evidence  
Conscious of the fact that if the Convention does not stop at the gates of prisons, the control 
of the guarantees devoted thereto becomes much more difficult beyond the bars 
 (whether prisons or police stations), the Court has granted a particular importance to the 
presence of the lawyer in the early stages of police interrogations (Salduz § 52). The 
mandatory presence of a qualified outside observer is a fundamental guarantee against ill-
treatment and contributes to the achievement of a proper administration of justice.  
 
1.3.1. SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION AND ITS INTENSITY: THE RESTRICTIONS 
ADMITTED AND THE EXAMINATION OF THE OVERALL FAIRNESS OF THE 
TRIAL. 
 
In Salduz  judgment, the Court finds that only compelling reasons may exceptionally justify 
denial of access to a lawyer and  uch restriction – whatever its justification – must not unduly 
prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 (§ 55).  
The need to justify the restriction on the basis of compelling reasons implies two types of 
consequences: on the one hand, the existence of such reasons does not exempt the Court 
from assessing whether the refusal of access to a lawyer has not in any event resulted in an 
irreparable infringement of the defendant’s rights; on the other hand, the absence of such 
reasons determines a sort of presumption of violation of Article 6 of the Convention 
Such a presumption of violation is set out as an obiter dictum in Salduz, insofar as the Court 
states that ‘as a general rule’ (§55) only exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons 
can justify a restriction of the rights of the defence in this context. The Court's position is more 
explicit in the case of the use of incriminating statements made without the assistance of a 
                                                             
236 L’article 93 de l’Ensemble des règles minima pour le traitement des détenus (Résolution (73) 5 du Comité des 
Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe) est ainsi libellé : « Un prévenu doit, dès son incarcération, pouvoir choisir son 
avocat (...), et (...) recevoir des visites de son avocat en vue de sa défense. Il doit pouvoir préparer et remettre à 
celui-ci des instructions confidentielles, et en recevoir. Sur sa demande, toute facilité doit lui être accordée à cette 
fin. (...) Les entrevues entre le prévenu et son avocat peuvent être à portée de la vue mais ne peuvent pas être à 
portée d’ouïe directe ou indirecte d’un fonctionnaire de la police ou de l’établissement. ».  
La Recommandation Rec(2006)2 du Comité des Ministres aux États membres sur les règles pénitentiaires 
européennes, adoptée le 11 janvier 2006 lors de la 952e réunion des délégués des ministres, dispose en ses parties 
pertinentes : « 23.1  Tout détenu a le droit de solliciter des conseils juridiques et les autorités pénitentiaires doivent 
raisonnablement l’aider à avoir accès à de tels conseils. 
23.2 Tout détenu a le droit de consulter à ses frais un avocat de son choix sur n’importe quel point de droit. (...) 
23.5 Une autorité judiciaire peut, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, autoriser des dérogations à ce principe 
de confidentialité dans le but d’éviter la perpétration d’un délit grave ou une atteinte majeure à la sécurité et à la 
sûreté de la prison. ».  
L’article 14 § 3 b) du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques prévoit que toute personne accusée 
d’une infraction pénale a droit à « disposer du temps et des facilités nécessaires à la préparation de sa défense et 
à communiquer avec le conseil de son choix ». 
L’article 48 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux énonce que « le respect des droits de la défense est garanti à 
tout accusé ». 
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lawyer to support a conviction, in which case it stated that such use would ‘in principle’ 
irreparably infringe the rights of the defence (§ 55-56). 
The automatism of Salduz is questioned in Ibrahim v. the United Kingdom, concerning delayed 
access to a lawyer during police questioning owing to exceptionally serious and imminent 
threat to public safety237.  
In this case, the Grand Chamber stated that the absence of ‘compelling reasons’ to restrict 
access to a lawyer does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 c) of the 
Convention (Ibrahim, §262), but is nevertheless an indication that a compromise of the 
guarantees of the defence has taken place and requires a very strict control by the Court and 
a reversal of the burden of proof. It is up to the Government to demonstrate that the restriction 
of access to legal assistance for the accused did not irreparably affect the overall fairness of 
the trial (ibidem, § 265). 
The Ibrahim judgment provided the Court with an opportunity to clarify the definition of the 
"compelling reasons" for delaying access to the lawyer, configured as exceptional hypotheses, 
of a temporary nature and based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances 
of the case.  
The Court specified that the existence of an urgent need to avert serious adverse 
consequences for life, liberty or physical integrity in a given case can amount to compelling 
reasons to restrict access to legal advice for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. 
In order to assess whether compelling reasons have been demonstrated, it is of relevance, 
whether the decision to restrict legal advice had a basis in domestic law and whether the scope 
and content of any restrictions on legal advice were sufficiently circumscribed by law so as to 
guide operational decision-making by those responsible for applying them (ibidem, §§ 258 et 
259). 
The judgment shows which circumstances should be taken into account in order to evaluate 
the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal 
proceedings. It includes: the applicant special vulnerability, procedural guarantees, the quality 
of the evidence, the circumstances in which it was obtained and the weight covered in the 
conviction238. 
                                                             
237 Le 21 juillet 2005, deux semaines après les attentats-suicides à la bombe à Londres, d’autres bombes furent 
mises à feu dans e réseau de transports publics londonien sans exploser. Les trois premiers requérants, suspectés 
d’être les poseurs des bombes, furent arrêtés mais une assistance juridique leur fut refusée pendant des durées 
allant de quatre à huit heures de manière à permettre à la police de conduire des « interrogatoires de sécurité ». 
Le quatrième requérant fut initialement interrogé par la police en qualité de témoin et lorsqu’il commença à s’auto-
incriminer l’interrogatoire ne fut pas suspendu afin qu’il puisse bénéficier des garanties et de l’assistance juridique 
accordées aux suspects.  
238 a) la vulnérabilité particulière du requérant, par exemple en raison de son âge ou de ses capacités mentales; b) 
le dispositif légal encadrant la procédure antérieure à la phase de jugement et l’admissibilité des preuves au cours 
de cette phase, ainsi que le respect ou non de ce dispositif, étant entendu que, quand s’applique une règle dite 
d’exclusion, il est très peu vraisemblable que la procédure dans son ensemble soit jugée inéquitable ; c) la 
possibilité ou non pour le requérant de contester l’authenticité des preuves recueillies et de s’opposer à leur 
production ; d) la qualité des preuves et l’existence ou non de doutes quant à leur fiabilité ou à leur exactitude 
compte tenu des circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont été obtenues ainsi que du degré et de la nature de toute 
contrainte qui aurait été exercée ; e) lorsque les preuves ont été recueillies illégalement, l’illégalité en question et, 
si celle-ci procède de la violation d’un autre article de la Convention, la nature de la violation constatée ;f) s’il s’agit 
d’une déposition, la nature de celle-ci et le point de savoir s’il y a eu prompte rétractation ou rectification; g) 
l’utilisation faite des preuves, et en particulier le point de savoir si elles sont une partie intégrante ou importante des 
pièces à charge sur lesquelles s’est fondée la condamnation, ainsi que la force des autres éléments du dossier ; h) 
le point de savoir si la culpabilité a été appréciée par des magistrats professionnels ou par des jurés et, dans ce 
dernier cas, la teneur des instructions qui auraient été données au jury ; i) l’importance de l’intérêt public à enquêter 
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The case is in line with the judicial trend refusing automatism239 and encouraging in concreto 
evaluations. The Grand Chamber reiterates that in assessing whether there has been a breach 
of the right to a fair trial it is necessary to view the proceedings as a whole, and the Article 6 § 
3 rights as specific aspects of the overall right to a fair trial rather than ends in themselves 
(§262). The absence of compelling reasons does not, therefore, lead in itself to a finding of a 
violation of Article 6 of the Convention, but has an impact on the assessment of overall fairness.  
While the requirement of an overall assessment and the refusal of automatisms are the 
expression of a reasonable and reasoned approach to the construction of the judicial decision, 
they also and inevitably entail a major tolerance of any possible restrictions on the rights of the 
defence and a weakening of the protection.  
According to the dissenting judges Sajo and Laffranque, Ibrahim judgment “frustrates years of 
European efforts to provide a high level of protection to procedural rights”. They regret that this 
judgment diminished the level of protection and weaken the irretrievability principle set out 
in Salduz and considered as a crucial tool for effective protection of the right to a fair trial and 
a a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment240.   
This approach was confirmed in the further judgments Simeonovi v. Bulgaria241 and Beuze v. 
Belgium242. In the Bulgarian case, concerning Lack of access to lawyer during first three days 
of police custody, the Court clarifies that the starting point for the right to legal assistance 
should be the date of the applicant’s arrest243. Anticipating the obligation to provide legal 
assistance at the time of arrest offers a stricter guarantee against ill-treatment and more 
effective defendant’s rights protection.  
                                                             
sur l’infraction particulière en cause et à en sanctionner l’auteur ; j) l’existence dans le droit et la pratique internes 
d’autres garanties procédurales. 
239 Le refus d’automatisme et l’évaluation globale caractérise, non seulement la jurisprudence en matière d’équite 
de la procédure, mais également la plus récente jurisprudence en matière de surpopulation carcérale. 
L’automatisme de la jurisprudence Sulejmanovic c. Italie, selon lequel la disponibilité d’espace inférieur à 3 mètres 
carrés correspondait automatiquement à une violation de l’art. 3 de la Convention, a été dépassé par la 
jurisprudence suivante et notamment les affaires Ananyev c. Russie et Mursic c. Croatie. Voir D. Ranalli, Recenti 
interventi della Corte europea dei diritti umani: qualche spunto per riflettere sul sovraffollamento, in Rassegna 
Penitenziaria e criminologica, n. 3/2014; A. Albano, Prime osservazioni sulla sentenza 20 ottobre 2016 della Corte 
Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo in Mursic c. Croazia: un caso icastico, Rassegna Penitenziaria e criminologica, n. 
3/2015. 
240 « L’absence d’un avocat lorsqu’un suspect en détention est confronté à la police pour la première fois a des 
effets durables sur l’ensemble de la procédure et la présence d’un avocat est une garantie importante contre les 
abus policiers. Dans certains cas, comme en l’espèce, il n’y a aucun moyen de s’opposer à la déclaration auto-
incriminante initiale. (On ne peut pas rétracter un mensonge.) Permettre à une déclaration auto-incriminante faite 
en l’absence d’un avocat de servir à fonder une condamnation fait apparaître le procès comme étant 
fondamentalement suspect. Nous sommes là au cœur de la condamnation car il est impossible d’en effacer les 
conséquences à un stade ultérieur (sauf application d’une règle d’exclusion). Des considérations d’opportunité 
tenant à la dissuasion policière militent également en faveur de la quasi-règle d’exclusion découlant de 
l’arrêt Salduz. Si les autorités chargées de l’enquête savent que certaines pratiques contraires aux droits que 
l’accusé tire de l’article 6 § 3 peuvent conduire à l’annulation du procès, elles hésiteront à y recourir. Et, comme le 
dit l’arrêt Salduz, l’accès précoce à une assistance juridique auprès d’un conseil est une garantie fondamentale 
contre les mauvais traitements » (opinion en partie concordante, en partie dissidente § 16). 
241 Simeonovi c. Bulgarie (GC), arrêt du 12 mai 2017, n. 21980/04. 
242 Beuze c. Belgique (GC), arrêt du 9 novembre 2018, n. 71409/10. 
243 Cette interprétation avait déjà été sollicitée par les juges Bratza et Zagrebelsky dans leurs opinions concordantes 
dans l’affaire Salduz. Les juges avaient souligné, en particulier que, les garanties reconnues dans l’affaire Salduz 
à partir des interrogatoires devraient s’appliquer, selon les juges concordants, dès le commencement de la garde 
à vue ou de la détention provisoire e devraient s’étendre tout au long de la détention dans les stations de police ou 
en prison. Le fait que le défenseur puisse voir son assisté détenu « permet, mieux qu’aucune autre mesure, d’éviter 
que la prohibition des traitements visés à l’art. 3 de la Convention ne soit enfreinte ». Voir Salduz, opinion 
concordante du juge Bratza et opinion du juge Zagrebelsky à laquelle se rallient les juges Casadevall et Turmen. 
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Anticipating protection is also intended to prevent informal interrogations, as in the present 
case, from taking place for the sole purpose of circumventing the obligation to ensure the 
prompt presence and assistance of a lawyer. The judgment transposed the statements of 
Judges Brazta and Zagrebelsky, expressed in their concurring opinions in Salduz, according 
to which access to a lawyer must be guaranteed from the very beginning of police custody or 
pre-trial detention and throughout the whole duration of detention.  
In the judges view, the fact that defence counsel may see the accused throughout his detention 
in police stations or in prison “is more apt than any other measure to prevent treatment 
prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention”. 
In the Belgian case, the applicant, arrested by the French gendarmerie and taken into custody 
for the execution of a European arrest warrant, alleged a lack of legal assistance during 
questioning by police and investigating judge in initial phase of criminal proceedings. The 
impossibility of obtaining legal assistance at the pretrial stage was due to the Belgian legislation 
in force at the time of the facts. The Court indicated, by way of example, that depending on the 
specific circumstances of each case and the legal system concerned, the following restrictions 
may also undermine the fairness of the proceedings: (1) a refusal or difficulties encountered 
by a lawyer in seeking access to the case file at the earliest stages of the criminal proceedings 
or during pre-trial investigation, and (2) the non-participation of the lawyer in investigative 
actions, such as identity parades or reconstructions (§ 135).  In addition, the Court has 
indicated that account must be taken, on a case-by-case basis, in assessing the overall 
fairness of proceedings, of the whole range of services specifically associated with legal 
assistance: discussion of the case, organisation of the defence, collection of exculpatory 
evidence, preparation for questioning, support for an accused in distress, and verification of 
the conditions of detention (§ 136).   
The Court thus reiterated the refusal of automatisms, the requirement for a overall assessment 
of the fairness of the proceedings and the importance of very strict control in the case of 
legislative restrictions with a general and mandatory scope. It is up to the Government, in these 
circumstances, to convincingly demonstrate that the applicant has been granted a fair trial 
overall. 
 2. THE SCOPE OF THE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION: PRISONER AS AN 
AUTONOMOUS ACTOR OF THE  PROCEDURE? 
2.1 BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS AND SUBSIDIARITY 
Procedural obligations have been conceived as a means of ensuring the effectiveness of 
substantive rights, at the same time the proceduralisation of rights244 also makes it possible to 
guarantee the principle of subsidiarity. This tension between effectiveness and subsidiarity 
permeates the whole corpus of case law concerning prisoners’ rights, specifically considering 
pilot and quasi-pilot judgments.  
By requiring states to create procedures to ensure the prevention and redress for violations of 
treaty rights, procedural obligations are therefore a means of promoting the principle of 
subsidiarity. As affirmed by Madelaine245 these obligations then have a dual interest for the 
Court. On the one hand, they are a strategic way of dealing with sensitive issues without 
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245 C. Madelaine, “Les obligations procédurales issues de la CEDH en matière de surpopulation carcérale”, in La 
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interfering with penal and penitentiary policies adopted by States246. On the other hand, 
procedural obligations constitute a means for the Court to offload its mass litigation to the 
national authorities by identifying  the measures to be taken both in order prevent a repetition 
of violations of the guaranteed right and to compensate, at the national level, the conventional 
violations thus preventing the applicants from seizing the Strasbourg Court again. Whenever 
the two instances, effectiveness and subsidiarity, goes hand in hand and are effectively 
balanced, making it possible to obtain redress for the alleged violation of the Convention at 
national level, they guarantee both the principle of subsidiarity and the effectiveness of the 
right concerned. 
However, the two principles may also come into conflict and an abstract preference for 
subsidiarity over effectiveness could be the result of an excessive use of pilot judgment and 
proceduralization of rights. The temptation to use procedural obligation as a measure to reduce 
the number of pending applications is high at a time when the Court is overwhelmed by a 
growing number of applications: “Une procéduralisation excessive visant à tarir à tout prix le 
flux de requêtes en les cantonnant au niveau national peut alors revenir à donner un blanc-
seing aux autorités nationales, au risque d’un abaissement des exigences conventionnelles, 
sacrifiant ainsi l’effectivité des droits247”.  
An example of this temptation can be seen in the Italian pilot judgment procedire (so forth, 
PJP), Torreggiani. Contrary to the ruling in Ananyev, the Court decided that the examination 
of applications dealing solely with overcrowding in Italian prisons would be adjourned pending 
the adoption by the domestic authorities of the required measures at national level. This 
provision, compared to the PJP in the Ananyev case, represents a sort of “double standard” 
concerning the adjournment of similar cases. In the Ananyev case the Court, after having 
reminded that adjournment is a possibility rather than an obligation, as clearly shown by the 
inclusion of the words “as appropriate” in the text of Rule 61 § 6 and the variety of approaches 
used in the previous PJP, evaluates that due to the fundamental nature of the right protected 
by Article 3 of the Convention and the importance and urgency of complaints about inhuman 
or degrading treatments, does not consider it appropriate to adjourn the examination of similar 
cases. On the contrary, the Court observes that continuing to process all conditions-of-
detention cases in a diligent manner will remind the respondent State on a regular basis of its 
obligations under the Convention and in particular those resulting from this judgment. On the 
Torreggiani case, on the contrary, the Court chooses to adopt a more deferential approach 
and to adjourn all similar cases.  
Analysing all the pilot judgments in the prison field, it appears that the Court has finally 
established a formalistic approach, requiring the existence of a set of preventive and 
compensatory remedy, provided of certain characteristics and features, without assessing the 
concrete effectiveness of those remedies for the implementation of rights and without 
considering the set of procedural guarantee which could allow the prisoner to overcome the 
obstacles to the access to court and justice.  
The Italian case is paradigmatic in order to understand the performative potential of a PJP and 
its actual reach in offering an effective prospect of relief and protection of rights.  
After the pilot judgment in Torreggiani, the Italian Government introduced a system of 
preventive and compensatory remedies. The decision in Stella v. Italy248, closing the pilot 
judgment procedure against Italy, offered a positive evaluation of the system of remedies put 
in place by the Italian government, considering that no evidence enabled the Court to find that 
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those same remedies did not offer, “in principle”, prospects of appropriate relief for the 
complaints submitted under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the 
Convention. Interestingly enough, the applications had been lodged before the entry into force 
of the new Italian legislative provisions, thus allowing the Court to examine the situation at a 
time in which no remedy was available for the applicants. Nevertheless, respectfully asserting 
the crucial importance of its subsidiary role, the Court considered that there were grounds in 
the Stella case for departing from the general principle that the exhaustion requirement should 
be assessed with reference to the time at which the application was lodged and that this 
exception could apply to all similar cases pending before it. Those exceptions seem to include, 
specifically, situations in which, after a PJP, the State enacts a number of measures aimed at 
resolving the structural problem at a national level249. This same consideration was used in the 
case Łatak v. Pologne, n° 52070/08, § 82, closing the quasi-pilot procedure in Poland. 
Worthy is to note that, concerning the pending applications at the time of these two judgments 
(Stella and Łatak), these decisions considered that the Polish and Italian laws gave to the 
applicants sufficient time to seek effectively redress before the national civil courts.  The time 
frame between the decisions and the end of the time limit established in the Polish and Italian 
legislations left 8 months to Polish prisoners and 3 months to Italian ones. This means almost 
no time at all, considering the legal vulnerability of prisoners, their lack of access to legal 
information and the difficult access to lawyers and legal assistance. All of these fundamental 
issues were left unsolved and unconsidered by the Court. The reality showed that Polish and 
Italian prisoners haven’t been able to have knowledge of the deadline and to file an application 
in front of the domestic judiciary on time. 
 
The analysis of the Stella judgment shows how the relevance conferred to the effectiveness of 
the remedies, stressed once and again in the reasoning of the judgment, conflicts with the 
same idea that the “remedies did not offer, in principle, prospects of appropriate relief250”. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of rights at a European level can have multiple dimensions251 and 
the Stella case clearly implies a more formalistic approach to effectiveness.  
 
Significantly, though, the Court underlined that the positive evaluation in Stella does not 
undermine an eventual future re-assessment of the effectiveness of the remedies, “notably 
considering the ability of domestic Courts to provide a uniform case-law that is compatible with 
the requirements of the Convention”. This enunciation is a precious reminder of the fact that 
only a national case law (or praxis) consistent with the conventional system of rights is able to 
substantiate the effective remedy required by Article 13. Therefore, the mere textualist analysis 
(for example of the legislation, of its wording and even of its ratio) does not allow an in-depth 
evaluation of the reach and effectiveness of the remedy.  
Another level of analysis, in order to assess the effectiveness of the remedy, is the level of 
compensation granted as a compensatory remedy in cases of violation of Article 3 at a national 
level. In Stella, the Court is ready to level down the protection afforded at the European level, 
accepting a low amount of money compensating a violation of the most absolute conventional 
rights:  
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251 See, Rietiker D. (2010) ‘The Principle of "Effectiveness" in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
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la Cour rappelle que lorsqu’un État a fait un pas significatif en introduisant un recours indemnitaire 
pour réparer une violation de la Convention, elle se doit de lui laisser une plus grande marge 
d’appréciation pour qu’il puisse organiser ce recours interne de façon cohérente avec son propre 
système juridique et ses traditions, en conformité avec le niveau de vie du pays (voir, entre autres, 
Cocchiarella [GC], précité, § 80). Ainsi, la Cour peut parfaitement accepter qu’un État qui s’est doté 
de différents recours et dont les décisions conformes à la tradition juridique et au niveau de vie du 
pays sont rapides, motivées et exécutées avec célérité, accorde des sommes qui, tout en étant 
inférieures à celles fixées par la Cour, ne sont pas déraisonnables (idem, § 96). 
The same reductionist logic is applied in the Domján v. Hungary (n. 5433/17) case, closing the 
Hungarian pilot judgment procedure. In this case a compensation of 5 to 5.3 euros per day is 
considered reasonable and proportionate to redress a violation of Article 3 of the Convention:  
28. The Court further reiterates that, within the context of prison overcrowding, in the case of Bizjak 
(decision cited above, §§ 37-43), it held that compensation awarded by a national court and 
representing approximately 30% of the award made by the Court in the pilot judgment Mandić and 
Jović v. Slovenia (nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, § 132, 20 October 2011) did not appear to be 
unreasonable or disproportionate. The Court took a similar stance in Stella and Others v. Italy ((dec.), 
nos. 49169/09 and 10 others, §§ 19 and 62, 16 September 2014), where the level of compensation 
available domestically was EUR 8 per day of detention in conditions incompatible with Article 3 of the 
Convention. Having regard to economic realities, as suggested by the Government (see paragraph 
11 above), the Court reaches the same conclusion as concerns an award comprised of between EUR 
4 and EUR 5.3 per day of unsuitable conditions of detention in the Hungarian context. 
The Court, in fact, represents the minimum standard of protection of rights that must be 
guaranteed by the member states of the Council of Europe, as affirmed by Article 53 of the 
Convention252. From this postulate derives the implicit, but permeating, principle of subsidiarity 
which informs the whole system of protection of rights at the Council of Europe. In short, in 
deference to what has been called “complementary subsidiarity”, the national and European 
guarantee systems for the protection of humans rights must proceed hand in hand253, and: 
[…] the Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features which characterise the life of the 
society in the State which, as a Contracting Party, has to answer for the measure in dispute. In so 
doing it cannot assume the role of the competent national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight 
of the subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established by the 
Convention254. 
A through interpretation of the subsidiarity principle should take into account the nature of the 
multilevel system of protection of rights at the domestic and international-regional level 
according to the minimum standard rule, in the sense that the Court intervenes where national 
authorities are incapable of effectively guaranteeing the rights of the Convention and more 
favorable national human rights guarantees shouldn’t be limited by the standards set in the 
Convention in order to ensure that the more favorable guarantee is applied. Subsidiarity 
principle cannot be understood in a formalistic way and the ECtHR’s use of the principle of 
subsidiary is limited by the ECHR’s guarantee that its rights are effectively applied255. 
2.2 A SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE. ACCESSIBILITY AND FAIR TRIAL 
GUARANTEES. 
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253 See, H. Petzold, “The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity”, in R. ST. J. Macdonald - F. Matscher - H. 
Petzold (eds.), The European System For the Protection of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 42-
43. 
254 Juriconsult, Interlaken Follow-Up. Principle of Subsidiarity, 2010, p.3. 
255 See, G.Füglistaler, “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court 
of Human Rights’ Post-2011 Jurisprudence”, Cahier de l’IDHEAP 295/2016, Unité Droit public, available at: 
https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_A4FA8A7A4A0B.P001/REF 
55 
 
The case law of the Court on Article 13, has so far expanded the notion of domestic remedies 
and the scope of the procedural protection, as seen above, according to a systematic approach 
which tends more on the simplification of the procedural mechanisms, in order to bring the 
protection afforded by article 13 within the reach of detainees, than to covering the issue of 
remedies with all the due process and fair trial guarantees.  
Thus, the Court has worked to simplify the procedural mechanisms, in order to bring the 
protection afforded by article 13 within the reach of detainees. This rationale makes it possible 
to handle the most common issues in European penitentiary systems: promiscuity related to 
overcrowding, insalubrity, constructions that are unfit for human habitation, etc. At the same 
time, working only on the side of the simplification of the procedure can be self-defeating. 
Concerning this aspect, the Italian case can offer an interesting perspective, since the Italian 
complaint procedure before the Torreggiani pilot judgment, allowed the prisoners to seize 
directly and independently the competent judicial authority. Article 35 of the penitentiary law 
established a very generic “diritto di reclamo” (right to ‘complain’) stating that: “prisoners can 
address oral or written requests or complaints, even in a sealed envelope: 1) to the director of 
the institute, as well as to the inspectors, to the director general for the institutes of prevention 
and punishment and to the minister for grace and justice; 2) to the surveillance magistrate; 3) 
to the judicial and health authorities visiting the institute; 4) to the president of the regional 
council; 5) to the head of state” (emphasis added). Even if the judicial authority (specialized 
court) was comprised in the list of the bodies apt to receive the complaints, the procedure was 
not a judicial one and lacked all the guarantees of a remedy for the protection of rights. First 
of all the respect of the principle of due process of law remained highly questionable in a 
procedure where the equality of arms, adversarial proceeding, the independence and 
impartiality of the tribunal and the effectiveness of the remedy (i.e. the bindingness of the 
decisions of the Surveillance Judiciary) are not guaranteed. Even if the Italian Constitutional 
Court reiterated many times that the decisions of the Surveillance judiciary are not to be 
considered as mere reports, but “prescriptions or orders, whose binding nature for the prison 
administration is intrinsic to the purposes of protection that the law itself pursues”256, the 
procedure remained inconsistent with the aim and the scope of Article 13, since the remedy 
was a sort of “recours gracieux au juge de l'application des peines257”. 
This simple procedure was therefore considered ineffective by the Court, thus showing that a 
right, such as the right to an effective remedy, should be articulated, at least in specific 
circumstances (and probably concerning vulnerable positions), through fully judicial claims. 
Claims that are subject to reasoning and interpretation and to a technical procedure which is 
essential for the fulfillment of the right itself and impose the assistance of a lawyer. In this 
perspective the fact that prisoners (only the literate ones) are able to write a simple, free form 
letter and that the procedure is simple is not itself a guarantee, on the contrary it can be 
considered a problematic issue in a situation of vulnerability due to the position of state control, 
where the assistance of a lawyer serve the purpose of informing and monitoring the situation 
and context in which the violation produced itself.          
2.3 DIGITAL JUSTICE OR DIGITAL DIVIDE. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN TIMES 
OF DIGITAL JUSTICE 
Looking at the Court’s case law, the  issue of digital justice and access to Internet can be 
approached from a twofold perspective. On one side, the connection between prisoners’ rights 
and Internet can be explorend under the scope of Article 10 and the right to information and 
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access to legal data and digital legal services. On the other side, the issue concerns the 
sensitive area of privacy and data protection. 
2.3.1 ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN PRISON 
In the information revolution era, traditional sources of law, as much as legal information have 
been progressively digitized. The development of digital technology in all aspects of life as a 
major factor of knowledge and integration seems to have had a paradoxical effect of more 
exclusion of prisoners and more isolation of prisons from the rest of society. In most European 
countries, the access to Internet is prohibited in prison, or limited to few experimental initiatives. 
The deprivation of detained persons from digital technology participate to increase their 
exclusion from the world outside of prison, and also limits their access to legal assistance. The 
rehabilitation mission of the prison administration is thus deprived of the necessary tools for 
almost all daily activities, whether professional, cultural, educational, social, civic or legal.258  
This ‘digital divide’ can count as a new (and so far poorly analysed259)  impediments to access 
to justice in prison and to the defence of detained persons: due to the poor legal and economic 
resources of detainees, an effective access to legal remedies depends above all on the level 
of legal aid available to them and the support from NGOs to carry prison litigation, and in 
particular their capacity to apply European law. This is why these hindrances should notably 
be fought by the EU legislation through recognition of the right to access to digital legal 
resources in prison as a necessary tool for an effective access to court.  
Furthermore, while the Court has obliged certain national States to ensure an effective access 
of detained persons to their rights and to court through the implementation of effective domestic 
remedies260, the transformation of justice into digital justice has a strong impact on the access 
to justice, as legal acts, case-law and even parliamentary activities necessary for the defense 
and litigation are now for some of them only available on the Internet261. Access to legal 
information on the Internet seems thus to be crucial for litigants and detainees that are in 
general not trained or allowed to use computers and digital devices. This process is detrimental 
to detainees and contributes to increase inequalities.  
In a number of Council of Europe and other international instruments Internet access had 
increasingly been understood as a right, and calls had been made to develop effective policies 
to attain universal access to the Internet and to overcome the “digital divide”. Moreover, an 
increasing amount of services and information are only available on the Internet. 
Within the Council of Europe, the Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet262, 
recognizes the need for the removal of barriers to the participation of individuals in the 
information society on a non-discriminatory basis263 and the Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 
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of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to human rights for Internet users 
affirms that:  
3. The Internet has a public service value. People, communities, public authorities and private entities 
rely on the Internet for their activities and have a legitimate expectation that its services are 
accessible, provided without discrimination, affordable, secure, reliable and ongoing. Furthermore, 
no one should be subjected to unlawful, unnecessary or disproportionate interference with the 
exercise of their human rights and fundamental freedoms when using the Internet.  
Any restrictions to this freedom must not be arbitrary, must pursue a legitimate aim in 
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression in his report of 16 May 2011 to the Human Rights 
Council (A/HRC/17/27) refers to the concept of “digital divide” that defines the gap between 
privileged people with effective access to digital and information technologies, in particular the 
Internet, and those with very limited or no access at all, which include detainees264. As the UN 
Special Rapporteur puts it: “without Internet access, which facilitates the enjoyment of a range 
of human rights, marginalized groups and developing States remain trapped in a 
disadvantaged situation, thereby perpetuating inequality both within and between States”265. 
The Internet is also defined as ‘a medium by which the right to freedom of expression can be 
exercised’ and can only serve its purpose if States assume their commitment to develop 
effective policies to attain universal access to the Internet. “Without concrete policies and plans 
of action, the Internet will become a technological tool that is accessible only to a certain elite 
while perpetrating the “digital divide”266”. 
The Court has tackled down this situation in Kalda v. Estonia, (n. 17429/10), where a violation 
of Article 10 was found because of restrictions placed on prisoner’s access to certain Internet 
sites. The websites to which the applicant had requested access predominantly contained legal 
information and information related to fundamental rights, including the rights of prisoners. The 
accessibility of such information promoted public awareness and respect for human rights. The 
national courts used such information and the applicant therefore also needed access to it for 
the protection of his rights in the court proceedings. When the applicant lodged his complaint 
with the domestic courts, Estonian language translations of the European Court’s judgments 
against the respondent State were only available on the website of the local Council of Europe 
Office to which he had been denied access. As the Court affirms: 
52. The Court cannot overlook the fact that in a number of Council of Europe and other international 
instruments the public-service value of the Internet and its importance for the enjoyment of a range 
of human rights has been recognised. Internet access has increasingly been understood as a right, 
and calls have been made to develop effective policies to attain universal access to the Internet and 
to overcome the “digital divide” (see paragraphs 23 to 25 above). The Court considers that these 
developments reflect the important role the Internet plays in people’s everyday lives.  
The Court start by recognizing that: “the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the 
public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general267” see Delfi 
AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, § 133, ECHR 2015; Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, 
§ 48, ECHR 2012; and Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 
3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27, ECHR 2009). Then, the Court considers that “imprisonment 
inevitably involves a number of restrictions on prisoners’ communications with the outside 
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world, including on their ability to receive information.”268. No general positive obligation exists 
for Contracting States to grant prisoners access to Internet.  
This solution appears controversial if we consider the notion of digital divide, a notion that the 
Court is ready to accept (see above, §52 of the judgment), in light of the vulnerability of 
prisoners. 
The only reason the Court found a violation of Article 10, then, lies on the fact that the State, 
in this case Estonia, already granted access to internet to prisoners. This results in a very 
uneven situation across European member states and as in a limited ability of intervention of 
the Court in order to implement access to information in prison and to bridge the digital divide 
gap in prison.    
In a subsequent judgment, Jankovskis v. Lithuania (no. 21575/08), a prisoner complained that 
he had been refused access to a website run by the Ministry of Education and Science, thus 
preventing him from receiving education-related information in breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention.  
The interest of this case lies in the fact that the Court interprets the case not considering access 
to internet in itself, but rather the access to a specific kind of information. As a matter of facts, 
the applicant’s complaint concerned a particular means of accessing the information in 
question: namely, that he, as a prisoner, wished to be granted access – specifically via the 
Internet – to information published exclusively on a website belonging to the Ministry of 
Education and Science. The court then reiterates that “imprisonment inevitably entails a 
number of restrictions on prisoners’ communications with the outside world, including on their 
ability to receive information”269. Therefore, as already affirmed in Kalda, (see Kalda, cited 
above, § 45), Article 10 cannot be interpreted as imposing a general obligation to provide 
access to the Internet, or to specific Internet sites, for prisoners, nevertheless, the Court 
considers that access to information relating to education is granted under Lithuanian law.  
Therefore, there is a relevant difference between Kalda and Jankovskis cases in that in 
Lithuania, not only no law exists allowing prisoners to access the internet, but the prohibition 
on the inmates’ use of the Internet in prison can be said to be “prescribed by law” within the 
meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Still the Court found a violation of Article 10, 
considering “the interference unnecessary in a democratic society”. First of all the Court argues 
that access to the internet has recently and increasingly “been understood as a right”, and calls 
have been made to develop effective policies to achieve universal access to the Internet and 
to overcome the “digital divide” (see Kalda, cited above, § 52). 
The link between the internet access and the right to information is made by the Court pointing 
out the fact that “certain information is exclusively available on Internet” (Jankovskis, §62), 
therefore establishing the nature of internet as a tool in order to receive information which 
relate to education. The Court goes even further to affirms that it is not only a generic right to 
information that is at stake in the present case, but the right to social rehabilitation itself, since 
“it is not unreasonable to hold that such information was directly relevant to the applicant’s 
interest in obtaining education, which is in turn of relevance for his rehabilitation and 
subsequent reintegration into society” (§59). The Government, therefore, has a double 
responsibility: on the one hand, it has totally omitted any consideration on the nature of the site 
in question; in facta  public platform, entirely managed by the Ministry; this should have been 
a suitable fixed point at least to dilute the risk linked to the security and to the proliferation of 
criminal activities. Secondly, the national authority is reproached for having taken into 
consideration the right to access to Internet as such, ex se, without understanding how in reality 
it is “only” a tool aimed at a particular purpose, the educational one and at the end, the social 
                                                             
268 Ivi, §46. 
269 Jankovskis v. Lithuania, §55.  
59 
 
rehabilitation. According to the Court, therefore, the Internet is not yet a right stricto sensu, but 
can be a tool in order to exercise fundamental rights. A means and not an end. 
The sole countries that have either implemented or at least experimented the Internet in prison 
are Belgium270, the UK, Denmark (only in minimum security prisons), Estonia (which is the only 
European country to have implemented in its legislation271 ECHR’s suggestion about allowing 
prisoners to have access to the Internet272) and the Netherlands (mostly in reintegration 
centres). Consequently, the deprivation of detained persons from digital technology contributes 
to increase their exclusion from the world outside of prison, and also limits their access to legal 
assistance.  
In this regard, the absence or lack of access to the Internet in prison and in detention facilities 
threatens the ability of detainees to defend their rights in court on an equal footing than other 
citizens273. More broadly, the rehabilitation mission of the prison administration is thus deprived 
of the necessary tools for almost all daily activities, whether professional, cultural, educational, 
social, civic or legal.274 In this regard, the Strasbourg Court has ruled that in the light of its 
accessibility and its capacity to  stock and communicate very large amounts of information, the 
Internet plays an important role  in increasing the public’s access to news and making easier 
the dissemination of information275. 
Another critical trend has been retrieved in some European countries concerning the 
digitalization of justice and trial. The Italian case can show this trend: the newly introduced 
legislative decree n. 123/2018 has foreseen the possibility for prisoenrs to participate to 
Surveillance hearing through videoconferences. This seems to be more dictated by the 
necessity to cut the budget for prison transfer, than to the need to guarantee the personal 
participation. The presence of the prisoner in front of the Court is pivotal in order to guarantee 
the right to a fair trial and is important to reduce the prison seclusion and the material distance 
between the detained person and the Court. 
 
2.3.2 PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 
Digital justice can also infringe upon Article 8 rights concerning privacy and data protection. 
The issue seems particularly relevant as it involves the storage and process of personal data 
and special category of personal data, such as data relating to criminal convictions and 
offences. The new Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) include a 
specific provision for such data276 which imposes to State authority the duty to process these 
data “providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects”.  
                                                             
270 See https://www.ebo-enterprises.com/prisoncloud 
271 Imprisonment Act ESTONIA [RT I 2009, 39, 261 - entry into force 24.07.2009] § 311: ‘Prisoners are prohibited 
to use the Internet, except in the computers specially adapted for such purpose by the prison service which enable 
access under the supervision of the prison service to public legislation databases and register of judicial decision’. 
272 Case no. 17429/10, Kalda v. Estonia, ECtHR, 19 January 2016; case no no. 21575/08, Jankovski v. Lithuania, 
ECtHR, 17 January 2017.  
273 Ibid., §33.  
274 Katsh, Ethan and Orna Rabinovich-Einy (2017) Digital Justice: Technology and the Internet of Disputes, Oxford 
University Press ; Eubanks, Virginia (2011) Digital Dead End. Fighting for Social Justice in the Information Age, MIT 
Press. 
275 Case no 64569/09, Delfi AS v. Estonia, ECtHR, 16 June 2015, §133; Case no 3111/10, Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, 
ECtHR, 18 December 2012, § 48; Cases no 3002/03 and 23676/03, Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom 
(nos. 1 and 2), ECtHR, 10 June 2009, §27.  
276 Art. 10 GDPR Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences: Processing of personal 
data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures based on Article 6(1) shall be carried 
out only under the control of official authority or when the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law 
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Government is responsible of protecting personal data of the prisoners. Most Prison Services 
act as registrar and european along as national legislation defines e.g. which registers it is 
responsible for, what is considered to be personal data, who has access to personal data, to 
whom the Prison Service is entitled to hand over such data and what are the data retention 
periods. We can expect a growing litigation at a european level on data protection of prisoners.   
In the prison context, this provision appears particularly relevant as an Italian case can show. 
The case concerns the prisoners of the female section of Sollicciano prison in Florence. After 
a case of overdose death in prison, the prison administration asked to the female prisoners the 
informed consent to undergo a drug test, in order to prevent future possible episodes. Many 
prisoners agreed and subsequenly the results of the test had been used to issue disciplinary 
sanctions. The Obudsman of Tuscany denounced the case to the Italian Ombudsman for the 
protection of personal data and an application was lodged to the civil judge who has recently 
issued a judgment sanctioning the violation of the right to privacy.  
 
3. THE BLIND SPOTS OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTION, A THREAT TO THE 
WHOLE CASE-LAW STRUCTURE  
 
3.1. THE LACK OF REALISM OF THE POSITION ON LEGAL AID 
Right to legal aid is conceived in the ECtHR case-law as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of 
the right of access to justice.  
According to International and European human rights law, the notion of access to justice 
obliges states to guarantee each individual’s right to go to court – or, in some circumstances, 
an alternative dispute resolution body – to obtain a remedy if it is found that the individual’s 
rights have been violated.277.  
Access to justice is directly linked to measures taken by States to remove the material and 
legal obstacles that may hinder access to justice for all. In particular, this entails the obligation 
for the state to remove the financial obstacles faced by citizens who do not have sufficient 
means to defend themselves in court or take legal action. In practice, this involves the 
introduction of a legal aid system.278.  
The establishment of a legal aid system aims to achieve effective access to justice and non-
discrimination, namely the requirements at the heart of the conventional understanding of 
human rights.   
                                                             
providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects. 2Any comprehensive register of 
criminal convictions shall be kept only under the control of official authority. 
277  Manuel de droit Européen en matière d’accès à la justice, Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’Union 
Européenne, 2016, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_access_justice_FRA.pdf  
278 Au-delà des dispositions de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et de la jurisprudence de la Cour 
de Strasbourg, le Conseil de l’Europe engage ses États membres à étoffer leurs systèmes d’aide judiciaire ; il a 
adopté plusieurs résolutions et recommandations en ce sens: la Résolution 76 (5) sur l’aide judiciaire en matière 
civile, commerciale et administrative ; la Résolution 78 (8) sur l’aide judiciaire et la consultation juridique ; la 
Recommandation 93 (1) sur l’accès effectif au droit et à la justice des personnes en situation de grande pauvreté, 
et la Recommandation 2005 (12) concernant la réglementation des demandes d’assistance judiciaire à l’étranger 
en vertu de l’Accord européen sur la transmission des demandes d’assistance judiciaire (STCE no 092) et de ses 
protocoles additionnels, CEPEJ, Rapport sur les systèmes judiciaires européens : efficacité et qualité de la justice, 
Edition 2014 (2012). 
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It is no coincidence that the doctrine of effectiveness, the founding principle of the Court's 
interpretative dynamism, was built on the landmark case of Airey v. Ireland279, concerning 
access to legal aid.  
The Court’s reasoning in that case is helpful in understanding the fundamental importance that 
procedural guarantees, and in particular, access to legal aid, have in the Convention system 
in order to ensure the full and effective enjoyment of fundamental rights.  
The case concerned the impossibility for the applicant, in the absence of legal aid for family 
law proceedings, to bring an action for judicial separation, since her insufficient means did not 
allow her to cover the cost of such proceedings.  
The reasoning of the Court is of great interest for three sets of reasons. First, the Court makes 
an in concreto assessment of the possibility of access to court. A domestic remedy was 
available in order to apply to the High Court and ask for the judicial separation and the 
assistance of a lawyer was not mandatory. Despite these considerations the Court wondered 
“whether Mrs. Airey’s appearance before the High Court without the assistance of a lawyer 
would be effective, in the sense of whether she would be able to present her case properly 
and satisfactorily” 280.  The Court reasoning follows a substantialist approach, which goes 
beyond appearances and considers the accessibility of the procedure in the light of its 
complexity and the applicant's socio-economic and cultural conditions.  
The second aspect of interest concerns the refusal of any water-tight division separating social 
and economic rights from the field covered by the Convention. Civil and political rights can 
have “implications of a social or economic nature” and social rights could be considered as 
prerequisites for the effective exercise of civil rights.281.  
Following this approach, the Court rejected the Irish Government's argument that “the 
Convention’s only express provision on free legal aid is Article 6 para. 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) which 
relates to criminal proceeding” and “it cannot be said (that Ireland) have implicitly agreed to 
provide unlimited civil legal aid”282.  
Even if the Convention only guarantees legal aid in criminal proceeding, the effectiveness of 
the right of access to the judge may impose a system of legal aid in civil matters wherever 
representation by lawyer is mandatory or due to the complexity of the procedure and to the 
individual situation of the person concerned. 
The last profile of interest concerns the fact that legal aid is considered not only as a 
prerequisite for guaranteeing the right of access to justice under Article 6 of the Convention, 
but also as an indispensable procedural element to ensure the effectiveness of substantive 
rights. According to the Court’ reasoning, procedural guarantees of legal aid flows directly from 
substantive rights and becomes an ‘inherent’ and consubstantial element of it. 283.  
Similarly, in Golder, the Court considered access to justice as the first condition for the 
realization of a fair trial and stated that “it would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, 
that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) should describe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to 
parties in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that which alone makes it in fact 
possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court”. The Strasbourg judges 
stress here that effective access to justice, through legal aid, is an inherent element of 
substantive rights, a prerequisite for its full and effective enjoyment.  
The principles affirmed, although grounded in the specific circumstances of the case, are likely 
to be transposed to other contexts and clearly set out the weight of effectiveness principle in 
the interpretation of the Court.   
However, this substantialist approach, main tool for ensuring the effectiveness of material 
rights from the procedural guarantee of legal aid and for providing access to justice for all, 
                                                             
279 Airey c. Irlande, arrêt du 9 octrobre 1979, n. 6289/73. 
280 Airey c. Irlande, précité, § 23. 
281 Ibidem, § 26. 
282 Ibidem 
283 F. SUDRE, Les grands arrêts de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, PUF, 2015, pp. 19 et ss.  
62 
 
without any discrimination based on socio-economic or financial conditions, has not been 
further developed in the subsequent case law.  
The same considerations developed with respect to Ms. Airey's individual position could have 
justified a more realistic position with regard to detainees and could have opened the door to 
a more in-depth examination of the possibility for them “to present their arguments properly 
and satisfactorily” in absence of legal assistance. 
The Court's case law in this matter is characterized by a twofold approach: the right to legal 
assistance and legal aid is fairly guaranteed in criminal proceedings, while it is marginally taken 
into account in the penitentiary field, including in pilot judgment procedures.  
In criminal matters, the hermeneutic strategy of the Court is strongly supported by the clear 
and explicit normative basis of the right to legal aid, namely Article 6 § 3 (c). The right to legal 
aid is closely linked to the right to  defense and the principle of equality of arms. 
On the other hand, the particular vulnerability of the defendants and the risk of being subjected 
to inhuman and degrading treatment impose a stronger protection and require that access to 
the lawyer, of his own choice or committed ex officio, be assured from the first police 
questioning. The right to legal aid, is subjected to two conditions: the accused must show that 
he/she ‘lacks sufficient means’ to pay for legal assistance and ‘interests of justice’ should 
require legal aid to be granted.  
As for the first condition, the Court has specified that it is up to the accused to prove his lack 
of financial means, but he/she needs not do so ‘beyond all doubt’; it is sufficient that there are 
‘some indications’ that this is so or, in other words, that a “lack of clear indications to the 
contrary” can be established284. Contrary to the case law on reimbursement of interpreting 
costs285  (Article 6 § 3 (e)), the Court does not exclude the possibility for the State to recover 
all or part of the costs of legal aid286 or ask for a contribution or payment in part of legal fees287. 
                                                             
284 Pakelli c. Allemagne, § 34. 
285 Luedicke et autres c. Allemagne : dans cette affaire, la Cour a exclu radicalement cette possibilité, en fondant 
son appréciation sur le sens littéral des termes "gratuitement"/"free", figurant à l’article 6 par. 3 e), cette possibilité 
n’est pas en principe exclue dans le cas de remboursement des frais de l’aide juridictionnelle. La position de la 
Cour en matière d’aide juridictionnelle ne se fonde pas sur une différente interprétation du signifié de l’expression 
"gratuitement"/"free", qui reste celle que ces termes possèdent d’ordinaire dans chacune de ses deux langues 
officielles : ils ne visent ni une remise sous condition, ni une exemption temporaire, ni une suspension, mais bien 
une dispense ou exonération définitive (§ 40). La différente approche se fonde sur le fait que, contrairement au 
droit à l’interprétariat (art. 6-3-e), le droit à l’aide juridictionnelle (art. 6-3-c), ne consacre pas un droit de caractère 
absolu : il n’exige l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat d’office que si l’accusé « n’a pas les moyens de rémunérer un 
défenseur ». 
286 La Cour a estimé, dans l’affaire Croissant c. Allemagne, que les juridictions allemandes pouvaient légitimement 
demander au requérant de couvrir les frais, à moins qu’il ne démontrât que la charge du coût de sa défense 
dépassait ses moyens. Selon la législation allemande, la nécessité de doter un accusé d’un ou plusieurs avocats 
d’office s’appréciait à la lumière des seuls impératifs des intérêts de la justice et la situation financière de l’intéressé 
était prise en compte seulement au stade de la procédure d’exécution qui suit le jugement définitif. La Cour a conclu 
en l’espèce que la vérification ex post de « l’absence de moyens » pour rétribuer un défenseur de son propre choix 
ne se heurtait pas au texte de la Convention, lequel n’empêche pas d’imposer à qui invoque l’insuffisance de ses 
moyens d’en fournir la preuve, soit au moment de la demande soit a fortiori pour demander le remboursement des 
frais 
287 Dans l’affaire Morris c. Royaume-Uni, la Cour a conclu à la non-violation de l’art. 6 de la Convention dans le cas 
où l’octroi de l’aide juridictionnelle était soumis à une contribution de 240 GBP, compte tenu du salaire du requérant 
à l’époque des faits. Dans l’affaire Lagerblom c. Suède, la Cour a considéré que l’art. 6 n’avait pas été violé même 
si l’aide juridictionnelle était soumise à la condition que le requérant payât une partie des frais de justice. Dans 
l’affaire Orlov c. Russie, dans lequel le requérant avait dû payer 170 EUR de frais en raison de l’aide juridictionnelle 
accordée, la Cour a conclu à la violation des garanties de l’art. 6 § 3b) et c) de la Convention sans toutefois se 
prononcer spécifiquement sur la question mais sur la base d’une évaluation globale des plusieurs défaillances au 
droit de la défense dans le cas d’espèce. Dans l’affaire Chukayev c. Russia, le requérant se plaignait de la violation 
de l’art. 6 § 3 de la Convention au motif qu’il avait été obligé à rembourser les frais de l’aide juridictionnelle accordée 
par les juridictions internes. La Cour a d’abord constaté que l’État avait pris en charge les frais de l’assistance 
judiciaire du requérant tout au long de la procédure et il ne cherchait à recouvrer qu’une partie de frais pour une 
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As for the second, the Court identified a number of criteria for determining whether the interests 
of justice require the granting of legal aid: the gravity of the sentence, the complexity of the 
case288 and the personal situation of the person concerned289.  Considering the primary 
importance that the right to liberty plays in a democratic society, the Court stated that where 
deprivation of liberty is at stake, the assistance of a lawyer should be granted290.  
The right to effective legal assistance includes the accused person’s right to communicate with 
his/her lawyer in private and the effectiveness of legal assistance. Concerning the first point, 
the Court stated that only in exceptional circumstances the State may restrict confidential 
contact between a person in detention and his/her defence counsel (Sakhnovski v.. Russia, 
GC, § 102). 
In addition to confidentiality, the accused must be able to communicate with his/her lawyer, 
even in the presence of language barriers. 
The Court recognizes that if the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter (Article 6 § 
3 e) does not cover the relations between the accused and his/her counsel but only applies to 
the relations between the accused and the judge (X. v. Austria, Commission decision), 
However, impossibility of an applicant to communicate with his or her lawyer due to linguistic 
limitations may give rise to an issue under Article 6 §§ 3 (c) and (e) of the Convention 
Lagerblom v. Sweden, §§ 61-64 ; Pugžlys v. Poland, §§ 85-92). 
With regard to the second aspect, the Court affirmed at a very early stage that “the mere 
appointment of a legal-aid lawyer does not ensure effective assistance” (Artico v. Italy).  
The effectiveness of legal assistance implies a duty of diligence of the appointed lawyer and 
the obligation of the State to intervene when the deficiencies of the legal aid lawyer appear 
obvious (Kamasinski v. Austria, § 65291).   
The State must provide the persons receiving legal aid with a service of such a level that the 
right of defence is not infringed in its substance and is guaranteed not only formally but also 
substantially. The Convention can thus ensure that the right to legal assistance, which is at the 
heart of a fair trial and an essential aspect of the rule of law principle, should be effectively 
recognized to disadvantaged people and does not became a privilege of those who have 
means to pay for a lawyer of their own choosing.  
Right to access to a court and to legal aid have a lower protection in prison litigation that falls 
outside of the criminal limb. The obstacles encountered by detainees, due to the situation of 
complete dependence on the prison administration, to their socio-economic situation and to 
the difficulty of communicating with the outside world and accessing to digital resources are 
not sufficiently taken into account in order to ensure the effective access to justice. Contrary 
                                                             
valeur de 30 EUR environ. La Cour a enfin considéré que le requérant n’avait pas demandé une exemption des 
frais en raison de son indigence et a estimé qu’il est acceptable, aux termes de la Convention, que la charge de la 
preuve de l’insuffisance de moyens incombe à l’accusé. Le requérant n’avait présenté aucun document pouvant 
prouver son impécuniosité ni avait allégué aucune entrave à l’obtention de tels justificatifs. Dès lors, compte tenu 
du fait que le requérant avait bénéficié d’une assistance légale gratuite tout au long de la procédure et qu’il n’a pas 
demandé d’être exempté des frais et à la lumière également de la valeur réduite des dépens, la Cour a considéré 
qu’aucune atteinte à l’équité de la procédure ne pouvait être décelée en l’occurrence (§ 113-118).  
288 Une affaire complexe en fait et en droit requiert de surcroît l’octroi de l’aide juridictionnelle. Gutfreund c. France ; 
Granger c. Royaume-Uni ; Quaranta c. Suisse ; Pham Hoang c. France 
289 La Cour prend en compte à cet égard le manque éventuel de familiarité avec la langue employée devant un 
tribunal ou dans un système de droits particuliers (Twalib c. Grèce, § 53), la complexité de la procédure (Quaranta, 
cit.) et la situation personnelle de la personne intéressée (Vaudelle c. France, concernant une personne placée 
sous curatelle en raison de l’altération de ses facultés mentales) ainsi que de son âge (Suzer c. Turquie, 23 avril 
2013, n. 13885/05) 
290 Benham c. Royaume-Uni (GC); Quaranta c. Suisse § 33 
291  
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to the Airey case, the Court does not consider whether detained persons “would be able to 
present their case properly and satisfactorily” without the assistance of a lawyer.  
The effectiveness of access to a court has been largely discussed in pilot judgment 
procedures. The Court defined in a rather precise manner the characteristics that such 
remedies must provide to satisfy the requirement of effectiveness, imposed by Article 13 of the 
Convention: a preventive and compensatory effect; the independence of the decision-making 
body vis-à-vis the prison administration; the binding force of decisions; the effectiveness of the 
repair; the respect of a reasonable time of the procedure292. However, no importance has been 
given to legal assistance and its role as an indispensable instrument for rebalancing the 
asymmetry between the prisoner and the prison administration has not been duly taken into 
account. 
Asymmetry that seems to be exacerbated by fears of retaliation or negative consequences 
related to the pursuit of a remedy. These may include direct reprisals by supervisors, the 
withdrawal of privileges by the administration, but also repercussions in terms of access to 
parole or other measure of individualization of sentences. Such risks are compounded by the 
lack of procedural safeguards for sentence adjustment, excluded from the scope of Article 6.  
The imbalance in the relationship between prisoners and the prison administration and the 
particular vulnerability of prisoners are normally taken into account by the Court's case-law as 
elements justifying increased procedural protection. It is sufficient to consider in this respect 
that Strasburg judges recognize a reversal of the burden of proof in respect of the allegation 
of inhuman and degrading treatment293, justified by the particular vulnerability of persons under 
the exclusive control of police forces and by the fact that the administration is sometimes the 
only one with access to information that may prove a violation of Article 3 of the Convention294. 
Similarly, the Court recognizes the importance of the presence and assistance of a lawyer in 
police custody and pre-trial detention as an essential procedural safeguard to remedy the 
accused particular vulnerability, with the aim of avoiding ill-treatment and safeguarding the 
right not to incriminate oneself and to enjoy the right to a fair trial295. The case-law lacks 
coherence to the extent that these considerations do not come into play for the configuration 
of the right to an effective remedy. Contrary to the examples recalled, the assistance of a 
lawyer is not considered as an essential procedural guarantee to remedy the situation of 
vulnerability nor, contrary to the line followed in the Airey jurisprudence, a precondition for 
effective access to justice. 
The case law on the effectiveness of remedies shows a rather formalistic approach and the 
right to legal aid, which should be considered as an element inherent to the effectiveness of 
the remedy, is completely ignored. 
 3.2. THE LACK OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE ROLE OF THE NGOS : 
THE LOCUS STANDI OF NGOS BEFORE THE ECTHR (UNDER ARTICLE 34 
ECHR), STATE OF LAW AND PROSPECTS. 
                                                             
292 Ananyev c. Russie, §§ 214-231. 
293  
294 Torreggiani c. Italia, précité, § 72 :  « Sensible à la vulnérabilité particulière des personnes se trouvant sous le 
contrôle exclusif des agents de l’État, telles les personnes détenues, la Cour réitère que la procédure prévue par 
la Convention ne se prête pas toujours à une application rigoureuse du principe affirmanti incumbit probatio (la 
preuve incombe à celui qui affirme) car, inévitablement, le gouvernement défendeur est parfois seul à avoir accès 
aux informations susceptibles de confirmer ou d’infirmer les affirmations du requérant (Khoudoyorov c. Russie, 
no 6847/02, § 113, CEDH 2005-X (extraits) ; et Benediktov c. Russie, no 106/02, § 34, 10 mai 2007 ; Brânduşe 
c. Roumanie, no 6586/03, § 48, 7 avril 2009 ; Ananyev et autres c. Russie, précité, § 123) ».  
 
295 Salduz ; Ibrahim ; Simeonovi ; Beuze ; précités. 
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 3.2.1  STATE OF LAW 
According to Article 34 of the ECHR, every natural person as well as every non-governmental 
organization (NGO) or group of individuals can apply to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Article 34 of the ECHR provides that the Court “may receive application from person, 
nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be victim of a violation by 
one of the High Contracting Parties...” NGOs may, therefore, institute case before the Court 
as victim itself296 or as representative of victim297 and excluding, thus, an actio popularis 
challenge (see Burden v. UK, § 33). A scrutiny of laws by the European Court of Human Rights 
in abstracto is not foreseen in the Convention (The Christian Federation of Jehova’s Witnesses 
in France v. France) and applicants cannot have a law or regulation examined by the Court 
just because they deem it contravenes the Convention; they have to be personally affected 
(Tanase v. Moldova). 
When laws or legal acts are concerned, establishing whether an applicant is affected in a way 
which gives him standing to lodge and application is not easy. In particular, it may prove difficult 
to discern between cases in which the applicant is considered a potential victim of a legal act 
and an application seeking an abstract examination of a law. The main criterion is whether the 
law is likely to affect him immediately or on the near future. In Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse 
et autres c Suisse, the applicants were Muslims who belonged to organizations advocating for 
reconciliation between Islam and other religions. They took issue with the result of a 
referendum in which a majority of the Swiss population had voted that the building of minarets 
should be prohibited in Switzerland. The ban on building minarets was not effective yet. The 
European Court of Human Rights declared the application inadmissible for the applicant could 
not claim to be a victim. It held that the result of the popular vote did not have an impact on the 
applicants yet and did not compel them to modify their behavior in any way. 
It is not sufficient that the applicant is affected in the way that a law or measure applies to 
her/him in the sense that he is a resident of a certain country in which a legal act is passed or 
a member of the general public. For example, in L.Z. v Slovakia, the applicant complained 
about the naming of a street after a man who, according to him, had been a Nazi collaborator 
during the Second World War. The Court acknowledged that the issue raised by the applicant 
was important. It noted, however, that the applicant had not presented any evidence that the 
renaming of the street had had a negative impact on his private life (§ 75). Therefore it declared 
the application inadmissible. 
 3.2.2 COMPARISON WITH EU LAW 
In the past, within EU law, NGOs could not be parties to a judicial proceeding unless they were 
either directly addressed by an EU decision, or directly and individually concerned by an EU 
decision or regulation. Later, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a provision expanding the right to 
challenge the EU measures. Article 263(4) of the Lisbon Treaty provides that: Any Natural or 
Legal person may...institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is 
of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern 
to them and does not entail implementing measures298. 
This article, while maintaining the direct and individual concern principle in order to challenge 
the EU acts, provides that, in the case of regulatory acts, the individual concern criteria is not 
                                                             
296 Conka and Others v. Belgium, App. No. 551564/99 (2001). The Ligues des Droits de l’Homme could not claim 
since 
they were not themselves victim of violation 
297 Yusupova and Others v. Russia, App. No. 5428/05 (2009). 
298 See Information and Notices in 50 OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION (2007), available at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF (last visited on Sept. 10, 2012). 
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required. Through this new rule of judicial review, NGOs may be recognized as having locus 
standi as party to challenge the regulation to protect a collective interest. 
According to Article 40 of the Statute of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and Article 93(1) 
of the Rules of the ECJ, any person establishing an interest in the result of the case submitted 
to the ECJ may intervene, except in the case between member States and/or institutions of 
the EU. An application to intervene shall be limited to supporting the form of order sought by 
one of the parties. The intervention must show direct and concrete interest in the outcome of 
the case. It is worth noting that under these provisions the intervening persons seek to protect 
their own interest in the dispute, not the interest of the proper administration of justice. This 
intervention is not thus amicus curiae. In various instances, NGOs attempted to intervene 
under Article 40 of the Statute of the ECJ, but were rejected by the Court simply because they 
could not have shown a direct interest established within the field of their objective299. 
 
 3.2.3 PROSPECTS: THE CENTRE FOR LEGAL RESOURCES ON BEHALF 
OF VALENTIN CÂMPEANU V. ROMANIA CASE AND THE  ISSUE OF 
LOCUS STANDI FOR HIGHLY VULNERABLE INDIVIDUALS. 
In Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania (n. 47848/08) the 
Court granted standing to an NGO to act as a representative of a highly vulnerable person, 
with no next-of-kin, Mr Câmpeanu, a young Roma man with severe mental disabilities who 
was infected with HIV, who spent his entire life in the care of the State authorities and who 
died in hospital at the age of 18, as a result of neglect. He had no relatives, legal guardians or 
representatives, was abandoned at birth and lived in various public orphanages, centres for 
disabled children and medical facilities, where he did not receive proper health and educational 
treatment. 
Undoubtedly this case falls into the category of what Dworkin calls the hard cases, since it 
does not fit into any of the categories covered by the Court’s case-law and thus raises a difficult 
question of interpretation of the Convention relating to the standing of an NGO which can’t be 
assumed as the direct, indirect or potential victim. The issues at stake are the principle that the 
Convention must be interpreted as guaranteeing rights which are practical and effective as 
opposed to theoretical and illusory (see Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37 and 
the authorities cited therein) and the necessity of ensuring that the conditions of admissibility 
governing access to the Court are interpreted in a consistent manner.  The Court considered 
that Mr Câmpeanu was in facts the direct victim300, within the meaning of Article 34 and that 
                                                             
299 See, e.g., The Autonomous Region of the Azores v. Council, 2004 European Court Reports (“ECR”) II-02153 
300 The direct victim is the person, organization or groups of persons directly affected by an action or omission 
(Brumarescu v. Romania). The European Court of Human Rights interprets the term autonomously, i.e. a person 
or organization may be considered a victim by the Court even if he does not qualify as victim under domestic law. 
Victim status does not require being prejudiced (Brumarescu v Romania), yet it is not possible to be the victim of 
an act which does not have any legal effect (Monnat v Switzerland) . In Benamar and others v France, an expulsion 
order had been issued against the applicant. He was expelled, secretly returned to France and finally was granted 
a work and residence permit. The expulsion order was, however, never officially revoked. The European Court of 
Human Rights rejected his application, by which he claimed that the expulsion order violated his rights under article 
8 ECHR as inadmissible because the order did not have any legal effect.  Even temporary legal effects on the 
person concerned may suffice to be regarded as a victim. Temporary legal effects on the applicant may suffice to 
render him a victim. In Monnat v Switzerland, the applicant was a radio journalist. Following complaints about one 
of his broadcasts, the official body competent for media regulation had found that the transmission violated media 
regulation.  While the appeal by the applicant was pending, the broadcast was not available to listeners. The 
European Court of Human Rights held that this temporary effect was sufficient to consider the applicant as a victim. 
It also pointed to the negative effects on the applicant’s professional reputation. In order to give full effect to the 
provisions of the Convention, the ‘victim criteria must not be applied in a rigid and mechanical way (Karner v Austria). 
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CLR could not be considered as an indirect victim301 within the meaning of its case-law since 
the NGO had not demonstrated a sufficiently “close link” with the direct victim; nor had it argued 
that it has a “personal interest” in pursuing the complaints before the Court, considering the 
definition of these concepts in the Court’s case-law. 
Finally the Court decided for the admissibility of the CLR’s application as a representative of 
the deceased, lodged with the Court after his death without any power of attorney: 
Against the above background, the Court is satisfied that in the exceptional circumstances of this 
case and bearing in mind the serious nature of the allegations, it should be open to the CLR to act 
as a representative of Mr Câmpeanu, notwithstanding the fact that it had no power of attorney to 
act on his behalf and that he died before the application was lodged under the Convention. To find 
otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from 
being examined at an international level, with the risk that the respondent State might escape 
accountability under the Convention as a result of its own failure to appoint a legal representative 
to act on his behalf as it was required to do under national law (see paragraphs 59 and 60 above; 
see also, mutatis mutandis, P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, and The Argeş 
College of Legal Advisers v. Romania, no. 2162/05, § 26, 8 March 2011). Allowing the respondent 
State to escape accountability in this manner would not be consistent with the general spirit of the 
Convention, nor with the High Contracting Parties’ obligation under Article 34 of the Convention not 
to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right to bring an application before the Court. 
Interestingly enough, for our analysis, the Court stress that even if Article 13 does not require 
a judicial authority, this form of procedural remedy is highly recommendable in this sort of 
cases: 
In the Court’s opinion, the authority referred to in Article 13 may not necessarily in all instances be a 
judicial authority in the strict sense. Nevertheless, the powers and procedural guarantees an 
authority possesses are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective (see Klass 
and Others, cited above, § 67). The Court has held that judicial remedies furnish strong 
guarantees of independence, access for the victim and family, and enforceability of awards in 
compliance with the requirements of Article 13 (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited 
above, § 110)302. 
This case is potentially relevant if we consider the theoretical approach and legal reasoning of 
the Court in cases of vulnerable or, as in this case, highly vulnerable individuals.  
As a matter of facts, the Court is ready to soften the rigidity of Article 34 rule concerning the 
locus standi in view of the “exceptional circumstances of this case and bearing in mind the 
serious nature of the allegations” (§112), which translated into a possible rule of reasoning in 
cases of highly vulnerable persons and for cases concerning violations of the most important 
fundamental rights, such as Article 2 and 3 of the Convention.  
It appears clearly how the Court tried to affirm the exceptionality of this case in order to reduce 
and limit the possible development of this case as a precedent in its case law. This same point 
is highly criticized by the dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque: 
3. My point of discontent lies in the fact that the majority chose to approach the legal issue at stake 
in a casuistic and restricted manner, ignoring the need for a firm statement on a matter of principle, 
                                                             
301 Actions or omissions which directly affect someone may also have an effect on third parties. For example, close 
family members of persons who are illegally detained may suffer from anxiety or grief. Third parties who are 
impacted by the infringement of another individual’s human rights may in certain circumstances have the right to 
lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights on their own behalf as ‘indirect victims’. Persons 
affected indirectly only have standing if their suffering goes beyond what is normal or unavoidable in a case in which 
a family member is subjected to human rights violations. As the Court has held in Cakici v Turkey, whether close 
relatives can be considered indirect victims ‘will depend on the existence of special factors which give the suffering 
of the applicant a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be considered as 
inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation’ (para 98).  
s 
302 Câmpeanu, cited, §149, emphasis added. 
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namely the requisites for representation in international human rights law. The judgment was simply 
downgraded to an act of indulgence on the part of the Court, which was willing to close its eyes to 
the rigidity of the requirements of the concept of legal representation under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (“the Convention”) and the Rules of Court in “the exceptional circumstances of this 
case” (see paragraphs 112 and 160 of the judgment), and to admit the CLR as a “de facto 
representative of Mr Câmpeanu” (see paragraph 114 of the judgment). To use the words of Judge 
Bonello, this is yet another example of the “patchwork case-law” to which the Court sometimes resorts 
when faced with issues of principle. 
The dissenting opinion proposes a principled reasoning, affirming that: 
When confronted with a situation where the domestic authorities ignored the fate of the alleged victim 
of human rights violations, and he or she was unable to reach the Court by his or her own means or 
those of a relative, legal guardian or representative, the Court has to interpret the conditions of 
admissibility of applications in the broadest possible way in order to ensure that the victim’s right of 
access to the European human rights protection system is effective. Only such an interpretation of 
Article 34 of the Convention accommodates the intrinsically different factual situation of extremely 
vulnerable persons who are or have been victims of human rights violations and are deprived of legal 
representation. 
Yet, it can be discussed that the potentiality of this case could be assessed having in mind the 
argumentative approach of high vulnerability cases. Even this “strictly opportunistic and 
utilitarian case-sifting methodology 303 ” can be used in analogous cases, discussing the 
contextual version of the notion of vulnerability and the fact that the rationale for vulnerable 
position can be totally dependent on the subordination to the state authority. This situation is 
able to afford a reinforced positive obligation to member state in order to provide the highly 
vulnerable person with the proper tools for the effectiveness of the right to access to justice.  
This implies a taxonomic work in order to identify, with a case by case approach combined 
with the principled reasoning proposed by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, the situation in which 
an individual is completely dependent and subordinate to the state authority in condition of 
deprivation of liberty. In these cases, free and effective legal aid, combined with the provision 
for legal information and legal counselling provided by NGOs in prison and in police custody 
centres (as well as in all detention sites304, such as detention of migrants sites and total 
institutions) could be a key-point in order to reduce the risk of being completely devoid of the 
Conventional protection. 
This should be paired with considerations for the possibility of establishing and assigning locus 
standi directly to NGOs in cases in which the highly vulnerable individual needs protection 
against violations of Article 2 and 3 rights, creating a concept of de facto representation, for 
cases involving extremely vulnerable victims who have no relatives, legal guardians or 
representatives. 
To echo the consequentialist approach of the Court in Câmpeanu of the Court Article 34 of the 
Convention, “to find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a 
violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level, with the risk that the 
respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention as a result of its own 
failure to appoint a legal representative to act on his behalf as it was required to do under 
national law”. This position can also be interpreted as a fulfillment of the subsidiarity principle 
and the provision of Article 34 stating that: “The High Contracting Parties undertake not to 
hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.” 
                                                             
303 Dissenting Opinion, cited, §6. 
304 Relevant is to mention here that, as an example of the future challenge awaiting the Court, the new legislative 
decree on migration and public security in Italy, d.l. 113/2018, open for an indeterminate number of places for the 
detention of migrants in Italy.  
69 
 
Three subsequent cases are showing the limits and potentialities of this perspective within the 
ECtHR’s case law.  
In Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania – Helsinki Committee on behalf 
of Ionel Garcea v. Romania (n.2959/11), an application was lodged by an NGO (APADOR – 
CH), on behalf of a prisoner Mr Garcea, who died in prison in 2007. While serving a seven-
year sentence, Mr Garcea was diagnosed with a mental illness and other health problems and 
was under regular supervision of the prison medical service. He had been in contact with the 
applicant association since the beginning of his prison term. In August 2004 he inserted a nail 
into his forehead and in early 2005 attempted suicide. Mr Garcea alleged that he was beaten 
up on several occasions and handcuffed and chained to a hospital bed. The applicant 
association lodged complaints with the domestic authorities after visiting him, stating that the 
lack of medical treatment amounted to torture and urging the prison authorities to stop using 
force against him. In June 2007 Mr Garcea inserted another nail into his forehead and was 
operated on in a civilian hospital. After his final return to the prison hospital he died there in 
July 2007. 
The applicant association lodged an administrative complaint with the prison administration 
requesting an investigation into Mr Garcea’s medical treatment. The prosecutor’s office 
decided not to prosecute the prison doctors. Concerning the allegations of ill-treatment through 
improper medical care a court of appeal ordered that the investigation be continued in February 
2011 after finding that the conditions that had precipitated Mr Garcea’s death had to be 
established. 
Concerning Article 34, the respondent Government submitted that the applicant association 
did not have locus standi as it did not fulfil the ratione personae criteria and was not able to 
show a strong link with Mr Garcea. The Court recalled its decision in Centre for Legal 
Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania to reaffirm that in exceptional 
circumstances and in cases of allegations of a serious nature, it should be open to associations 
to represent victims, in the absence of a power of attorney and notwithstanding that the victim 
may have died before the application was lodged under the Convention. As in that case, 
serious allegations of violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention had been made in 
respect of a person with no known relatives and suffering from mental illness. Even though, 
unlike Mr Câmpeanu, Mr Garcea could have lodged a complaint during his lifetime, but at the 
same time had a relatively closer connection with the association that represented him, the 
Court considered that the applicant association had standing as his de facto representative. 
Even in this case, the Court relies on the special vulnerability of the person, a multiple 
contextual vulnerability of a mentally ill, disabled detained person:  
66. In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject 
deprivation of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State 
agents but also all the surrounding circumstances. Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position 
and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Where the authorities decide to place and 
maintain in detention a person with disabilities, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing 
such conditions as correspond to his special needs resulting from his disability (see Centre for Legal 
Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, cited above, § 131, with further references). 
More recently, another case saw the affirmation of the locus standi for an NGO in case of a 
deceased prisoner. In Kondrulin v. Russia (application no. 12987/15) there is a significant 
difference with the previous cases against Romania, the first applicant was in fact, the same 
direct victim, Vladimir Kondrulin, a Russian national. In February 2014, while serving a 13-year 
and ten month prison sentence for a criminal offence, Mr Kondrulin was diagnosed with 
terminal prostate cancer. In October 2014 this diagnosis was confirmed by a medical panel, 
which also checked Mr Kondrulin’s medical condition against a list of illnesses provided for by 
Government decree which could have warranted his release. The panel concluded that his 
medical condition made him eligible for early release. In January 2015 a hearing was thus held 
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to examine Mr Kondrulin’s request for early release. The doctor who was treating him testified 
in court that his condition had significantly deteriorated since the beginning of 2014. The court 
rejected, however, his request for release, finding that he had failed to reform while in detention 
and that his illness did not preclude further detention as the requisite medical treatment was 
available within the prison system. This decision was upheld on appeal in April 2015. In the 
meantime, in March 2015 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decide to apply 
interim measures under Rule 39, indicating to the Russian Government that Mr Kondrulin 
should immediately be examined by independent medical experts with a view to assessing: 
whether his medical treatment in the prison hospital was adequate; whether his condition 
required him being placed in a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital; and whether his state of 
health was compatible with detention in a prison hospital at all. The Government responded in 
April 2015 and, relying on a number of documents (including a copy of Mr Kondrulin’s medical 
file, certificates, reports and statements), asserted that the medical treatment in the prison 
hospital corresponded to his needs. In the absence of any arrangements for an independent 
medical examination having been carried out as requested by the ECtHR, Mr Kondrulin’s 
lawyer summoned two independent doctors to assess his client’s state of health as well as the 
medical treatment he was receiving. They issued a report in May 2015 concluding that Mr 
Kondrulin’s treatment in the prison hospital was inadequate. Mr Kondrulin’s health continued 
to deteriorate and he died of cancer on 15 September 2015, four days before a hearing was 
scheduled to examine another request for his early release on health grounds. Mr Kondrulin’s 
lawyer requested an inquiry into the circumstances of his client’s death, but it ended with a 
decision in October 2015 not to open a criminal case. 
The Court noted that Mr Kondrulin had died in custody, leaving no known relatives. The 
Russian NGO, AGORA Interregional Association of Human Rights Organisations (“Agora”), 
had represented Mr Kondrulin in his proceedings against the domestic authorities, and 
continued to do so even after his death, without the authorities ever having expressed any 
objections. Given their strong link with Mr Kondrulin and, bearing in mind the exceptional 
circumstances of the case as well as the serious nature of the allegations, the Court found that 
Agora’s lawyers had standing to continue the application. It noted in particular that, in such 
cases as Mr Kondrulin’s, not leaving it open to associations to represent victims ran the risk of 
allowing a State to escape accountability under the European Convention: 
31. …It has been also established that, in exceptional circumstances and cases concerning 
allegations of a serious nature, it should be open to associations to represent victims in the absence 
of a power of attorney, and notwithstanding that a victim may have died before the application in 
question was lodged under the Convention. The Court considered that to find otherwise would 
amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined 
at an international level, with the risk that a respondent State might escape accountability under the 
Convention (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu, cited above, § 112, 
and Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania – Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel 
Garcea v. Romania, no. 2959/11, § 42, 24 March 2015). 32. Considering the information in its 
possession, the Court notes that the applicant died in custody. He left no known relatives. Agora’s 
lawyers represented him in his proceedings against the domestic authorities, and continued to do so 
even after his death, in the absence of any objections from the respective authorities. Accordingly, 
the Court considers that there was a strong link between the applicant and Agora. 33. Against the 
above background, the Court is satisfied that in the exceptional circumstances of this case and 
bearing in mind the serious nature of the allegations, it should be open to Agora to pursue the 
application (see, mutatis mutandis, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu 
[GC], cited above, § 112). 
It seems that the “Câmpeanu test” imposes a two-steps assessment: first the strong link 
between the direct victim and the representing NGO and the exceptional circumstances of the 
case. This last criterion is established according to a numbers of not alternative conditions: 1. 
The special vulnerability of the direct victim, making it impossible for him to complain during 
his lifetime; 2. the importance of the allegations brought before the Court (the serious nature 
of the allegation, i.e. an alleged violation of Article 2 or 3 of the Convetion); 3. the absence of 
heirs or legal representatives likely to seize the Court. The first criterion requires the NGO’s 
contact with the victim and its intervention in the internal proceedings following the death, as 
71 
 
well as the recognition of its locus standi at a national level by the domestic authorities (see, 
Câmpeanu, cited above); §§ 104-111).  
This trend toward the substantiation of the role of NGOs working with prisoners and the special 
protection for highly vulnerable persons has been recently interrupted by an inadmissibility 
decision of the Court. This decision allows us to highlight a number of shortcomings deriving 
from the “exceptional circumstances” approach adopted by the Court in Câmpeanu. In 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee v. Bulgaria (dec., no.35653/12 66172/12) the critical issue arises 
on the criterion of the strong link between the direct victims and the NGO. Alarmed by a BBC 
documentary denouncing the situation of children with mental disabilities in an institution in 
Bulgaria, the NGO Bulgarian Helsinki Committee requested the State Prosecutor to investigate 
the conditions under which these children were accommodated in the home, and the deaths 
occurring there. In cooperation with the applicant organization, the State Prosecutor inspected 
various homes for disabled children. The association monitored the criminal investigations and 
lodged appeals against a number of decisions not to prosecute and discontinuance orders. 
Because a final judgment discontinued the investigations in the cases concerning the death of 
Aneta Yordanova and Nikolina Kutsarova, the applicant organization took these to the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
Having regard to the exceptional nature of that application of the concept of locus standi, the 
criteria set forth in Câmpeanu were decisive for the examination of the present applications. 
The exceptional circumstances criterion was met: the direct victims, on account of their mental 
disability, their status as abandoned children and their extreme vulnerability, had not been in 
a position to complain, while alive, of the conditions in the home where they had been 
placed305. As the young girls had been abandoned at birth and had not had any contact with 
their biological parents while alive, and one of the mothers had explicitly waived parental rights, 
the children had de facto led an orphan’s life in the institutions in which they had been placed. 
Accordingly, even if the mothers remained the children’s legal representatives under domestic 
law, there had been no real link in the present case between the parents and children, with the 
result that no one had been responsible for protecting the children’s best interests. Accordingly, 
the parents in question could not be regarded as persons “capable of lodging an application 
with the Court”.  
Nevertheless,  the Court found that the “strong link” criterion was lacking: the applicant 
association had not had any contact with the adolescent children and had not taken an interest 
in their case prior to their deaths, which had occurred in October 2006 and October 2007 
respectively. Long periods had elapsed not only between the girls’ deaths and the first steps 
taken by the applicant association in the respective investigations, but also between the 
decisions discontinuing the proceedings, of which the applicant association had already learnt, 
and their applications to the prosecution to have the investigations reopened.  
Also, even if the NGO had intervened at domestic level it had not had formal standing in the 
domestic proceedings under Bulgarian law. It had not been party to the proceedings and had 
not enjoyed the procedural rights granted to the parties. It had only been able to challenge the 
prosecutor’s discontinuance orders and had not subsequently had the right to appeal against 
them before the courts. 
                                                             
305 53. Pour ce qui est de la vulnérabilité des personnes concernées, la Cour remarque que, comme dans l’affaire 
Câmpeanu, précitée, les victimes directes, en raison de leur handicap mental, de leur statut d’enfants abandonnés 
et de leur grande vulnérabilité n’étaient pas en mesure de se plaindre de leur vivant des conditions dans lesquelles 
elles avaient été placées (Câmpeanu, précité, § 108). De même, les présentes requêtes soulèvent des allégations 
sérieuses de violation des articles 2 et 3 de la Convention (ibidem, § 112). 
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This formalistic approach does not provide a clear distinction on this ground between BH and 
Câmpeanu, since it is not self-evident whether domestic law granted full power of 
representation in Câmpeanu or they just acquiesced. Moreover, as stated:  
To link the standing before the ECtHR to standing on the national level, is a dangerous practice. An 
undesirable consequence could be that states will become very careful in granting standing. It might 
even induce some to take measures not to accept or allow NGOs to represent victims at the national 
level, in order to circumvent subsequent standing of these same NGOs at the regional or international 
level. That this is not in the interest of the most vulnerable in society is self-evident306. 
This interpretation seems at odds with the principle of effectiveness and directly and critically 
link the protection of fundamental conventional rights to domestic legislation, creating a pure 
discrimination between applicants in view of their nationality. This decision seems also to be 
in contrast with the very essence of the reasoning within the perspective of vulnerability, since 
the same fact that the domestic legislation excludes representation for these sort of cases 
render the individuals more vulnerable and therefore more in need of the same representation 
at an international level.  
Conclusion 
As we have seen, the absence of legal aid in domestic penitentiary issues is hardly ever 
sanctioned as such by the ECtHR. The development of the effective access to justice in prison 
is largely left to the initiative of NGOs, pro bono lawyers, associations and more or less 
formalized networks of professionals who act as “smugglers of law”. The recognition of a legal 
standing for NGOs representing the interests of prisoners before the ECtHR, which could partly 
compensate for the legal vulnerability of persons deprived of their liberty, is highly ambiguous. 
We could argue that a better recognition for NGOs would be likely to lead to a faster resolution 
of structural or systemic problems in European prisons. 
 
3.3 PROSPECTS 
3.3.1 VULNERABILITY IN CONTEXT : A TOOL FOR EXPANDING THE RIGHT 
TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN PRISON 
According to a study by Al Tamimi on the protection of vulnerable groups and individuals by 
the European Court of Human Rights: “in recent years, vulnerability reasoning has played an 
increasingly prominent role in the case law of the ECtHR. Some have gone as far as calling 
the trend a revolution307”. 
As shown by Peroni and Timmer308, the Court originally used the notion of vulnerability in cases 
involving Roma minorities, and has structured the line of reasoning along a contextual version 
of vulnerability, considering the specific historical and social feature of the targeted groups: 
                                                             
306 H. de Vylder, “The saga continues … Legal standing for NGOs when de facto representing mentally disabled 
dying in institutions”, The Strasbourg Observer, August 29, 2016, available at: 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/08/29/the-saga-continues-legal-standing-for-ngos-when-de-facto-
representing-mentally-disabled-dying-in-institutions/ 
307 Y. Al Tamimi, The protection of vulnerable groups and individuals by the European Court of Human Rights, PhD 
Thesis, May 20, 2015, p. 5, citing A. Timmer, ‘A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the European Court of Human 
Rights’, in: M. Fineman & A. Grear (eds.), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and 
Politics, Farnham: Ashgate, 2013, pp. 147-170. Al Tamimi’s work is available at : 
https://njb.nl/Uploads/2015/9/Thesis-The-protection-of-vulnerable-groups-and-individuals-by-the-European-Court-
of-Human-Rights.pdf; 
308 See, L. Peroni, A. Timmer, “Vulnerable groups: The promise of an emerging concept in European Human Rights 
Convention law”, ICON, (2013), Vol. 11 No.4, 1056-1085. 
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“[A]s a result of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific 
type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority … As the [European] Court [of Human Rights] 
has noted in previous cases, they therefore require special protection …309”. The Court went 
on expanding the scope of vulnerability to mentally disabled persons, by recognizing them as 
a “particularly vulnerable group in society, who have suffered considerable discrimination in 
the past.310”. The same notion was used for asylum seekers311 and people affected by HIV312.  
From a theoretical point of view the same notion of vulnerability needs to be assessed from a 
critical point of view313, following Fineman’s discussion on the myth of the personal autonomy 
of the liberal subject314.  Fineman argues that the legal implications of the term vulnerability, 
specifically, in international human rights law, applied only to specific marginalized identities 
and groups, only serves to sustain the liberal myth that, “normally,” people are self-sufficient, 
independent, and autonomous. As affirmed by Peroni and Timmer: “Instead Fineman proposes 
to understand vulnerability as a “universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition” 
and posits that the proper role of the state is to be responsive to this. She presents her 
vulnerability thesis as an alternative to traditional group-based US equal protection analysis. 
Fineman argues that her analysis is capable of delivering substantive equality (where the 
traditional analysis has failed) because her thesis turns the inquiry to the “institutional practices 
that produce the identities and inequalities in the first place.”315”. 
Starting with the etymological analysis of the word, ‘vulnerability’ stems from the latin word, 
vulnus, wound, and is therefore embodied in the corporeal dimension of physical suffering and 
harm316. As a result vulnerability is a conditions that pertains to every human being for the 
same fact of being human, of being a ‘social animal’, since the notion of vulnerability bears a 
strong relational nature: “[V]ulnerability speaks to our universal capacity for suffering, in two 
ways. First, I am vulnerable because I depend upon the co-operation of others (including, 
importantly, the State) . . . Second, I am vulnerable because I am penetrable; I am permanently 
open and exposed to hurts and harms of various kinds.317” 
Now all of these dimensions can be traced in the ECtHR’s understanding and elaboration of 
its own autonomous concept of vulnerability. The anti-essentialist, relational, contextual nature 
of vulnerability and the fact of being harm-based are all matched in the casuistic approach 
employed by the Court: 
Based on a close reading of the case law, our understanding is that the concept of group vulnerability, 
as used by the Court, has three characteristics: it is relational, particular, and harm-based. The 
Court’s account of group vulnerability is first of all relational. As already transpired from Chapman, 
the Court locates vulnerability not in the individual alone but rather in her wider social circumstances. 
The Court’s notion of vulnerable groups is thus relational because it views the vulnerability of certain 
groups as shaped by social, historical, and institutional forces. In other words, the Court links the 
                                                             
309 D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, n. 57325/00, Grand Chamber judgment of 13 November 2007, § 182. 
310 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, n. 38832/06, 20 May 2010, §42. 
311 See,  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, n. 30696/09, §251 (2011). 
312 See, Kiyutin v. Russia, n. 2700/10, §63 (2011). 
313 Along with Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008–2009), ID., The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 
251, 268 (2010), ID.,  “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 
THE ELDER L.J. 101 (2012). 
314 M. Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, The New Press, 2004. 
315 L. Peroni, A. Timmer, cited above, p. 1064. 
316 See e.g., J.Butler, Precarious life : the powers of mourning and violence, London ; New York, N.Y. : Verso, 2006; 
R. E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social. Responsibilities, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London, 1986. 
317 Mary Neal, “Not Gods but Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood, 33 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 177, 
186–187 (2012), as cited in L. Peroni, A. Timmer, cited above. 
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individual applicant’s vulnerability to the social or institutional environment, which originates or 
sustains the vulnerability of the group she is (made) part of. The emphasis on context inherent in the 
relational character of the Court’s understanding of group vulnerability is in line with contemporary 
analyses that use vulnerability as a critical tool. As we have seen in Section 2.2, they all insist on the 
need to explore the role of societal or institutional arrangements in originating and maintaining 
vulnerability318. 
Now, what is particularly relevant is that the Court included prisoners within the category of 
vulnerable persons according to a specific reasoning, resting on the individual analysis of the 
different cases and not on the abstract characteristics of a “group”. 
As a matter of facts, the vulnerability reasoning cannot be considered as a doctrine, but rather 
as a “a case by case development, over time, in a wide variety of settings (…) which has 
crystallised into a particular interpretative approach employed by the Court in such cases in 
recognition of the factor of vulnerability319”.  This casuistic approach has been criticized has 
been too lose and undefined, but it was argued that:  
the categories of vulnerability in the Strasbourg system are loosely delineated to allow the Court the 
broadest freedom in future cases to identify other groups and categories that merit special attention. 
While this may be a point of criticism for some pointing to a certain laxity in the development of the 
notion, it is, in my view, necessary for an international human rights court faced with the complexities 
of modern life and the often unforeseeable realities of disadvantage and stigma to leave the 
categories of vulnerability open320. 
Chenal goes even further holding that a system based on principles and fundamental rights 
cannot accept an abstract definition of the notion of vulnerability321. In his view only a case by 
case approach and the same relational nature of the notion of vulnerability serves the purpose 
of the effective protection of conventional human rights322.  
Today, among all the categories, groups or individuals considered vulnerable, to different 
extent and degrees, by the Court (Al Tamimi counts: prisoners, non-nationals, victims, 
suspects, roma people, children , mentally ill persons and HIV persons, while Peroni and 
Timmer distinguish between vulnerable groups, roma people, asylum seekers, mentally ill 
persons and HIV persons and vulnerable individuals: prisoners and children323) prisoners are 
by far the most mentioned vulnerable category in the Court’s judgments. In a first stage of this 
reasoning approach, the Court accepted that there are certain categories of prisoners that are 
vulnerable: these were prisoners who had been subject of ill-treatment, mentally ill prisoners 
or those who did not speak the language of the legal officer (see inter alia, T.W. v. Malta, 29 
April 1999, no. 25644/94). Subsequently the Court came to the conclusion that all persons that 
are held in detention are in a vulnerable position, see the Grand Chamber case of Salman v. 
Turkey ([GC] 27 June 2000, no. 21986/93): “In the light of the importance of the protection 
afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, 
taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding 
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circumstances. Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a 
duty to protect them.”. 
Now, this poses the question of the nature of the notion of vulnerability involved in the Court’s 
case law. From a theoretical and methodological point of view, the Court adopts a casuistic 
approach to the understanding of a position of vulnerability, choosing a relativistic, contextual 
approach instead of an abstract and absolute version of the notion of vulnerability. As a 
consequence, the prisoners are not vulnerable person ex se, but they are vulnerable because 
they are in prison. So, the determinant for their vulnerability can be traced in their subjection 
to state control. The Court has held, in Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, that the dependence of 
prisoners on the authorities is the reason for their vulnerability. In other cases, the Court held 
that prisoners are vulnerable because they are limited in terms of access to medical assistance 
(Wenerski v. Poland). Other conditions during an imprisonment can exacerbate the vulnerable 
position of a prisoners, for example if the prisoners is held in custody with limited contacts with 
her/his family or the outside world, when she/he has had no representative during the 
proceedings or when a prisoners has noticed another prisoners being harmed or killed. The 
prisoners’ situation is also considered particularly vulnerable when he has no representative, 
either in the criminal procedure (Levinta v. Moldova) or in the proceedings before the Court 
(Ponushkov v. Russia, inter alia). Finally, the length of the period of detention also influences 
the level of vulnerability, meaning that a person that is detained for a long period of time is 
considered particularly vulnerable, and vice versa (Ochelkov v. Russia).  
Parallel to the notion of multiple discrimination or multi-factors discrimination, the Court has 
created the idea of multiple vulnerability factors. At first, next to the ‘ordinary’ prisoners, the 
Court has involved vulnerability reasoning in quite a number of cases involving mentally ill 
prisoners. The Court considers prisoners with a mental disorder either as ‘particularly 
vulnerable prisoners’, or as ‘more vulnerable than the average prisoners’ , or as prisoners ‘in 
a particularly vulnerable situation’ (See inter alia: Munjaz v. the United Kingdom; Halilovic v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; Claes v. Belgium; Dybeku v. Albania; Sławomir Musiał v. Poland.; 
Lashin v. Russia). 
The Court has also considered prisoners who have health problems as vulnerable. As was the 
case with mentally ill prisoners, the health issues of prisoners are circumstances that make 
them ‘particularly vulnerable’ and ‘more vulnerable than the average prisoners’. 
Concerning the legal implications of vulnerability, always following Al Tamimi’s research, the 
most evident consequence of recognizing a subject as vulnerable is that the state has a special 
positive obligation to protect that subject. The Court has, in different situations and with regard 
to different Articles of the Convention, made clear that vulnerable individuals and groups 
require special protection by the state, therefore expanding the scope of positive obligation for 
the States. The most evident consequence of recognizing a subject as vulnerable is that the 
state has a special positive obligation to protect that subject.  The Court has, in different 
situations and with regard to different Articles of the ECHR, made clear that vulnerable 
individuals and groups require special protection by the state. The obligations differ per 
vulnerable subject and interest that needs to be protected. The Court has put special positive 
obligations on the state with regard to the right to life (Article 2 ECHR) and the prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3 ECHR) in cases where authorities 
are concerned with vulnerable subjects, i.e. prisoners; 
In multiple cases about mentally disabled prisoners, the Court has held that the assessment 
of whether a treatment or punishment is compatible with the standards of Article 2 and Article 
3 ECHR has to take into consideration the vulnerability of prisoners. 
The expanded obligations vis-à-vis prisoners under Article 3 ECHR were further developed in 
Orchowski v. Poland. The Court gives a specific description of what it requires of a detention 
policy in order to be in accordance with Article 3 ECHR, namely that a person is detained “in 
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conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity”. The Court relied on the 
vulnerability of prisoners to demand a higher level of diligence from the state, and ultimately 
found a breach of Article 3. 
Additionally, a lack of medical attention for detained persons with HIV or other health issues is 
regarded as a violation of Article 3 ECHR. States are obliged to take the vulnerability of these 
individuals into consideration and have a special duty to provide them with adequate and 
necessary medical assistance, in particular when it has been established that such treatment 
is urgent. 
 Adequate medical assistance means that the prisoners is regularly checked by “sufficiently 
qualified medical personnel” capable of effectively assessing his condition and setting up an 
adequate course of treatment for his health issues. This obligation pertains all the more to the 
assistance of prisoners with a physical disability. 
Another implication of vulnerability in the Court’s case law is that the margin of appreciation of 
the state with regard to the vulnerable subject is narrowed. In several cases, the Court has 
held that the margin of appreciation afforded to the State is narrow when the restriction on 
fundamental rights applies to a vulnerable person. 
Concerning the implication for the admissibility of the case, in Tokić and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), the applicants were charged with several criminal offences. They were all found 
not guilty due to insanity and ordered to be detained in the psychiatric wing of a prison. The 
case concerned the applicants’ complaint about the unlawfulness of their detention in that 
institution. One of the applicants, Mr Alibašić, had failed to go to the Constitutional Court, and 
therefore had not exhausted all domestic remedies. Nevertheless, the Court held that Mr 
Alibašić’s vulnerable position and the fact that the Constitutional Court had already ruled in a 
similar case made his complaints admissible. 
A second procedural implication of vulnerability is the reversal of the burden of proof from the 
applicant onto the authorities.  The most significant reversal of the burden of proof occurs in 
cases concerning detention. In these cases, the Court has found that – due to the vulnerable 
position of detained persons – the state is required to provide an explanation if the person were 
to be harmed while in detention and has used this principle consistently in its case law on 
overcrowding and prison conditions. 
All of these examples make it clear that the Court adopt a notion of vulnerability strictly rooted 
in the concept of physical suffrance and bodily harm: the Court considers prisoners vulnerable 
because they are under the control of the state and therefore their physical well-being depends 
on the state. As noted by Timmer, this notion of vulnerability is too narrow and limited324 to 
issues arising under Article 3 concerning physical state control, underestimating the issue of 
political and legal vulnerability of prisoners. The paradigmatic example is the Scoppola v. Italy 
(no 3), in which the Court held that disenfranchising certain prisoners for life pursues “the 
legitimate aims of enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law and ensuring 
the proper functioning and preservation of the democratic regime325”.  
The same consideration could apply with respect to legal vulnerability of prisoners, considered 
on a case by case perspective, but starting from the consideration that the essence of 
imprisonment is not only state control in physical well-being, but also the level of dependence 
and subjection from state authority and control in the area of personal autonomy, access to 
information and legal information in particular,  contacts with the outside world, specifically 
concerning contact with lawyers or legal assistants. The legal vulnerability of prisoners should 
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be assessed according to an analysis of the prison context and the specific condition of 
deprivation of liberty. 
In this perspective, a potentially exportable reasoning is presented by the Court in the case 
Aden Ahmat v. Malta of 23 July 2013 (n. 55352/12). The Court consider the specific vulnerable 
position of the applicant: “not only because of the fact that she was an irregular immigrant and 
because of her specific past and her personal emotional circumstances (see also M.S.S., cited 
above, § 232), but also because of her fragile health” and finds a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention, also affirming that the absence of a structured system of legal aid posed in itself 
a problem in terms of access to remedy, regardless of the merits thereof (§66):  
The Court is struck by the apparent lack of a proper structured system enabling immigration detainees 
to have concrete access to effective legal aid. Indeed, the fact that the Government were able to 
supply only one example of an immigration detainee making use of legal aid (moreover, in different 
and more favourable conditions than those of boat people) despite the hundreds of immigrants who 
reach the Maltese shores each year and are subsequently detained, and who often have no means 
of subsistence, only highlights this deficiency. 
The Court is linking directly the condition of vulnerability of “boat people” to the reinforced 
positive obligation for states to provide a proper and structured system of “concrete access to 
legal aid”.  
This findings are likely to be transposed to disputes regarding the prison system, in view of the 
specific, contextual vulnerability of persons deprived of their liberty.  
The vulnerability-oriented reasoning should be paired with the principle of effectiveness in 
order to understand how to better secure access to justice for marginalized and socially 
excluded persons, in order to guarantee the protection of their fundamental conventional rights. 
As Tulkens puts it: 
Without equal access to justice, persons living in poverty are unable to claim their rights, or challenge 
crimes, abuses or violations committed against them, trapping them in a cycle of impunity, deprivation 
and exclusion. Moreover, the relationship between poverty and obstructed access to justice is a 
vicious circle: the inability of the poor to pursue justice remedies through existing systems increases 
their vulnerability to poverty and violations of their rights, while their increased vulnerability and 
exclusion further hampers their ability to use justice systems326.  
 
This brief overview can be a useful tool in order to substantiate a line of reasoning concerning 
legal vulnerability in access to justice for European prisoners. The litigation in this field should 
keep into consideration the special  
3.4 THE IMPACT OF AUSTERITY POLICIES ON THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
FOR DETAINEES. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONFRONTED WITH THE “HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC 
CRISIS”.  
The economic crisis that Europe and the world have experienced in recent years has caused 
challenges for the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. The negative effects of austerity 
policies on fundamental rights protection have been monitored and denounced by several 
European institutions.  
On the “State of democracy, human rights and rule of law” report (April 2014), Secretay 
General M. Thorbjørn Jagland declared: « Les droits des personnes sont menacés par l'impact 
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de la crise économique et les inégalités croissantes. Les sociétés européennes ont souffert 
des effets de la récente crise économique, qui a profondément affecté la cohésion sociale 
dans de nombreux États membres et qui pourrait menacer à la fois l'État de droit et la 
démocratie »327.  
These concerns are shared by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
European Agency for Fundamental Rights328. The Commissioner for Human Rights stressed 
that vulnerable and marginalized groups are hit hardest, especially in terms of access to 
justice. In his recommendations to Member States, the Commissioner called on Governments 
to "guarantee access to justice for all", in order to ensure the equal and effective enjoyment of 
all human rights - civil, political, economic, social and cultural - in times of economic crisis and 
austerity. Council of Europe member states have been invited to "ensure effective access to 
justice despite economic difficulties, by ensuring proper functioning of the judicial system, the 
legal aid system and complaint mechanisms that are easy to reach (..). Particular care should 
be taken in providing assistance and legal assistance to disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups so that they can express their grievances ". Prisoners are considered particularly 
vulnerable in times of economic crisis when they often came from difficult socio-economic 
context and often lack financial and cultural conditions 329.   
 
The crisis negative impact on detainees rights has been highlighted by Mr Dean Spielmann, 
former President of the European Court of Human Rights, in his speech at the opening of the 
colloquium: “Implementing the European Convention on Human Rights in times of economic 
crisis” in January 2013. Juge Spielmann stated that: “It must be said that those most affected 
by the crisis are the vulnerable, for example prisoners (and in difficult times many people 
clearly find it hard to accept high expenditure on prison renovation)”330. 
 
In this context, the ECtHR had to discuss about the “human consequences of the economic 
crisis”331.  
The Court adopted a twofold attitude: on the one hand the Court, invoking the principle of 
subsidiarity, adopts a self-limitation when addressing major economic decisions, on the other 
hand the Court shows intransigence when it comes to preserving the core Convention rights: 
namely non-waivable rights and principles related to the concept and values of the rule of law, 
like the right to a fair trial.   
The self-limitation approach has been adopted in the context of legislative measures affecting 
salaries and pensions.   
In view of the wide margin of appreciation of States in the field of economic and social policies, 
the Court has, in its case-law, given precedence to state reasons for the fundamental rights 
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affected by such measures. Often the economic parameters and the crisis context have 
become the strong points of the Court's argument. In Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece case, 
concerning a whole series of reductions in salaries, pensions and other benefits following the 
austerity measures adopted in 2010-2011, the Court declared the applications inadmissible in 
view of the wide margin of appreciation in regulating their social policy and taking into account 
that measures pursue a legitimate aim “in the public interest”and also coincided with those of 
the euro area Member States, in view of the requirement under European Union legislation to 
ensure budgetary discipline and preserve the stability of the euro area.332 This decision has 
been  followed in several occasions, for example in cases concerning austerity measures in 
Portugal (Da Conceiçao Mateus and Santos Januario v. Portugal333 ; Da Silva Carvalho Rico 
v. Portugal334), in Lithuania (Savickas v. Lithuania) and Italy (Aielli and Arboit v. Italy335).   
In all these cases, the context of crisis coupled with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
alone justified the finding of no violation or the rejection of the applications as manifestly ill-
founded and the closure of the examination at the admissibility stage without a decision in the 
merits. Only sparingly and in very exceptional situations the Court intervenes in the choice of 
priorities and of major economic measures finding a violation of the Convention in the context 
of austerity measures. For example, in N.K.M. v. Hungary case he Court found a violation of 
the right to the enjoyment of possessions in the context of austerity measure. It concerned a 
severance payment of which a portion had been taxed at 98%.  As well, in Belane Nagy v. 
Hungary, concerning loss of disability benefits due to newly introduced eligibility criteria, the 
Court found that the disputed measure failed to strike a fair balance between the interests at 
stake, there was no reasonable relation of proportionality between the aim pursued and the 
means applied and found a violation of Article 6.  
By contrast, the Court shows intransigence when it comes to preserving the essence of the 
Convention, and primarily the non-waivable rights, severely affected by economic crisis.  
Although several European states were already seriously concerned about prison 
overcrowding before the economic crisis, the latter aggravated it in some countries, in 
particular because of staff reductions and the lack of resources to improve conditions of 
detention. 
The absolute nature of those rights requires a strong position of the Court, which, in turn, 
requires States to organize their penal system in a manner that ensured respect for the dignity 
of detainees, “regardless of financial or logistical difficulties”336. 
While recognizing that prisons generally require the mobilization of significant financial 
resources, the Court has often emphasized in its case-law that lack of financial resources 
cannot justify detention conditions that are incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. 
Following this approach, the Court has adopted several pilot and quasi-pilot judgments 
concerning conditions of detention337 and has imposed on States a sort of ‘obligation of result’, 
to ensure that in all circumstances the conditions of detention continue to meet the 
requirements of Article 3, even if that means changing penal policy and mobilizing financial 
resources.  
While these cases have led to a major reorganization of the national penitentiary systems and 
have led to the establishment of a domestic system of preventive and compensatory remedies, 
the accessibility and effectiveness of such remedies has been approached in a rather artificial 
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manner. In its case-law, the Court has drawn attention to the requirements of prompt and 
effective redress.338 
However, the effectiveness dimension of such remedies has not been taken into account in 
the Court reasoning, which does not duly consider the difficulties linked to prison and to 
prisoners’ special vulnerability. Effective access to internal remedy can be very problematic 
whereas prisoners are often deprived of economic means to seek the assistance of a lawyer 
and taking into account the lack access to legal information in order to lodge a valid application.  
The Court substantialist approach, adopted in Airey and placed at the heart of the doctrine of 
effectiveness, is replaced here by a rather formalistic and artificial approach without adequate 
account of the penitentiary context. This dimension is not taken into account in pilot judgment 
concerning prison overcrowding.  
It should be considered that although the Court has not pronounced itself on access to legal 
aid in order to complain about the violation of Article 3 resulting from poor conditions of 
detention, the question has not been explicitly submitted before the Court. Short-sightedness 
of the Court, but also a question not really exploited by prison litigations before the European 
Court.  
  
It should be pointed out that, even in proceedings before the Court, the right to legal assistance 
and legal aid is relatively weakly protected. Legal aid is granted to applicants only in cases 
involving complex questions of fact and law and not in cases of a repetitive nature. The 
Convention system, founded on the right of individual application339, has been conceived in 
such a way as to enable any person to bring an action before the Court in order to complain of 
a violation of his or her fundamental rights, regardless of the assistance of a lawyer 
 
The idea underlying this concept was to promote access for vulnerable people, such as 
detainees, to the Court. The absence of fees, the possibility of seizing the Court without the 
representation of a lawyer and the almost complete absence of formalities for lodging an 
application ensured accessibility for all, including most vulnerable people.  
The evolution of Court and its working methods have, however, progressively imposed stricter 
and stricter formal criteria on the applicants, both in terms of administrative requirements, 
arising from rule 47 modifications340, and of admissibility criteria.  
Rule 47 requires that an application shall be made on the application form provided by the 
Registry and it shall contain all of the information requested in the relevant parts of the 
application form. Failure to comply with the rule 47 requirements result in the application not 
being examined by the Court.  The introduction of a new admissibility criterion341 and the 
stricter application of pre-existing ones make it much more difficult and technically complex to 
lodge a valid application before the Court. Statistics fully confirm this difficulty and show that 
approximately 90% of the applications are declared inadmissible. 
This evolution has not been accompanied by an in-depth reflection on the effective access to 
the Court of vulnerable and marginalized people. While exceptions to Article 47 are admissible 
(Article 47 § 5) and detention constitutes, in practice, a condition which may justify such an 
exception, that doesn’t seem sufficient in order to avoid the rejection of the application.  
Given the complexity and the technical requirements of the proceedings before the Court, the 
presence of a specialized lawyer becomes an essential condition for overcoming the 
admissibility stage and obtaining an examination on the merits. Such findings require the Court 
to proceed to a new interpretation in terms of effective access to its own judicial protection 
system and effective protection of fundamental rights for vulnerable and marginalized persons, 
including the right to individual application, cornerstone of the Convention system.  
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